

A
VIEW of the EVIDENCE
RELATIVE TO THE
~~CONDUCT~~ OF THE ~~WAR~~
AMERICAN WAR

UNDER
SIR WILLIAM HOWE,
LORD VISCOUNT HOWE,
AND
GENERAL BURGOYNE;
AS GIVEN BEFORE A
COMMITTEE of the HOUSE of COMMONS
Last Session of PARLIAMENT.

To which is added
A COLLECTION
OF THE CELEBRATED
FUGITIVE PIECES
That are said to have given rise to that
Important Enquiry.


The SECOND EDITION.

Collecta revirescunt.

L O N D O N.

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THE failure of success in the American war having deeply engaged the Public attention, the following collection has been made of the Evidence given at the bar of the House of Commons, of the charges in and out of Parliament that are said to have given rise to the Enquiry into the Conduct of the War, and of the strictures that have occasionally been made during the course of that Enquiry, in order to lay before the public a comprehensive view of that most important Question. The Fugitive Pieces will be found to bear hard upon the Commanders in Chief, which should not be attributed to any partiality in the Collector, but to the nature of the subject; as almost every Essay that has appeared in the Public Prints, containing either **REASONING** or **FACTS**, has been a severe censure on the conduct of the War.

In this Edition the substance of all the material parts of Mr. Galloway's Evidence is accurately given,



Lord Howe in a speech April 29th, gave the following reasons for demanding an Enquiry. " His conduct and his Brother's had been arraigned " in Pamphlets and in News Papers, written by persons in high credit and " confidence with Ministers; by several Members of that House, in that " House, in the face of the Nation; by some of great credit and respect in " their public characters, known to be countenanced by administration; " and that one of them in particular, (Governor Johnstone) had made the " most direct and specific charges." The Pieces alluded to by his Lordship are inserted, to give the Reader a full view of the subject.

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General

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FUGITIVE PIECES that are said to have GIVEN RISE to the
ENQUIRY into the CONDUCT of the AMERICAN WAR.

LETTER from BOSTON, July 6th, 1775. Rebel plan to cut off the army discovered; battle of Concord; our wounded scalped, ears cut off, and eyes put out by the rebels; description of the rebel redoubt and lines on Bunkers Hill; General Howe's plan of attack; attack of the grass fence on our right; light infantry and Grenadiers mostly cut off; Pigot staggered on our left; redoubt at last carried; account of Warren the rebel commander; the rebels might have been dislodged, or taken, or blown to pieces, or their works stormed with a tenth of the loss; Clinton saved us; the amours of an artillery officer the cause of the artillery blunder; excellency of Gen. Gage's intelligence, but no use made of it; brave men's lives wantonly thrown away.

LETTER from NEW YORK, March 9th, 1777. Opinions on General Gage and General Howe; real character of Howe; Boston evacuated by a secret capitulation; our not possessing the heights of Dorchester the cause of our flight; immense quantity of woollens and linens left the rebels; General Sullivan's odd scheme; not securing the harbour loses us 700 men; at Brooklyn the rebel army escape; a strong instance of the rebels dismay and trepidation; Lord Howe lets the rebels escape by sea; why the rebellion continues; profusion of the Sultana and her husband.

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LETTERS from NEW YORK. Burgoyne's ruin imputed to the Howe's; military division of America; voyage to Chespeak confirms the rebellion; sacrifices the Canada army; Mufgrave saves Howe's army when surprised; General Howe's indifference on Burgoyne's disaster; curious anecdotes of Tryon; reasons why our native troops are superior to foreigners; North River and Lakes the Key of America; Howe confounded; fettered to Philadelphia; rebels will keep Burgoyne; resentment of the army on shipping them for the southward; Howe's conquests 1777 about 5 miles by 2; army opinion of Howe; his plan proved his own by his letters; general despondence on his going southward; lamented for the torture he must feel on the honours and glory he has lost; rebels ridicule him for deserting Burgoyne; character of Lord Howe; his strange reply to the refugees; an excellent moral character; vanity of Tryon; gaming and the ladies; if independency granted, we lose Newfoundland and the West India islands; the danger to all maritime states; to Britain in particular; exertion and conquest, or ruin and contempt.

MATTER of FACT. Faction at home tutors the Congress; misconduct in allowing the rebels to escape at Long Island, New York, White Plains, and Jerseys; our astonishment suffers no rest; Gen. Howe retreats from Jersey without recovering his honour; the people should never be deceived; gaming a pernicious example in a General; loyalists plundered; curious fact of General de Heister; of a British military genius; Albany defenceless; frigates can go within 12 miles of it; disadvantage of the southern voyage; battle of Germantown; success certain had we attacked at White Marsh, or remained in the rebel rear only two days; on a change of commanders; absurdity of the southern expedition; folly of occupying Philadelphia; the Gen. at his wits end; offers terms disgraceful to us; his negotiator imprisoned; oppression

pression of Commissaries; character of a military Governor; an indolent dissipated General; a licentious army; indulgence to favourites.

OBSERVATIONS on SIR ANDREW SNAPE HAMMOND'S EVIDENCE. Partiality of his evidence; the Chesapeake voyage Sir Andrew's own advice; two months lost by it; the supposed danger in the Delaware refuted; proofs given from Sir Andrew's own actions; Red Bank fortified before the General's face; rebels allowed to finish it; then it is attacked and 400 of our men killed, &c. and two men of war and 100 seamen destroyed.

GOVERNOR JOHNSTONE'S SPEECH. Lord Howe reinforced with two 64 gun ships; did not collect his force though he had two month's notice; d'Estaing could not have succeeded on the Delaware; Admiral Barrington given as a noble example; on two Admirals; they are too high for the State; naval virtue spirit and abilities enough to repel our enemies if these two were no more; his Lordship fulsomely flattered; list of both fleets; proofs that Lord Howe did not think himself too weak; an English 50 beats a French 74; he trifles away eight days when superior, and d'Estaing lying dismasted within 20 leagues of him; method of bringing frigates into a general action; English 64 and 50 equal to a French 74 and 64; recent gallant examples in Captains Rayner and Reynolds; had Lord Howe fought he would have beaten d'Estaing.

ENQUIRY into SIR WILLIAM HOWE'S CONDUCT. Strong proofs that both King and Minister, by the most flattering attentions, and unasked honours, did every thing that could be done to keep him in good humour, and engage him to do his duty; his ridiculous speech that the Minister ought to have vindicated him against the public censure; very convenient for themselves if they had such a power; has lost us Burgoyne's army and brought on the French war; General Howe's ill founded promises; Minister justified from Howe and Burgoyne's letters; Howe's letter expressing his amazement at the masterly strokes and vigorous conduct of the Minister for America; 1776 General Howe 30,000, Washington only 16,000; his written and verbal excuses refuted; neglects Boston harbour; has left the rebellion stronger than he found it.

STRICTURES on G. HOWE'S MISCHIANZA or TRIUMPH on leaving AMERICA UNCONQUERED, with his CHARACTER from the AMERICAN CRISIS published by the CONGRESS. A series of ill conduct and disgraces, for which crowned with laurels never won; his romantic triumph, not after victories, but after Thirteen Provinces wretchedly lost.

ÆMILIUS SCAURUS on the CANADA ARMY. Quantity of artillery and choice of the route retarded the army; General Burgoyne's reasons insufficient; his letters and evidence in opposition; army halts a month; rebels weak in August; ingenuity in vindicating misconduct; Bennington; General Frazer against it; General Burgoyne's reply; first mistake; then a second; both parties retreat; the German cannon not taken by the rebels for four days; new mode of justification.

REVIEW of the WAR. Effrontery and malignity of public delinquents; loss at Bunkers hill by despising situation; secret history of the capitulation at Boston; 100 cannon, 100 ships, and two years supply of linens and woollens abandoned; Howe wishes to be attacked; is attacked and flies; receives mortifying dispatches in his flight; curious opinions of General Howe and Admiral Graves for and against reinforcing Quebec; conduct and character of Lord and General Howe; interesting military particulars of Brooklyn battle; Gen Robertson palliates General Howe's conduct; our odd situation on Frog's Neck; ridiculous obstinacy; Clergyman murdered; our defeat at Trenton; dead Rhall blamed; the evidence dead Donop; General Howe nearly taken prisoner; General Vaughan not for nursing a rebellion; gloom and resentment of the army on shipping them to the southward; despondence and execration at New York on deserting Burgoyne; the army in fetters at Philadelphia; the Brandywine manœuvres from Saxe's Reveries; Saxe's opinion of Generals who neglect decisive opportunities; individuals from the army reach Philadelphia the night of the battle; our army only in 15 days; hears of Burgoyne's ruin; instantly retreats and writes to be recalled; enumeration of our losses; a radical weakness in the constitution of the state or in the minds of the people.

EVIDENCE

RESPECTING THE

American War, &c.

IN the following evidence the questions are mostly omitted, as they would extend this work to a great bulk; yet whenever it is requisite for the more clearly understanding the answers, they are inserted.

May 6th, 1779.

Committee of the HOUSE of COMMONS to examine into the conduct of Sir William Howe, Lord Howe, and General Burgoyne,

FREDERICK MONTAGUE, Esq; in the Chair.

EARL CORNWALLIS.

Examined by Sir William Howe.

I am happy to take this public opportunity to declare my great L. C's high regard and veneration for the character of Sir William Howe, I rather of G. H. think he has deserved greatly of his country; I think he has served his country with fidelity, assiduity, and with great ability. After having given this public testimony of my opinion of the General's conduct, I beg this House will understand that I do not come here to answer questions of opinion, but merely questions of matter of fact; the private opinions of a subordinate officer can give very little satisfaction to this House; they may possibly not do justice to the character of the honourable General, or my own. I therefore trust in the candour of this House, that they will put no questions to me, but such as relate to matter of fact. Will not answer
quest. of opinion.

The knowledge of the face of the country of America, for America in a military view. military view.
inhabitants.

The country in general so covered with wood, and so favourable

B

able

able to ambuscades, that but an imperfect knowledge of it can be obtained from reconnoitering.

I never saw a stronger country, or one better calculated for the defensive.

The movements of the King's army much embarrassed and retarded by the difficulty of getting provisions when in the field, and from the closeness of the country.

On the left at the bat. of Brooklyn 27th August 1776 with any accuracy; I was on the left with the second battalion of grenadiers, and could form no judgment.

I never did hear it suggested by any one that those lines could have been carried by assault.

It was universally supposed that the enemy's principal strength was at that time on York Island.

I do not know that any time was lost in making preparations for the landing on York Island: the preparations were of a complicated nature, and depended, in some degree, on the naval department.

No delay in the motions of the army. I did observe no avoidable delay, prior to the movement of the army from York Island; and from the particular employment I had at that time in superintending the works thrown up for the defensive army that was to remain on York Island, I think there was no avoidable delay.

Will not discover G. H.'s reasons for not attacking the rebels at White Plains. I was acquainted with Sir William Howe's reasons for not attacking the enemy's entrenchments at White Plains on the 28th October, after the defeat of the corps on the enemy's right.

From political motives it is impossible either for the General or myself to explain those reasons. If they could be explained to the House, it must appear evidently that the attack was impossible.

The country in the rear of the enemy did appear very strong.

I am on the present occasion free to say, that I could not have pursued the enemy from Brunswick with any prospect of material advantage, or without greatly distressing the troops under my command.

Delaware not fordable and no boats to pass. The night that the General arrived at Trenton, he detached me with a considerable corps of troops from Maidenhead to Corriell's Ferry, where we had some hopes, from previous measures taken by the General, that we should have found boats to cross the river; our expectations were disappointed, and we found no boats.

As the Delaware was not fordable, and we could get no boats, it was certainly impracticable to cross at that time.

Advise taking post at Trenton. As I believe that I was the person that first suggested the idea to the General of taking Trenton and Burdenton into the chain of his cantonments, I think myself in honour bound to answer for it. The advantage that must naturally arise from holding so large a part of the Jerseys, the great encouragement we met with

with from the inhabitants, *three or four hundred of whom came* Near 4000 take in and took the oaths *every day for at least ten days*, the great the oaths. advantage we should derive from obtaining forage and provisions, made me think it adviseable to risk that extended cantonment. Human prudence could not foresee the fatal event of the surrender of Colonel Rhall's brigade. I apprehended no danger, but the chance of having our quarters beat up in the winter, and the object in my opinion, towards finishing the war, was of greater consequence than two or three victories. In regard to what the General mentions of posting the Hessians on the left of the cantonments, I must say, I ever had, and still have the highest opinion of those brave troops. The misfortune at Trenton was owing entirely to the imprudence and negligence of the commanding officer; on all other occasions the troops ever have behaved, and I dare say ever will behave, with the greatest courage and intrepidity. The behaviour on the attack of Fort Washington of this very brigade of Colonel Rhall's, was the admiration of the whole army. Negligence of Rhall cause of the defeat.

Sir William Howe, in the beginning of the campaign 1777, took great pains to inform himself of the situation of the enemy's camp at Middle Brook, and the intelligence he received was by no means encouraging.

There were certainly many solid reasons against attempting the passage of the Delaware through Jersey at that time.

I did not observe any unnecessary delay in moving the army from the Jerseys, for the embarkation from Staten Island.

I think we embarked three or four days after we arrived, and we could not have embarked sooner.

As any reference to any private conferences or consultations that I was honoured with by Sir William Howe, may involve me in matters of great intricacy, I must decline giving any evidence to this house concerning it. Will not state his consultations with G. Howe.

Q. Did not the expedition to Pennsylvania prove a powerful diversion in favour of the Northern army.

A. I likewise apprehend that to be a matter of opinion, and decline answering it. Nor say moving to Penn. a diversion in favour of Burgoyne.

Q. Whether the rebel main army did not march into Pennsylvania to oppose the corps on that service?

A. I apprehend the main army did; that is, the army commanded by General Washington, and it was understood the greatest part, if not the whole, did.

I recollect hearing that a body of about two thousand men marched from the high lands under the command of the rebel general Maxwell, to reinforce General Washington's army immediately after the battle of Brandywine.

The manœuvre that brought on the action at Brandywine, certainly reflects the highest honour on the General; as I have already refused to inform this House whether I concurred in His concurrence at the Brandywine.

other operations, I have no right to take any merit from concurring in this.

The Schuylkill is not fordable by the Derby route; and as we understood that the bridge was broke, it would not have been very easy to have passed there.

C. Donop's desire to distinguish himself. Soon after the army landed at the head of the Elke, Colonel Donop wrote to me to desire me to represent to the General that he thought he had not been sufficiently considered, that he had no separate command, and consequently had no opportunity of distinguishing himself: Sir William Howe then, I think, directed me to assure him, that he would take the first opportunity of giving him a suitable separate command.

His orders discretionary. I had the honour of communicating to Colonel Donop, Sir William Howe's orders for the attack of Red Bank, and they were entirely discretionary.

Colonel Donop appeared to me perfectly satisfied with his orders, and much pleased with his command.

I never heard Lieutenant General Knyphausen was dissatisfied with the orders given to Colonel Donop.

Colonel Stirling, who crossed the Delaware at Chester with three battalions, to take possession of Billingsport, was directed by the General to make his report to me at Philadelphia; he represented to me that he could not proceed to Red Bank without a considerable reinforcement.

Rains retard attack on Mud Island. We were much retarded in the attack of the fort on Mud Island by an extraordinary storm of rain, which broke down the dykes, and did great damage to the works.

Q. Does your Lordship recollect any instance of Sir William Howe's omitting any opportunity of attacking the enemy when it could be done with a reasonable prospect of advantage, considering all respective situations and circumstances at the time?

Clears G. H. of any omissions. A. I have already, and I hope very fully, declared to this House the high opinion I entertained of that honourable gentleman; I should not have entertained that opinion of him, if he had been guilty of any such omissions.

Examined by Lord Howe.

Great character of Lord Howe. When I mentioned that the operation of landing on York Island depended in a great measure on the naval department, I did not I am sure mean to hint, that there was any unnecessary delay in that department; I can with truth assure the House, that during the whole time that that noble Lord commanded the naval department in America, as well whilst Sir William Howe commanded the army as afterwards, the troops met with all possible assistance and co-operation from the navy, and that the greatest harmony subsisted between them, and that that noble Lord's character cannot be more revered by the seamen, than it is by the soldiers of the American army. The reason for

for my having mentioned the naval department before, was, that I was not a competent judge.

Examined by other members of the Committee.

Q. Were the lines at Brooklyn, after General Clinton had turned the left of the enemy, and got into their rear, and was advancing to the enemy's lines, were they manned, or was the enemy retiring from them?

A. As I was not with Sir Henry Clinton, I cannot answer that question. I never heard that the enemy were retiring. At Brookl. never heard the enemy were retiring.

Q. Was there a possibility of getting behind the enemies lines without forcing them?

A. Undoubtedly not.

I do not know whether the enemy's lines at Brooklyn were complete; I have already said I did not see them during the action. I was detached to Newtown, and had no opportunity of going to Brooklyn till the lines were nearly demolished.

I cannot tell the strength of the enemies lines as to numbers. 6 or 8000 of the enemy at battle of Brooklyn. It was reported they had six or eight thousand men on Long Island.

I really do not know the principal strength of the enemy on York Island more than common report.

Q. In what respect would the pursuit of the enemy from Brunswick have distressed the troops under your command?

A. We arrived at Brunswick the night of the first of December: we had marched that day twenty miles through exceeding bad roads: we subsisted only on the flour we found in the country: and, as the troops had been constantly marching ever since their first entry into the Jerseys, they had no time to bake their flour: the artillery horses and baggage horses of the army were quite tired: that sufficiently proves we were not in a good condition to undertake a long march. The bridge over the Rariton was broken, which caused a necessary delay of one day: if the enemy could not have passed at Trenton, they might have marched down the east side of the Delaware. What I have said I believe is sufficient to prove that we could not reap any considerable advantage from such a pursuit. Reasons for discontinuing pursuit at Brunsw.

I took no notes or memorandums of troops that arrived the first day at Brunswick. I think two battalions of the light infantry, two battalions of British grenadiers, three battalions of Hessian grenadiers, and I believe the forty second and thirty third regiments, but I am not quite clear. The fourth brigade under General Grant were halted at Bonham Town, about seven miles in our rear. There were likewise two companies of Hessian Yagers, and the sixteenth regiment of light dragoons. I do remember Colonel Griffin, an Adjutant General of the rebel army met me on the march, and I was unwilling he should see the troops as they were so few. L. Cornw. corps 9 battalions.

Q. Were

Could have gone
on before the 6th

Q. Were the troops under the command of your Lordship in a condition to have marched forward before the sixth?

A. The troops would have been so undoubtedly.

Q. At what hour on the seventh did the King's troops reach Prince Town?

A. The left column came an hour before sunset, the second column between nine and ten at night.

I understand, I cannot speak with certainty, that a detachment of the enemy quitted Prince Town that morning, what time I do not know.

Enemy no artill-
ery or baggage.

I do not know what the number of the enemy was; they were represented to us to be without artillery or baggage. The number of the King's troops I do not recollect, it may easily be ascertained if material.

I cannot speak as to the enemy's rear guard passing the Delaware on the 8th; they kept a small detachment in Trenton till our troops got near it. I do not apprehend the enemy's rear guard was in any danger from our troops that day.

Q. What was the impediment to pursuing the march from Brunswick, as your Lordship says the troops were undoubtedly able before the sixth?

A. As the enemy had so much the start of us, I do not see there was any great object for the march. We wanted reinforcement in order to leave troops for the communication between Brunswick and Amboy. It was likewise necessary to pay some attention to a considerable body of troops then passing the North River under General Lee.

Knew of no pro-
mise to G. Howe
from Pennsylv.

I did not know of any offers or promises of any of the chiefs, or men of considerable interest among the rebels in Pennsylvania, made to General Howe on or about the 20th December 1776, for furnishing him with any aid or assistance, in case of his entering Pennsylvania with his army.

No friendly dis-
position there to
Great Britain.

I knew of no circumstances existing on or about the 20th December 1776, which could warrant a confidence of a peaceable or friendly disposition in any very considerable part of the Pennsylvanians towards Great Britain.

I can only say that America is a very strong country, very rugged, very hilly, and very woody.

This description not equally applicable to all parts of the country in which I have served, but in some degree to all.

I had very little opportunity of knowing any thing about the raising the provincial troops.

Sound 1000 or
1200 yards wide

I believe the breadth of the sound between Long Island and New York was about a thousand or twelve hundred yards. I can speak with no accuracy.

The army was encamped a little out of cannon shot of the lines after the action. I know of no place where they could have

have taken post so as to discern what was passing at Brooklyn Ferry.

Q. Has your Lordship not heard as a fact, that Sir Henry Clinton declared that he did not believe such a movement as Sir William Howe's carrying the army southward *possible*, and that he took the communication of it, when made to him, as a feint to cover some design either to the eastward or up the North River. Asked if Sir H.C. was not against the Pennf. exped.

A. I never heard that Sir William Howe asked any public opinion of Sir Henry Clinton, and I do not think this a proper place to repeat private conversations in. Will not give priv. conversat.

I have been twice up and down the Delaware, but both times in the night.

The army was well supplied with provisions on the march from the head of the Elk to Philadelphia, partly by what was carried in the provision train, and partly by the cattle and flour we found in the country.

We received no provision from the Delaware till the army had reached Philadelphia.

Q. Whether the lines at Brooklyn on the left were brought down so near the water's edge as to preclude the passage of the troops between the shore and the lines, so as to come on the back of the lines?

A. I have said I know so little of the lines at Brooklyn, that I can say nothing with accuracy about them; but I believe I can with certainty say, that there was no such opening as the question supposes. No opening on the left of the rebel lines at Brooklyn.

As the order for the attack of Red Bank was given verbally, it is impossible to recollect all the words exactly. I recollect perfectly well that I began with telling Colonel Donop that Sir William Howe by no means wished him to sacrifice the troops under his command; that if he found the Red Bank could not easily be carried, that he would give notice to Sir William Howe, and that proper measures should be taken to send him reinforcements and artillery; that if he found that Red Bank could be easily carried by assault, that the General was very desirous of putting an end to that business, and wished him to *brusquer l'affaire*: I believe this was nearly what I told him, I told it to Sir William Howe the same evening. Orders to Donop not to sacrifice the troops yet to BRUSQUER L'AFFAIRE.

Q. How near were the thirty third regiment and the grenadiers to the enemies lines at Brooklyn.

A. I have already said I was on the left with the second battalion of grenadiers, and therefore cannot answer that.

Q. Whether the grenadiers and the thirty third regiment did not pursue the enemy so close to their redoubt, that it required repeated orders to prevail on them to desist from taking it by storm? Does not know grenadiers &c. were called off.

A. I have already said that I do not know. There is an honourable

nourable member present who commanded one of these battalions, he can answer it: Colonel Stuart.

A storm prevents an attack on the enemy.

After the enemy fell back to the heights near North Castle, they left an advanced corps on the heights of the White Plains; there were orders given for an attack of that corps, which was prevented by a violent rain. We did not lay upon our arms.

I do not apprehend that the attack was prevented by the storm of rain being in either of our faces; there are other effects of a storm of rain, such as spoiling the roads, and preventing the drawing the artillery up steep hills.

Q. Whether if the powder was wet on both sides, the attack might not have been made with bayonets?

A. I do not recollect that I said the powder was wet.

Q. Whether you knew before the sailing from Sandy Hook of any letter received by Sir William Howe from General Burgoyne?

G. Howe made no public communication of G. Burgoyne's letter.

A. General Howe made no public communication to me of any such letter; I include all letters privately shewn to me under the idea of conferences and consultations.

Q. Has not the war been a war of posts?

A. I apprehend the history of the war will answer that question.

On a war of posts

Q. Whether a war of posts is not tedious and expensive?

A. I apprehend this to be a general proposition, which the honourable Gentleman, as a member of this Assembly may answer as well as I.

Q. How many days provisions could the troops carry without inconvenience, each soldier on his back?

Men carry 3 or 4 days provif. on their backs.

A. We generally carried three, it might possibly be, on particular occasions, four.

Q. How many days provisions could be carried for the army in the beginning of the year 1777, by land carriage, waggons and horses only?

In waggons, 22 days rum, 6 days pork, 12 or 14 days bread.

A. I cannot answer that question with precision; we could carry more in Pensylvania, because we trusted there to find flour and cattle in the country. I think in Pensylvania we carried about twenty two days rum, about six days pork, and twelve or fourteen days bread. In the Jerseys we should have been obliged to carry a larger proportion of meat, consequently a smaller proportion of bread and rum.

Q. Whether your Lordship sees any prospect of an end to this war, with the force now employed on that service?

A. I cannot suppose the honourable Gentleman really expects that I should answer the last question.

Refuses again G. H's reasons against attacking

[Then the former part of Lord Cornwallis's evidence, in which he said, that from political motives it was impossible, either for the General or himself, to explain the reasons for an attack at the ... the 28th of October,

ber, was read; and being asked what he meant by political motives? his Lordship said, what I call political reasons relates to no orders from hence, or any thing in which English politics are concerned; perhaps the word political is not a proper one, but I do not know what word to substitute in its place.

Q. Did the Hessian infantry refuse to charge?

Did the Hessians

A. In answer to this question, I must again repeat the highest encomiums on the valour of the Hessian troops; on that particular day the regiment of Losberg, one of Colonel Rhali's brigade, greatly distinguished itself. I cannot satisfy the honourable Gentleman's curiosity, but I will venture to assure him upon my honour, that if he knew the reasons he would be perfectly satisfied.

refuse to charge.

Does not answer

the question, but

praises the Hess.

Q. In what sort of opinion, and in what sort of character did Sir William Howe stand in with the officers and soldiers of his army?

A. Sir William Howe was highly esteemed by the officers and soldiers of his army.

Gen. H. esteem'd

by the army.

Q. Do you know what reinforcements were demanded by the General for the year 1777?

A. I know nothing of any requisitions made by the General, nor of his correspondence till it came on this table.

Q. Did you stop at Brunswick from the first to the sixth in consequence of orders?

A. I understood it to be the General's directions that I should halt at Brunswick; but had I seen that I could have struck a material stroke by moving forward, I certainly should have taken upon me to have done it.

G. H's orders to

halt at Brunsw.

Q. Did you receive no orders after you arrived at Brunswick?

A. I had a constant correspondence with Sir William Howe; I reported my situation to him, and from time to time received his directions.

Q. Did you receive any reinforcement between the first and the fourth at Brunswick?

A. I think not.

Q. Was it in consequence of orders that you marched on after the halt?

A. Sir William Howe came up to join me on the sixth with the fourth brigade, and then I went on under his orders.

Gen. H. joins

him the 6th.

Q. Whether Sir William Howe consulted with you on his expedition to Philadelphia?

A. I apprehend I have given a satisfactory answer to that question in the former part of my evidence.

MAJOR-GENERAL GREY.

He was indulged with a chair, without the bar; and on the General Grey first question being put to him, said he looked upon him

C

bound

bound upon every principle of justice, to give answers to questions of opinion as well as fact.

The difficulty, danger, trouble, saw ; it was the most difficult to make war in ; it was full of hills and passes, covered with woods and intersected by numerous and rapid rivers ; that from the nature of the country, and the disposition of the inhabitants, it was impossible to obtain that degree of intelligence necessary to carry on military operations with success ; and, in short, a war there to succeed, must be a war of posts, carried on by very superior numbers, and at a very enormous expence, and with infinite trouble, hazard, and danger.

Arrived June 5, He arrived at New-York on the 5th of June, 1777, and joined the grand army in a day or two after. The campaign reasons for not open. the campaign earlier. could not be opened earlier for two reasons ; because kettles, cantines, and tents were wanting, each of which were extremely necessary, in order to preserve the health and spirits of the army ; yet such was the ardour and zeal of the troops, that even those difficulties might be got over ; but by all he could learn from his service in Germany, and elsewhere, the field could not be properly taken till the ground was covered with verdure.

The S. expedition preferable to the North River. He thought that the southern operations were much preferable to removing the seat of war to the banks of the North River, in order to co-operate with the Canada army ; his principal reasons were, that Washington would either have sent so great a force to the Highlands, as must have engaged Sir William's *whole attention*, and have prevented him from forming a junction with General Burgoyne ; or supposing that the Commander in Chief would have been able to have forced his way through the Highlands to Albany, then Washington would have been enabled to totally cut him off from his communication with New-York, and with his magazines, provisions, recruits, &c. Nay it was more than possible, it was probable, that Washington would have been able to retard his progress through the Highlands, by a proper distribution of his force, and at the same time cut off his communication with the water-side. But taking the matter as one uniform measure, on the part of Washington, that of preventing a junction, Sir William Howe must have divided his force, so as to have commanded both sides of the North River. If one bank was in possession of Washington no supplies could come up, or follow the army with safety ; and if the British force was divided, it would have been a most dangerous situation for either part ; which, in that event, would have to contend with the whole of the grand rebel army ; so that considering it in any or either light, the measure was big with hazard and danger ; and if adopted would have portended ruin ; whether the whole of the rebel army took strong posts in the Highlands ; whether it possessed itself of one bank of the river ; whether

Whether it took a position between the main army and New-York; or whether a resistance in the Highlands, and the intercepting the supplies from the water side, should be adopted as a mixed measure. Washington had one bank of the North River open to him; he might pass at King's Ferry, and take his option on either bank; and he might, whenever he pleased fall back into the cultivated country, where he could have every supply of provisions he wanted; while the British army must be obliged to depend upon the precarious supply from New-York.

The above was the substance of two hours examination. On the expedition to Pennsylvania, for the reasons already given, though not consulted by the General, he said, it was in every point of view the most eligible. The attack at Middlebrook was utterly impracticable with any prospect of advantage: the native strength of the country, the innumerable number of posts and defences which it presented, forbid any such attempt; and the making our way to Philadelphia, without giving a decisive defeat to Washington, must have been the last stage of foolhardiness.

No time was lost till the embarkation at Staten Island took place; and the only probable means of success was to land at the head of the Elk in Chesapeak, and not attempt the Delaware.

Had we landed at Newcastle in the Delaware, we would have had much more numerous difficulties to encounter with. If we landed higher, the attempt would be attended with imminent danger, nor could we have forced our way, or ventured to meet the annoyance and actual obstruction we should have met with from galleys, fire-rafts, fire-ships, from strong tides and rapid streams, which conveyed down a rapid stream, would render our whole transport fleet subject to a conflagration; besides, while the enemy, supposing we had been able to effect a landing, would lie upon our left flank, our right next the river would lie exposed to the fire of the enemy's frigates and galleys. In this route too we should have nine creeks and rapid streams to pass, every one of which we avoided by landing at Elke; and marching round the head of them.

He gave an account of the manœuvres that brought on the attack at Brandywine, which he extolled as the greatest he ever knew; and spoke to every subsequent step, which had been taken as long as the General retained his command in terms equally warm and commendatory.

From the circumstances so often repeated by him, he was of opinion, that all had been done which could be expected from the highest exertions of military skill, wisdom, and zeal for the service; and affirmed, that it was impossible for such a force to succeed in the subduing of America. It was totally unequal and inadequate to the task, and carried disappointment

Attack at Middlebrook impracticable.

Better to land in Elke than Delaware.

Imminent danger if they land in the Delaware.

Greatness of the manœuvres at Brandywine.

Military skill, wisdom and zeal of G. Howe.

ment and want of success in the very principle of it; nor did he now think the conquest of America was practicable with any force we could send. The force in 1777 and 1778, was inadequate for the effecting that purpose; the force of 1779 was likewise so. Being asked whether he thought 6000 recruits, and the troops at St. Lucia, if recalled, along with the force now under Sir Henry Clinton, would be equal? He replied not, nor any other force we could spare from the home defence, or that of our dependencies and distant possessions.

Attack at Vall. Forge impractic. An attack upon Washington at Valley Forge was impracticable; the enemy were too much in force, and too advantageously posted. The Provincials were not a contemptible enemy; they had given repeated proofs of their skill and bravery. A single defeat availed very little over such a people in such a country, almost united as they were, and a better proof need not be given than that after the defeat at Brandy-wine, drove as they were from the capital, they had the confidence to attack a victorious army, in a few days after they had lost every advantage then enjoyed by a conquering enemy.

Armies in Penns 16,000 each. He stated the force under Sir William Howe and Washington, as to veteran troops, to be nearly equal, about 16,000 each, besides the Provincial militia. Being asked by Lord North what they were respectively at the engagement in the Jerseys?

Clinton attack'd by 6000 under Lee. He replied, that the rebel force which attacked Sir Henry Clinton, was from 4 to 6000 men.

Q. What was the whole force if it had come up?

A. About 14,000; 6000 under General Lee, and 8000, the main body, under Washington, which did not engage.

SIR ANDREW SNAPE HAMMOND.

May 11th, 1779.

Sir A. S. Hammond, Capt. in the Navy, call'd in; danger of landing in the Delaware. Sir A. Snape Hammond's examination was chiefly confined to the eligibility of debarking the grand army, under Sir William Howe, in some part of the Delaware, in preference to going round by Chesapeak, and landing at the head of the Elk.

After he had been at the bar upwards of an hour, and was preparing to retire from it, Sir Richard Sutton, Mr. Eden, and Governor Johnstone, put a great number of questions to him, particularly respecting the rapidity of the tides in the Delaware, and the ability of being able to make a landing good near Newcastle, or higher up. He was clear he said, that the army must have met with very singular, if not insurmountable difficulties, in one event; and if they attempted a descent nearer to the town, the whole fleet would have been exposed to the galleys, fire-rafts, and fire-ships; which, favoured by the wind, and by the rapidity of the stream, might, in spite of the greatest efforts,

efforts to the contrary, prove the destruction of the whole fleet. He declined to answer several questions of opinion put to him, relative to the operations upon land. His examination was very favourable to Sir William Howe; and in the course of it he took frequent opportunities of paying the highest compliments to the great zeal, good conduct, and professional ability of the noble Lord his brother.

CAPTAIN MONTRESOR.

At half after seven o'clock, Capt. Montresor, who acted as chief engineer in America was called; and, as it is impossible to follow the infinity of questions that were put to him, we shall just state the particular subjects on which he was interrogated.

On the lines on Long-Island, he said, they were so very strong, that the morning they were evacuated, it was with great difficulty that he and a corporal's patrol, of six men, could get into them to view them. They were finely designed, so were all the works he saw raised by the rebels, but not judiciously executed. The works could not be taken by assault or storm; they called, from their nature, for regular approaches. It would be a forlorn hope to commit naked men to storm redoubts, without fascines, scaling ladders, &c. If they had attempted, and got possession of the intermediate part of the lines, they could not live an instant in them, so long as the redoubts on the flanks were held by the enemy. They extended in front about two thousand yards, from the swamp on the left to the water. It was asked, if the 33d regiment and grenadiers of the army, might have penetrated? he said, there was not room for a single man to pass between the end of the line and the swamp: but if the swamp had not been impassable, there would be no living for naked troops, under the fire of the redoubt. The lines were evacuated on the night of the 28th. and he discovered it at four o'clock the next morning with the patrol already mentioned. He saw the rear embarking, and several boats (four or five) passing over to York-Island. The bringing up fascines, ladders, &c. would have been the work of some hours; and if they were at hand, did not think that the lines could be taken by assault without hazarding a defeat, or at least purchasing victory very dearly, and by a great loss of lives: nor in any way, in his opinion, but by regular approaches.

Relative to Washington's position in the mountain above Quibbleton, he did not think it advisable to force his camp. He did not pretend to be a judge; but, as far as the knowledge of the particular part of the military profession he was bred to, enabled him to give an opinion, he thought the risk and danger greatly outweighed the probability of success. He had been

been to reconnoitre the rebel camp on the mountain, at two miles distance ; and though he could not particularly describe the ground, he looked upon it to be a very strong natural fortress, rendered still more so by art. The General could take no new position, to draw Washington from his camp, without manifest hazard ; the exposing of New-York, or of being cut off from his communication both with that city and the North River.

Did not know
N. River naviga-

He did not know the navigation of the North River. Washington might pass over at King's-ferry. The Highlands were impenetrable, if defended by an enemy in force. Washington could not pass at King's-ferry, if both banks were in our possession ; nor could operations be carried up the river, if the British had not possession of both banks, which would of course amount to the temporary loss of one half the army ; operations up the North River, in order to keep open the communication with the fleet and New-York, would have weakened the grand army greatly ; and the loss of one important post in the line of

Imp practicable to
penetrate from
Middlebrook or
Quibble. to Red
Bank on the De-
law. dist. 45 mil.

posts and communications might, in some events, be the loss of the whole, and the army be thereby cut off from all supplies. It was about 45 miles from Middlebrook and Quibbleton to Red-Bank : it was impracticable to penetrate that way ; and if it were not the enemy would have it in their power to take a stronger position for the defence of Philadelphia.

Red Bank well-
construct. width
of the Delaware

Red-Bank was judiciously planned, well-constructed, and the attack of it, while Washington was hanging on our rear and flanks, would force the grand army into a situation, perhaps, extremely dangerous, both respecting provisions, and being compelled to fight upon very disadvantageous terms. Mud-Island covered the environs next the river ; the Delaware was there 2600 yards wide ; 1700 from the Jersey side to Mud-Island, and 900 from the island side to the main land, on the other side. Red-Bank had been reconnoitred ; he thought, till Red-Bank was taken, it would not be adviseable to land the troops high up the river. He was not Engineer-General ; his rank was that of Captain, and he only acted without pay, in the absence of Major Dixon.

CAPTAIN ROBERT M'KENZIE.

Private Secretary to Sir William Howe.

May 18th, 1779.

Saw a letter from
G. Burgoyne to
G. Howe, re-
ceived at New-
York, July 15,
and the Answer.

He was asked whether he had ever seen a letter from General Burgoyne to Sir William Howe ?--Answered, he had seen one, dated Tinconderoga, July 2, 1777, and received July the 15th at New-York, the day but one before the grand army embarked for the southward.

Q. Whether he had seen the answer ?

A. He

A. He had; dated July the 16th from New-York.

Q. Had he seen a letter dated New-York, July the 25th, and written by Sir Henry Clinton to Sir William Howe?

A. Had seen a letter from aboard the Eagle, in the Delaware, from Sir William Howe to Sir Henry Clinton, dated July the 30th.

Produced the letters alluded to, and being asked whether they were copies or extracts?—Answered, No. 1 and 2 were originals; the letter from Sir Henry Clinton was an extract copy; and the letter from Sir William Howe was a copy. The letters, extract, and copy, delivered in at the table, and read by the Clerk.

The letter from General Burgoyne contained an account of his arrival and capture of Ticonderoga, and of his intention of proceeding on for Albany as soon as the necessary steps were taken for that purpose; referring more at large for his plan of operations to his letter from Plymouth, dated March 26, and another from Quebec, dated May the 16th.

Gen. Howe's answer was, that he was then preparing for an G. H's. Answ. expedition to the southward; that he understood that Putnam was at the head of 4000 men in the Highlands; but that he would leave direction with Sir Henry Clinton, who was to command in his absence, to give him every assistance in his power.

Sir Henry Clinton's letter to Sir William Howe contained an Gen. Clinton's account, that he understood that Washington was in the neigh- Letters. bourhood of Morris-town, in order to cover Philadelphia; that ——— in ———, an officer in the rebel army, was a great rogue, but was the more likely to be of service to him.

Sir William Howe's answer was, that he would take proper G. H's. answ. notice of his information; and desiring Sir Henry to do every thing in his power by making a diversion in the Highlands to favour the operations of General Burgoyne; and to enable him the better to perform this service, he told him he might, if he thought proper to withdraw the twelve hundred regulars stationed on Long Island, and leave the defence of it to the Provincial corps. to make a diversion in favour of G. Burgoyne.

SIR GEORGE OSBORNE.

Major-General.

He said, that on the evening before the battle of German Col. Osbornecal-Town, having the command of the grenadiers and light infantry of the guards, Sir William Howe came to him in the German-to. in-house where he was posted, and told him to move forwards and forms him when take post about half a mile towards the enemy, for that the rebels would make an attack at such an hour next morning. He he'll be attack'd posted

posted himself accordingly, and was attacked much about the hour Sir William Howe informed him.

Strongly in favour of G. H.

He went through a very long examination, in the course of which he seemed extremely favourable to the Commander in Chief, and returned very dry answers to those who interrogated him on the part of administration, particularly to Mr. Eden, Sir Richard Sutton, and Governor Johnstone. Among other very strong circumstances in Sir W. Howe's favour, he related a conversation which passed between him and Col. Donop, in which that officer told him that the General gave it to him in orders to direct Col. Rhall to raise defences, and fortify a house or houses at Trenton; that in case an attack should be made on that post by the rebels, the brigade should be able to defend themselves till reinforced from Burdenton by Colonel Donop. Donop said that Rhall had neglected to obey the orders which he had conveyed to him from the General, and that was the cause of the fatal surprize and disaster which afterwards followed.

Rhall's neglect and disobedience the cause of his defeat.

General Howe then acquainted the House, that he had closed his evidence for the present, but that he meant, should he think it necessary to bring other witnesses hereafter, to move for having them called, in order to be examined.

SIR GUY CARLETON.

Respecting General Burgoyne.

Q. Whether he thought that the Canada expedition was to be executed peremptorily for forcing the way to Albany?

Will not answer if G. Burgoyne's orders were peremptory.

A. That was a matter of opinion which he did not think himself obliged to answer.

Q. Whether he thought the train of heavy or field artillery disproportioned to the service?

A. He could not say any thing respecting that, because he was unacquainted with the service to be performed after passing Ticonderoga; but he was inclined to think that an heavy train was necessary till Ticonderoga was reduced, and put into a tenable state.

On the train of artillery.

Q. Whether the heavy train was not the same as accompanied the army, when the witness commanded the expedition in 1776?

A. He believed it was.

Q. Whether the arrangement of both trains was not formed in concert with General Phillips?

A. He believed it might within the province, but could not say what passed upon the subject, after the Generals had taken possession of Ticonderago.

Q. Did not the witness think that the field train described by the Hon. General was necessary to the effecting the operations he was charged with?

A. He

A. He could give no direct opinion, as that must have depended upon circumstances with which he professed himself entirely unacquainted.

Q. Had not Sir Guy Carleton carried on a correspondence with Lord George Germaine, respecting the conduct of the Northern expedition?

A. He would rather wish to decline giving an answer; he did not chuse to give one. Not answer if he corresponded with Lord Geo. Germaine.

Q. Were not all dispatches forwarded for the General, thro' the witness, and was not he the person to whom they were first communicated?

A. He was; but when General Burgoyne left the limits of his government, he had no more to do than to forward them.

Q. Did the witness look upon himself to have any controul or direction over the expedition?

A. So long as General Burgoyne remained in Canada he thought he certainly had.

Q. Was it the witness that collected the force, and settled the distribution, and took all the necessary measures for forwarding the expedition?

A. It was he made the necessary preparations before the arrival of the General; but afterwards, in order to expedite and forward the operations, and to save the time which might be spent in applications for fresh orders, he committed the whole management to the General himself.

Examined by Colonel Barre.

Q. Whether, if acquainted that the General was likely to meet with great difficulties from the enemy, such as being strongly posted in the line of communication, he (the witness) looked upon himself sufficiently authorised to countermand him and prevent him from proceeding?

A. If under his command he most certainly should.

Q. If the witness had learned that the enemy was in force on the frontier, &c. would he think himself warranted in suspending the operations?

A. If the rebels were in the province he should collect the whole force of the province to expel them.

Q. Not an answer: it was not to know what he would do in case of invasion within the province, but supposing that the northern army had reached the frontier of the province, and that an account of the strength of the enemy, and the difficulty of dislodging them had reached him, in that case, would he look upon himself authorised by his commission and instructions from the Secretary of State to put a stop to the expedition, or so bound to the peremptory orders under which he acted, as to permit the northern army to proceed?

A. If within the limits of his government, where he was
D compe-

competent solely to command: but after the northern army passed the frontier, most certainly the General who commanded must act upon his own judgment.

Q. But supposing that the order was peremptory to proceed, would he think he had a right to controul or depart from those peremptory orders?

A. The General's instructions and his were of equal authority. While the General remained within the limits of the province of Quebec, his own authority was defined; when the General passed them, the same authority vested in the General an equal power, which could not be controuled by any authority short of that which delegated it, namely the noble Lord who gave it. A great number of questions to the same purport were put, in which it was plain that the witness avoided all in his power (and with great dexterity) to give a direct answer.

Q. Would the witness be warranted, upon being informed before the General had passed the frontier, that there was a very formidable body of the enemy strongly posted in the line of communication with Albany, to exercise the power vested in him as Commander in Chief, within the province, to prevent the General passing the frontier, in the execution of the measures with which the General was charged, by his instructions from the Secretary of State?

Thinks the order peremptory. A. I think I would not be authorized to stop the General; I think he was bound by his instructions to carry his Majesty's orders into execution, to the utmost of his power. I think further that if I had information that there were 20,000 men strongly posted in the line of communication, I would not be warranted in countermanding the northern expedition. I do not pretend to speak to all possible circumstances. I am convinced what a delicate and trying situation a General must stand in, who is charged with the execution of a certain definite measure; and how much he must feel in his own breast between his duty and his judgment. I did not wish to evade or avoid giving an answer to the questions put to me by the Right Honourable Gentleman. I stand myself, for reasons, in a very delicate situation at this bar. I wish to decline giving any opinion. As I have been called upon for one by the Committee, I thought it my duty to comply; otherwise, I must confess, I should have rather avoided to give an answer to a question which I did not clearly understand, nor if I had, could not have given a decisive opinion. This was the substance of his answer, not the words.

A variety of other questions of less moment were afterwards put to him, such as his making a requisition for a reinforcement of 4000 men; it being complied with but in a very small part, and part of that small not arriving till late in the season; the

the greater part of the distribution of the force, for the internal defence of the province, being sent out to him by the Secretary of State ; accounts having been received, that great numbers of the inhabitants in the General's route were well affected to his Majesty, and would take up arms and join the British forces, &c.—Mr. Eden moved, that the latter part of the evidence might be expunged from the minutes, as it might materially injure the persons alluded to.

EARL of BALCARRAS.

May 27th, 1779.

General Burgoyne moved that Lord Balcarras be called in. E. of Balcarras
The following leading questions and answers are selected out of an examination of upwards of four hours.

Examined by General Burgoyne.

Q. What capacity did the noble Lord act in, or what was his post ?

A. He commanded the grenadiers and light infantry of the right wing under the late Brigadier General Frazer. Commanded the grenadiers and light infantry.

He had the honour of an intimacy, and had the confidence of that officer, being the next in command.

He always imagined that General Frazer and General Burgoyne stood upon the most friendly terms imaginable.

General Frazer was of an open, candid disposition, ready to declare his sentiments on all ordinary occasions and common occurrences ; but in matters which required secrecy no man could be more reserved, or knew better what was, or was not proper to be communicated. Gen. Frazer's character.

He never heard or learnt that General Frazer disapproved of passing Hudson's River ; on the contrary, when he was obliged to repass it early in the campaign (7th or 9th July) on account of the communication being broke with the army under General Burgoyne, he did it with apparent reluctance. Did not disapprove passing the Hudson.

His Lordship thought that the route by Skeenesborough was preferable to that of Lake George, it appearing to him to be more expeditious.

As far as he could judge from his knowledge of the country, the march by Fort Edward, Fort Anne, and Skeenesborough, and the line of communication opened thereby, in its consequences must have induced the garrison of Fort George to abandon that place, being cut off from all intercourse with the main rebel army. Lord Balcarras approves of Gen. Burgoyne's route.

He could not speak with precision ; but he believed if the army had passed Lake George, the garrison at Fort George might have eluded a surprize, and have made an effectual retreat to

the main body, in spite of every precaution of the King's forces to prevent such a retreat.

The part of the army under General Frazer did not arrive at the general rendezvous till the 9th of July, two days later than the main body under General Burgoyne.

His lordship could not recollect the express dates; but General Burgoyne said, the journal, or general orders, would fully prove the fact.

He did not think, that any further immediate advantage could be drawn from the success at Huberton, the necessary provisions, stores, &c. not being come up, so as to enable the army to make a movement forward with safety or propriety.

There was a bridge of boats thrown across Hudson's River, on which the body under the command of General Frazer passed to the western side of that river.

The bridge was broke down by a great flood, occasioned by heavy rains, &c.

General Frazer repassed it in boats, under the protection of the heavy cannon, without loss or obstruction.

Gen. Frazer did not complain of the weight of the train.

General Frazer never complained in his hearing, or to his knowledge, that the weight or the number of the artillery was disproportioned to the objects of the intended service.

The part of the army under General Frazer that had been attacked in force, must have been cut off, had they not had the protection of the heavy and field artillery, in repassing Hudson's River.

Artillery of great service.

The heavy artillery and field pieces were found, by experience, during every part of the campaign, to be of infinite service, both from the nature of the country, the works thrown up by the enemy, and the great number of lives it must have saved, in every operation where the enemy were entrenched, or had taken strong positions of art or nature.

Lord Balcarras no opinion on passing the Hudson.

He could not say whether the passing Hudson's River was or was not a proper measure. He could only speak to matters which he was entitled to judge of from his rank in the service; so far he could speak to the best of his judgment; farther than that, he wished to decline answering questions of opinion.

We must have fallen back to Ticonderoga, or have crossed Hudson's River.

At the affair at Stillwater, the rebels disputed the ground for several hours with great obstinacy; they were often obliged to give way, but they as often rallied, nor did not give up the contest till it was almost dark.

The British troops suffered greatly on that day, particularly three regiments.

Battle Oct. 7th.

He could not pretend to say whether the King's army was in a condition immediately to improve the advantages gained on

on the 19th of September, because he was not acquainted with the state of each particular corps.

He believed the troops were much fatigued, and the number on account of killed and wounded considerably decreased.

On the 7th of October the rebels marched down to attack the British entrenchments, with great steadiness and resolution, though opposed by a heavy and well directed fire of our heavy cannon and field pieces, and beat back part of the left wing. They continued to fight with great obstinacy after frequent repulses, and withdrew with remarkable order, considering the great loss they had sustained.

On the night of the 7th the whole of the King's forces evacuated their entrenchments, and took a new position at Saratoga, without any loss.

On the 8th they were greatly annoyed by the heavy artillery and rifle fire of the rebels. He was present in the General's tent when a ball passed over the table while they were at dinner. A ball passes the table during dinner.

On the 9th when the officers of certain ranks and the commanders of corps were convened, there was not a spot within the whole camp in which they could deliberate in personal safety.

When the proposition of a surrender was first made, there was no dissenting voice; the situation of the army was such as rendered it impossible to quit the camp without inevitable destruction, or to remain longer in it without being sacrificed by a constant cannonade, or falling by famine. No dissenting voice to surrender.

The General, on the first proposition made by General Gates, for the army to lay down their arms in the trenches, and surrender prisoners of war, declared in the second council, that he would sooner perish with his sword in his hand, than accede to such ignominious and disgraceful terms. Gen. Burgoyne rejects Gates's terms.

The strength of the rebels the day they passed in review in the presence of Generals Burgoyne and Phillips, seemed to amount to between twelve and fourteen thousand men. They seemed well formed, marched in silence, and had every exterior appearance of being well disciplined. Rebel force 12 or 14,000.

He understood early that a co-operation with the grand army was expected. He never heard that the army under Sir Henry Clinton was in the Highlands till the 3d of October, when that news was first communicated in general orders to the whole army. Understood a co-operation was expected.

In the consultation between the 9th and 11th, the burning of *Æsopus*, &c. was stated by the General, and a question put by him to the officers, &c. whether it would be proper to wait and delay signing the treaty, till it should be known if the detachment coming up the North River would be able to force their way to Albany; but it was thought, considering all the circumstances and uncertainty of such a co-operation, that it would be more

more advisable to accept of the convention; and this was at length unanimously determined on.

Examined by Colonel Barre,

G. Burgoyne in all situations the confidence of his army.

The General had the full confidence of his army from the day in which he was invested with the supreme command; that they were perfectly satisfied with his zeal and abilities; that as well after as before the convention, he was equally dear to them; that in all difficulties and trying situations, the General had always possessed himself; that the army approved of the General's return to Europe, as they looked upon a man who had all along shared the common dangers, afflictions, and distresses with the private sentinel, to be the fittest person to recommend them to the notice of their Sovereign; that in the distribution of promotion, which has since generally taken place, they had every reason and good ground to hope, that the representation of their Commander in Chief would strongly plead in their favour; and that, whether in England or America, General Burgoyne would have proved the best friend and most proper advocate for the officers and brave men that had served under him.

Examined by Governor Johnstone.

Cannot state the consequence of a co-operation.

His Lordship could not undertake to say what might have been the consequence of a co-operation of Sir William Howe's army up the North River. He had, it was true, given opinions in the course of his examination; yet none, he trusted, but such as clearly arose from facts, or from matters of which his rank and situation in the army entitled him to give. Farther than that he must decline. An intended co-operation was first expected, and it was not till the 3d of October that the motions of Sir Henry Clinton in the Highlands gave any certain assurance of a co-operation up the North River.

After several questions being asked by Mr. Burke, Colonel Onslow, and Sir Richard Sutton, Mr. Eden desired to know, if the officers in general approved of Sir William Howe's expedition by the way of Chesapeak. His Lordship was ordered to withdraw, on which a long debate on the point of order ensued, whether a witness of any rank or situation was justified in refusing to answer.

Lord Balcarras was called in by general consent, and on condition that he should not be pressed to answer any questions to which he might think proper to object.

His Lordship gave one general answer, that he could not speak on the propriety of measures of which he was not a witness, nor upon them farther than his rank and experience in the service enabled him to decide.

CAPTAIN

CAPTAIN MONEY.

Examined by General Burgoyne.

He acted as Deputy Quarter-master General in Canada, and Capt. Money after leaving that Province, in the absence of Lieutenant Colonel Carleton, the whole service devolved on him.

From his rank and general connection in the service, he confirmed in a more full, positive, and detailed manner, every particular movement and manoeuvre stated by the Earl of Balcarres, relative to the route by Skeenesborough; the situation of Fort George; the engagement at Fort Anne; the first and second crossing of the Hudson's River; the delay and the causes of it, previous to the battle of the 19th September; the transfer of heavy action of that day; and the infinite use the heavy artillery proved on every occasion during the campaign.

He acted as Commissary of the Horse. He had the care of the contract with the drivers of the waggons, for the horses, &c. The General had issued a specific and general order, that no Officer, under any pretence whatever, should take an horse from the use of the baggage; that the horned cattle taken on the march should be employed in the land transport of provisions; that there were seven days spent only in the repair of the road from Fort Edward to Fort Anne, and one from Fort Anne to Skeenesborough, in the whole eight: that the provision transport was effected by 180 waggons; the water transport by 400 batteaux and craft across Lake George; and the carrying place would on the whole have taken ten days or a fortnight's time more than the land transport by Skeenesborough.

After the junction of General Frazer with the detachment on the other side of Hudson's River, July the 9th, it being determined to push for Albany, the delay was in order to get a month's provisions forward. The engagement at Stillwater was a most bloody conflict; it continued from three in the afternoon till dark; the great weight of it lay on the 20th, 21st, and 62d regiments; these regiments suffered greatly, and were unfit for the line for some time; the rebels disputed the ground with great obstinacy, and uncommon resolution, and were never entirely broke till it was too dark to pursue them, in a country so naturally strong. He could not tell exactly the rank and file fit for actual service. He did not know that the 62d regiment consisted of but sixty four rank and file, and five officers fit for service; the returns would tell that; but he believed the three regiments already mentioned did not amount to three hundred men, and were of course inferior to a complete battalion. They were much stronger on the 7th of October, numbers of sick recovered, and slightly wounded, having considerably strengthened them.

He reconnoitered the right of the rebel camp in their lines, pre-

Rebel camp very strong. previous to the battle of the 7th October; there were strong entrenchments on the right, on the top of a hill, defended by cannon to a swamp adjoining, where there was a strong abbatis. Their left he had not seen.

Battle Oct. 7th. On the morning General Arnold marched out to force the British lines, he had a full view of the whole transaction; the right under Arnold moved forward to meet the British in the front of their lines, under the heaviest cannonade of artillery grape shot, and rifle fire he ever beheld, and never gave way till they met the British Grenadiers; in his whole knowledge of service, it was the heaviest he ever recollected except in the affair of Fort Anne; he was astonished, still more astonished, when he heard the fire of the enemy's musketry kept up with much vigour and constancy, after undergoing so heavy a fire of artillery, &c. as he had described. The British were not broke, but were in the act of manœuvring in some disorder, in taking

Brunswickers a new position, which they at length effected. At this instant he observed a battalion of Brunswickers, who should have sustained them, on the first fire disperse in confusion, without the loss of

run, tho' not one of them killed.

Would never come on again.

Their misbehaviour the loss of the army.

Gen. Arnold's milit. conduct.

a man, for he did not see one man killed or wounded lying on the ground which they quitted. When the British were taking the new position, he heard a cry of shame! shame! but they soon got into order. When the Brunswickers run, he did not see General Reidfel rally them, but he perceived two Aids de camp, threatening, endeavouring, &c. to bring them back to charge, but to no effect. They were, after several exertions, collected, but not in order, behind the artillery, and could never be prevailed on afterwards to come forward in the line. His being made a prisoner, he believed, was not occasioned by the flight of the Brunswick battalion, it was rather owing to the death of Sir William Clark, who had a command in the artillery, and part of the troops forward being broke, they fell back upon the artillery near where he was stationed, during which time a confusion having ensued, he had no choice left him but to fly, or remain in his proper post, as long as he saw it was his duty, abiding by the consequences. His opinion on the whole respecting the affair of the 7th of October was, that the misbehaviour of the Brunswick battalion was the cause of the loss of a victory, if not of the whole army which was the consequence of that loss.

There was an high ground on the left of the rebels and the right of the British. Had a position been taken on that high ground, and heavy artillery planted there, it would have commanded the left of the rebel lines, and they must either have fought under very great disadvantage, or have been compelled to abandon their camp. Their left would have been exposed. While he was a prisoner he learned that General Arnold made the attack on the British lines without orders from General Gates;

Gates; that knowing of this high ground, which opened to the lines already described, he was aware if that ground had been occupied by the army, the rebels would have abandoned their lines, but by bringing them forward in the manner he did, he inspired them with a confidence that they were not only able to defend themselves, but to force the enemy, entrenched and defended as they were. The Captain entered into several other details, and his examination was seemingly over, when Colonel Onslow rose and put a great variety of questions, which he answered very much in favour of the General. At length, being asked by him what opinion did the rebels conceive of the conduct of Sir William Howe? He said, he was not in the confidence of the rebel chiefs, nor did he think the opinions of a rebel peasantry were proper evidence to be received respecting the conduct of so great and able a commander.

And gallantry.

Capt. M. much in favour of G. Burgoyne.

And of Gen. H.

Governor Johnstone said, Capt. Money has given the opinion of the officers who served with him, respecting the conduct of his Commander in Chief; of the rebel officers; respecting the conduct of Mr. Arnold, &c. He has been at New York, and several other places. Asked, what, then, was the general opinion entertained of the expedition to the southward, under Sir William Howe?

Sir William objected to the question, unless the Captain was admitted to name the officers with whom he conversed.

Gen. H. objects against asking opinions on the expedition southward.

Lord North consented to wave the question, provided the witness would answer the following one: Does Capt. Money mean to infer, that the opinions of officers on military measures are not entitled to credit, or ought to carry no particular weight with them, in the course of the present enquiry?

Colonel Barre rose, and said, that most certainly if opinions were to be received generally, there could be no exception taken against any one opinion more than another, according to their intrinsic value; but if the opinion respecting Generals, of people at a distance from the scene, was to be received concerning the latter, so it ought concerning Ministers. Here the Colonel launched forth on Administration, respecting the whole of their conduct; the military conduct at home; the sending troops on impracticable services; the deceiving the commanders in their promises; their not sending out a sufficient force; their expedition to Georgia and St. Lucia, &c.

Col. Barre.

Lord North gave up the question, but complained greatly of the Hon. Gentleman's unprovoked severity.

EARL of HARRINGTON.

June 1st, 1779.

E. Harrington's strong evidence. He spoke to every material point already described, if possible, with greater strength and precision, than either Lord Balcarras or Captain Money.

After the affair at Huberton we were not immediately able to pursue our advantage; indeed he thought that we rather advanced too far, and pushed forward too soon, considering that our provision transport had not as yet come up.

Gen. B. restrains the Savages under St. Luc la Corne. The Savages were of very little use, unless the General had indulged them in massacre and plunder, and every horrid enormity and cruelty; that he determined to inflict signal punishment on the murderers of Miss Mecree, but was dissuaded from it; for two reasons; first, that it would be the loss of any future aid from the Indians, and that being provoked, on their return home, they might have marked their footsteps through Canada with blood and slaughter. He carried several messages to Mons. St. Luc la Corne, who had the direction of those savages; the last of which was, that he would much rather want their services than permit them to scalp the living, though he was obliged to connive at their scalping the dead. To induce them to forbear upon motives of interest, he even offered and gave rewards to them for the bringing in prisoners.

Delays from want of provis. The delays which took place after quitting Fort Edward were solely owing to the disaster at Bennington, for being disappointed in procuring forage, &c. from that quarter, the army was necessarily obliged to wait for the stores and provisions, before any effectual movement forward could be safely risked.

Bennington exp. The application to go on that service originated with Major-General Reidsel, which he first communicated to him (the witness.) He informed General Burgoyne of it. General Reidsel selected his own officers and troops, and fixed upon Col. Baum and Col. Breyman. If, however, the latter had arrived in time, that disaster would never have happened, so as to be productive of the consequences which afterwards followed.

Necessity of moving on to Stillwater. The army must have crossed Hudson's River, or returned as far back at least as Fort Edward, which would, in fact, amount to an abandonment of the campaign; and the movement forward, which brought on the engagement at Still-water, became necessary, no choice remaining but that measure, or a very hazardous retreat to their former position on the other side of Hudson's River.

Order of battle at Stillwater. The British grenadiers, light infantry, &c. at the action at Still-water, were on the right, under Gen. Frazer, which body was obliged to make a *détour* through the woods; the line was led by

by General Burgoyne himself, who formed it on the opening of the plain; the other wing, composed chiefly of the Germans, were on the left, and had their left flank covered by the river, but they were not up so soon as the right and centre. The weight of the engagement was sustained by the Commander in Chief, at the head of the British line, and the three following regiments, 20th, 21st, and 62d, suffered most. The ground was well disputed by the rebels, who fought with great obstinacy, and kept up a regular fire, with more or less effect, for upwards of five hours. Several attempts had been made by the General, at the head of the British line, to charge them with bayonets, but the fire on the part of the enemy was too heavy and regular to give that manœuvre the expected success. He went with several messages himself from the General to the Germans, to compleat the line early in the day, and to take certain positions, in order to favour the attack of the centre. Probably if those orders had been timely carried into execution, the victory would have been more compleat.

Gen. B. with the 20th, 21st. & 62d regts. bear the weight of the battle.

Victory incomplete from the slowness of the Germans.

The troops were not in a condition to improve the advantages of the victory the next day, nor to prevent the rebels from entrenching themselves, in less than ten days at the soonest. The three regiments already mentioned suffered greatly, as did the 9th and 24th, which composed the British line; the British light infantry and Brunswick grenadiers, under Gen. Frazer, on the right forward, amounted to about 1200, the line to about 1300. He did not know the exact loss of the three regiments, but believed it was much too great to permit them to do service in the line for some time, their numbers from the affair of the 19th being so very defective to the necessary complement of battalion.

Numb. of British

Before the army was again in a condition to proceed to further operations, the rebels were strongly intrenched; the hill on their right down to the river was full of works planted with cannon; their front was covered with a wood, and their left secured by ravines. His lordship then proceeded to give an account of the action of the 7th of October, and confirmed every particular that had been already stated relative to that affair.

Descript. of the rebel camp.

The army had the greatest confidence in their General during the whole progress of the campaign, till the surrender at Saratoga; equally so after that misfortune while in America, and to that instant. He had the honour of an intimate friendship with the late General Frazer; it amounted to what might be called confidential, and he never heard him pass the most distant degree of censure on the conduct of the campaign till his death, though he conversed with him after he received his wound, which he did not survive many hours: on the contrary, he heard him frequently, in the course of the campaign ex-

Army great confidence in Gen. B.

Gen. F's high opinion of Gen. B.

press himself in warm terms of approbation respecting General Burgoyne.

Gen. Phillips never offered to force his way back.

He never heard that Gen. Phillips made a proposition at Saratoga to endeavour to force his way back to Ticonderoga with a part of the army; but he was present when Gen. Phillips offered to hazard his own person, attended by one or two guides through the woods, in order to throw himself into that fortress, and defend it against the rebels should they think proper to attack it.

His Lordship answered two questions as follows.

1400 baggage horses to 7000 men.

Does the noble Lord think that fourteen hundred horses were not too great a number to carry the baggage, cannon, provision, stores, &c. of an army considerably under 7000 men? He does not, because he always understood, that there was a demand for more horses than could be procured.

Consequences if they abandoned their artillery.

Is it not his Lordship's opinion, that if the park of artillery and heavy field pieces had been abandoned after the action of the 7th of October, that the army thus disincumbered might have found its way back to Fort Edward?—By no means, because the heavy artillery and heavy field pieces proved its best defence, in its subsequent situation, till after the surrender; that it would be impossible to repass the ford over Hudson's River, unless protected by them; and that being surrounded on every side, if they had abandoned their cannon, that circumstance alone would have proved their destruction, as their own artillery would be employed against them.

G. Frazer mortally wounded.

We beg leave to state a circumstance relative to this engagement, mentioned by Lord Harrington, but which Capt. Money could not speak to; after the German battalion had given way on the left, General Reidfel did every thing in his power to rally them, and bring them back to the charge, but to no real effect. It was during the retreat on the right, which necessarily took place, lest from the defection on the left, that part of the army should be turned and surrounded, that the gallant General Frazer received the wound, which in a few hours proved mortal.

MAJOR BALL.

Major Ball.

He confirmed every thing material already given in evidence till the battle of Stillwater, in which he was wounded early in the day. He was peremptory in his opinions, and gave them without reserve. He said he fought in the line on that day, which was formed on the edge of the plain by the Commander in Chief; that the rebels fought with great obstinacy; that the right, commanded by General Frazer, and the centre, were formed in time; that the left, composed of the Germans, were

were not arrived in their proper station, on account of which Germans prevented a decisive victory. the left of the centre was uncovered, and the opportunity lost of turning the right of the enemy; that five or six British regiments (we forget which) engaged in the line, had suffered greatly; that the rebels disputed the ground with great obstinacy and resolution, but that being wounded early in the action, he would speak nothing as to what happened after that circumstance took place; that the troops, harrassed, fatigued, and decreased in numbers as they were, were not, in his opinion, fit the next day to improve the victory they had gained.

He underwent, as did Lord Harrington, a very long cross-examination. The questions were chiefly put by Sir Richard Sutton, and Mr. Eden; but the witnesses were stronger, if possible, in their answers, than on their examinations in chief. The cross-examination was chiefly directed to learn, whether there were not too many horses employed; whether the heavy cannon were not too numerous, and whether, in fine, the land transport was not the cause of the slowness of the movements forward.

CAPTAIN BLOOMFIELD.

of the Artillery.

After giving answers to the successive questions already stated, Capt. Bloomfield and being very fully cross-examined relative to the number of on the bat. Oct. 7. horses, carriages, &c. employed in the land transport; the number of light and heavy field pieces, the weights, callibres, &c. of the artillery park, the necessity of which he fully justified in every particular, he gave the following narrative of the battle of the 7th of October.

He said, that the 24th regiment was placed in a wood on Order of battle. his right, and the light infantry on the right of them forward in a plantation, or opening of clear ground; on his left, the battalion of Hesse-Hanau, and some other German corps. The artillery, two medium twelves, were planted on a hill, on the plantation in his front; and a little on one side 6 six-pounders. The position was therefore this; the artillery and Germans were posted on the plain; the wood on the right was lined with the 24th; in the other plantation, still further on the right, and which was divided only by the wood, the light infantry, advanced corps, &c. were posted.

In this position the army remained, when the rebel co- Rebels attack. lumn advanced into the plain. They came forward out of the woods in front, but partly on his left. On this a most heavy cannonade ensued on our part, which the rebels bore with remarkable resolution. After sustaining the shock of Repulsed by the British. this cannonade, grape shot, and rifle-fire from the troops for some

Form again and
attack the Ger-
mans who run.

Battle lost.

Some time, they fell into a wood on their own right, and after forming again, attacked the German advanced posts, who fell back in great confusion upon the main body, which afterwards communicated itself to the regiment of Hesse-Hanau, posted nearly on a line with him, upon his left. At that instant he heard a very heavy fire in the plantation, on his right, and discovered that the light infantry were broke, and were, as he heard, drove into the wood. After some further contest, he perceived that the regiment posted in the wood on his right had given way, and that the rebels had gained his right and left. In this critical instant he was wounded, and could give no account of course of what happened afterwards, further than that the artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KINGSTON.

Adjutant-General to the Canada Expedition.

June 3d, 1779.

Col. Kingston. After the Colonel had given an account of the army passing the frontier of the province of Canada, the taking of Ticonderoga, the march by Skeenesborough, the action at Huberton, and almost of every movement and position taken, previous to the expedition planned against Bennington, he produced copies and extracts of several letters, written by General Burgoyne, during those operations, to the Secretary of State, General Sir Guy Carleton, Gen. Hervey, Adjutant-General in Great-Britain, &c. in which it appeared that Gen. Burgoyne stated strong doubts that his force was inadequate; complained of the enormities committed by the savages, the little service they were of in forwarding effective operations, pressing the necessity of sending with all possible dispatch the additional companies from Canada lately arrived from England, and earnestly pressing Sir Guy Carleton, if possible, to spare a garrison for Ticonderoga, in order that the force left in that garrison might be withdrawn for the purpose of augmenting his army.

Exculpates Sir
Guy Carleton. This written evidence being read, and followed by some observations by General Burgoyne, to shew that he did not mean to fix or imply any censure on the refusal of Sir Guy Carleton, because he understood by Sir Guy's instructions from the Secretary of State, that officer did not at all look upon himself at liberty to comply with the requisition on his part now mentioned; Colonel Kingston proceeded, and gave the preference to the land transport from Skeenesborough to Fort Edward, and proved the necessity of repairing the roads, for the purpose of bringing the stores and provisions forward.

He then produced the memorandum-book of Sir Francis Clarke, first Aid-de-Camp to Gen. Burgoyne, who was killed

at the action of Beaumont's Edge, on the 7th of October. He said, he knew the memorandums therein set down, to be the deceased's hand-writing. He read several of them, stating a variety of facts, receipt of orders from the General, &c. particularly an early order (July the 12th) to forbid any of the officers being permitted to use the baggage and provision-horses belonging to the army. To shew that the time spent in the repair of the roads was absolutely necessary, for the speedy supply of the army, he stated, from Sir Francis Clarke's memorandum book, that from the 2d to the 5th or 7th of August, there was frequently not more than one days provision in store; that on the 6th, as well as he could recollect himself, there was a report made to him by the Commissary General, that there was not a supply for the ensuing day, and for that reason, the Commissary desired to take his direction, whether the right or left of the army should be served next morning, meaning the British or the Germans; but that as soon as the roads were repaired, there was a constant and full supply.

After having conducted the army up to the 12th or 13th August, he proceeded:—He said he had in his possession the plan originally framed by General Reidfel for the expedition to Bennington, with General Burgoyne's additions to, and alterations of that plan, and a copy taken that morning. The motives which induced the German General to propose the expedition were, that, on a movement to Castletown, the party employed on that expedition were informed, that the people were well affected to the British government about Connecticut river and Bennington; that a great many men might, if freed from the tyranny and power of the Congress, be induced to take arms and join us, and that great quantities of cattle, horses, and provisions might be procured. The plan consisted of two objects, the procuring provisions, recruits, &c. and, if it should prove successful to the full extent wished for, then to proceed by a detour to the right, and join the main army at or near Albany; if not, to return by the same rout back to the main body.

Colonel Baum was accordingly detached with Germans, Provincials, and Savages, amounting to about five hundred and seventy on the 13th. He was to be supported by a chosen corps under Colonel Breyman, part of which was to consist of Reidfel's dismounted dragoons; and in case that either the first or second detachment should prove unsuccessful, or meet with a strong resistance, they were to be sustained by the whole army.

Colonel Baum's journal of his operations, transmitted from the several posts he occupied, was then read, by which it appeared, that the savages were ungovernable, proved entirely disobedient to the orders of the Officers appointed to direct and controul them, and, in short, were of more disservice than use.

He then stated that Colonel Breyman was sent forward the next

next morning, the 15th, to support Colonel Baume; but that no account having been received of them the next day (16th) on Sunday, the General put himself at the head of the 24th regiment; but before he had got forward more than two miles, he met Breyman's corps returning in great disorder, and was informed of the disaster at Bennington. The Germans continued to return in small or broken parties the whole day.

Germans return broken.

Army 4900.

He stated the returns of the army on the 1st of September, previous to the crossing Hudson's River. British 2,600, Germans 2,300. On the 3d, after passing the River, there was very little difference.

The General wished to keep a communication open by his posts with Fort Edward; but as that was impossible, and to be in force, in obedience to his instructions from the Secretary of State, he resolved to make a movement forward. The artillery, stores, baggage, and detachments on the other side of the river being all brought up and called in, he moved towards Stillwater. Previous to the passing of Hudson's River, and after, he had several confidential conversations with the late General Frazer, upon the propriety of that measure, who always expressed the warmest approbation of it.

Gen. Frazer approves passing the Hudson.

He was present near the General the whole day in that action, which was more obstinately disputed than any a long service ever gave him an opportunity of seeing. The British line consisted of but four regiments, 20th, 21st, 62d, and the 9th, amounting to 1,100 rank and file: the whole weight of the action fell on this body. On the last charge, just before dark, the troops seemed to be greatly fatigued, and not in a condition to make very vigorous exertions; they retained their spirit, firmness, and resolution, but not that alacrity they shewed in the beginning of the day, which was very natural for troops that had now been nearly five hours firing and manœuvring, and

Firmness of the 20th, 21st, 62d, & 9th regts.

Always attack'd by fresh troops.

Yet victorious.

One third of them killed and wounded.

He saw the line after the rebels had been dispersed; it had suffered greatly: the ranks had been thinned; the men were fatigued; the loss in killed was 76, wounded 247, missing or prisoners 28. The two field officers of the 62d were wounded, and the greater part of the Officers of the regiment killed or wounded. The other regiments had likewise suffered greatly, and the officers and men on the next day (September 20) nor for several days after, were not in a fit condition to undertake further operations.

At this period army 3890.

The general returns at the latter end of the month were, British 2300, Germans 1590, besides the three additional companies from Canada.

The rebel camp near Beaumont's-Edge could not be reconnoitred on the left; he saw the right, and perceived it was very strongly defended by field-works, redoubts, and cannon planted

planted down the side of the hill to the swamp adjoining the river.

He saw a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, received September the 22d, informing General Burgoyne, that Gen. Vaughan would be about that time in the Highlands, and was meditating an attack on Fort Montgomery, which, tho' the royal army had been considerably more in force, was a strong reason for not attacking the rebels in their intrenchments, till some further account should be received of the operations of General Vaughan. Gen. B. receives a letter from Sir Hen. C. Sept. 22.

He was present at the action of the 7th of October, and occasionally in every part of the line. When the retreat became general, he did not think he was authorised, as an officer, to give orders for the cannon being brought off, while there was an artillery General Officer (Phillips) of singular reputation, on the field. At the very instant that the cannon were left exposed on the right and left, he met Sir Francis Clarke on a gallop going to the left. He asked him where he was going? he said from the General, to order off the artillery. They had scarcely parted when a very heavy fire came from the enemy, by which, he had every reason to believe, Sir Francis Clarke was killed. Battle of Beaumonts Edge.

He had a copy of an original paper in his hand, which he received from General Gates, containing a return of the rebel army. General Gates and he were old and intimate friends, when that brave officer was engaged in a more commendable line of service. An old friend of General Gates.

He had not the original in his possession, but he saw it at General Burgoyne's that morning. The General promised he would produce the original. He was not certain whether the commissioned and non-commissioned officers were included in the return, but he believed not, because they were distinguished in it.

One General, twelve Brigadiers, 46 Colonels, 43 Lieutenant-Colonels, 45 Majors, 346 Captains, 342 First Lieutenants, 19,383 men. 332 Second Lieutenants, 328 Ensigns, 640 Serjeants, 648 Drums, and 13,200 rank and file; he understood the return to mean that, besides corps and out-posts not included, 3400.

British, on the 1st of November, 2086, Germans, including every description, 1900; there were besides some Provincials and Canadians, not included in his former returns of the King's army. British army 3986 men.

His intimacy with General Gates led him to the knowledge of the following particulars. Previous to the action of the 7th of October, some, if not all of the following posts were taken by the rebels on the flanks and rear of the royal army: 1400 on the heights opposite the ford of Saratoga; 1500 at the ford higher up; 2000 in the rear to prevent a retreat. Gen. B. surrounded without the possibility of a retreat.

treat to Fort Edward on the west side of the river; the body on our rear, and on the heights opposite Saratoga, were posted before the 7th, and the body at the second ford, he believed, after, on the 8th. On the 8th a working and covering party were seen on the plain of Saratoga, throwing up works; but a party, being sent forward, they crossed the river and posted themselves on the other side at the head of the ford. It was intended by the General to attempt a retreat, and hazard a second action which would have taken place, had not the out-scouts given intelligence of those positions having been taken, the truth of which was afterwards confirmed to him by General Gates. Sick of the rebels present, 600 and upwards, sick not present, about 700.

Strong instance
of courage in a
Clergyman.

Said, there was a remarkable instance happened at Saratoga on the 8th or 9th. General Frazer, a few minutes before he died, requested that he might be privately interred in the redoubt next the enemy. The injunction was not rigidly complied with; for Generals Burgoyne, Reidsel, and Phillips, with such officers and others as could be spared from their posts, and he among the rest, attended the funeral, in respect to the memory of that very gallant officer. The rebels, the only act of inhumanity he knew them to be guilty of, observing the funeral procession, pointed two guns at the redoubt, and kept up an incessant fire until the body was covered in. The Chaplain, however, notwithstanding his very unpleasant situation, went through the funeral service with all due propriety and solemnity, seeming to be totally regardless of any consequences while discharging his duty.

He said he had an original paper in his hand, being minutes taken at the second council of war of the Generals and Field Officers.

The names of the officers were not read.

47th & 62d reg.
not fit for action.

— says, that the 47th regiment is not to be depended upon, in case the proposition from General Gates should be rejected.

— is of opinion, that the 62d is too much reduced and dispirited to be able to do regimental duty in real action.— Similar opinions, or nearly to the same effect, but not quite so strong, were given as to other regiments. Foreign officers could not answer for their men in an enterprize which forbid all expectation of success. British unanimously engaged for their several regiments and corps, so long as they remained in their present position, being determined to resist the attack of the enemy to the last. Three of the Field Officers were not present.

German's not
fight.

It was unanimously agreed in a consultation between the General Officers only, that an attempt should be made to gain Fort Edward at all events, had not the intelligence already stated to have been given by the scouts happily prevented it.

On

On his cross-examination by Sir Richard Sutton, Colonel Kingston said, that he did not know that there were any horses to spare to remount Reidsel's dismounted dragoons; that he knew of none but those appropriated to the carrying of provisions, camp baggage, artillery, and those belonging to the officers; that the officers could not spare theirs, as they had not enough to supply their own wants; that he and Sir Francis Clarke found themselves greatly distressed for horses, and that he procured some with much difficulty; that the horses belonging to the train and provision transport, belonged to the contractor in Canada, who provided them; that he saw no ground in America fit for cavalry to make a charge on, though in small parties, for secret intelligence, &c. dragoons might have proved of essential service. He did not know that there were many women followed the army; he had no time to attend to their beauty or their numbers; he never heard there were two thousand, nor did he believe there were half that number.

Examined by General Burgoyne.

By the questions asked by the honourable gentleman, it would imply as if I was influenced by improper passions. He put several questions to Col. Kingston.

The Col. answered, that there were only three women allowed to every company; that provisions were allowed for so many and no more; that the Commissary, without a gross breach of his duty, could not issue any more rations than what the order allowed; and, as for impeding the baggage, it was impossible, for if any more women than were allowed by the order attended, they must have walked, or found a mode of carriage for themselves: but without entering into further particulars, he had every reason to believe that there was no colour of complaint on that head.

Examined by Governor Johnstone.

A co-operation up the North River, if in force, would, as he had heard from some of the rebel general officers, and made in time, have obliged Gen. Gates to have quitted his position. He believed, if Sir William Howe, with the grand army, had come up by that route, the impression he would have made would have been in proportion to his numbers. It was reasonable to think, that he would have effected more with a greater force than what he understood might have been done by an inferior one. He understood the country between Albany and New-York was very strong. He did not know what degree of interruption or obstruction Sir William Howe might have met with from Gen. Washington, in the course of his operations

If Sir W.H. had co-operated, G. Gates must have retired.

up the North River, as he knew nothing of the force or condition of that General's army.

State of 47th & 62d regiments. The Colonel begged to explain one circumstance in the minutes of the council of war, which, by the paper delivered, where it said the 47th regiment was not to be depended upon, implied a censure on that corps. It was no reflection meant or intended on that regiment, nor upon the other, but merely as the former was not complete, some of the companies only being upon service with the army; and the other was so greatly reduced in number, that they were not to be depended upon as capable of doing regimental duty in the line, should active service be determined upon.

The Colonel concluded his examination in replying to several questions put by General Burgoyne, relative to that General's appointments respecting secret-service money, and the disposition of the money contained in the military chest.

Disinterestedness of Gen. B. General Burgoyne had not the appointments of a Commander in Chief, but of a Lieutenant General; that he was at the same expence as if he had; that he was obliged to keep a table, to which, besides the officers on the staff, it was customary that all others should, from their rank, or the particular services they were engaged in, have free access and invitation at particular times. That from the advanced price of every article suited for such a table, the General was at a very great expence; and that, on the whole, he was persuaded, when his appointments were balanced against his outgoings, that the General was considerably out of pocket, out of his private fortune, by the campaign of 1777.

His Generosity. On the disposition of the secret service money, he said he kept the account of its expenditure; that a shilling never was appropriated to any other use than that for which it was intended; but on the contrary, he had known the General to have advanced money out of his own purse to the widows of soldiers, and other distressed persons, which, by the constant usage of the army, might have well come within the description of secret service money.

Military Chest. On the military chest, he said the General had nothing at all to do with it, further than it was his duty to preserve it in safety; that the payments and receipts were transacted entirely between the Paymaster-general and the Commanders of corps; that he understood, before the signing of the Convention, those officers drew certain sums in advance from the Paymaster-general, for which they gave accountable receipts; and that the remainder was retained by the Paymaster-general, for which, of course, he stood, responsible to the public.

We forgot to mention one circumstance, it was an answer of Col. Kingston's to the following question: Does the witness, in all his intimate and confidential conversations with Gen. Frazer, recollect

recollect that he found fault, or censured any one measure or operation of the campaign of 1777?—Not one but that of employing the Germans, instead of the British, on the expedition to Bennington. Gen. Frazer for employing British instead of Germans.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON.

June 8th, 1779.

Previous to the calling in General Robertson, Lord George Lord. G. Germain opened the grounds of his defence, respecting his main's speech. conduct as Secretary of State for the American department, and as having a voice in his Majesty's confidential councils.—He observed that the Hon. General who commanded in chief, and the other Hon. General who commanded the Northern expedition, (Howe and Burgoyne) had produced a vast mass of evidence to throw the miscarriage of the American war upon his shoulders; and that, in the course of the examination, several witnesses had endeavoured to prove, that America was, “almost unanimous” in resisting the claims of this country, and were determined never again to return to their former state of obedience.

To meet the personal charges respecting himself, as well as to repel that part of the evidence, which described the majority of the people of that country as hostile to a British government, he had summoned General Robertson to the bar. His long residence in America, upwards, as he understood, of twenty-four years; his high and deserved rank in the service, and his being present on the spot when the rebellion broke out, furnished him with every reason to expect that his evidence would be accurate and important; and that he was every way, from his long experience and local residence, enabled to give the most satisfactory information to the Committee.—His Lordship, after stating the particular facts, which will be more properly collected from the minutes themselves, moved, that Gen. Robertson be called in. Great expectations from Gen. Robertson's evidence.

Examined by Lord George Germain.

He had resided in America, twenty-four years; his experience and long residence there, enabled him to be well informed of the dispositions of the people. They were warmly and affectionately attached to the people and government of this country. A very short time before the disturbances broke out, he had several conversations with persons of great weight and consequence in the colonies, who all agreed in what he had now asserted. Independence was never thought of till the rebellion commenced; and he remembered a circumstance that arose in those conversations, which confirmed him in the opinion, which

which was that only one man on the whole continent of America was known to be a friend of independency.

Two-3ds loyal. Said, that the majority of the people, full two thirds, were well affected towards Great Britain; and that the loyal Provincials now in arms, were equal, if not superior in numbers to

Force adequate to the conquest. the rebels.—Said, that the force sent out from home was fully adequate to the services for which it was designed, particularly for the campaign of 1776, and following years. Said, that

he had numberless opportunities of knowing the wishes and desires of the people, while Quarter-master-general; that they had

Americans affectionate. given frequent proofs of their loyalty and affection; that although not obliged to furnish quarters, or lodgings for the troops, they spontaneously consented, and gave every possible mark of a friendly and hospitable disposition to the King's army.

Our force always equal to the service. The royal army was equal to the several services as they arose; and he remembered well, when it was known among the

Officers at New-York that a certain commander (supposed to mean Sir Jeffery, now Lord Amherst) had made it a condition

Lord Amherst. of his acceptance of the command of the army, that a reinforcement of 20,000 men, should precede the acceptance of the command, it was looked upon as a most extraordinary requisition, and interpreted only as an apology for declining to accept of any command in that country.

Rebels 16,000. He never understood that the rebel army exceeded 16,000 men; the royal army, in its several distributions, under the

Howe 40,870. command and order of Sir William Howe, including Germans and Provincials, amounted to 40,870 effective men in the campaign of 1777.

Description of America. The country was not remarkably strong, so as to impede and render difficult military operations. There were woods interspersed among plantations in the cultivated parts. He knew

the Jerseys, particularly that part of them which lay in the route between New-York and Philadelphia, and for some distance on each side. The cultivated parts were full of farm-

houses, gentlemen's seats, &c. inclosed like England, or the vicinity of London. There were woods here and there; but in

the Jerseys he knew of none of any great extent in the low lands. In the internal parts there were mountains, and of

course defiles, which were called the Jersey Highlands. There

No want of intelligence. was no remarkable difficulty in procuring intelligence; enough could be procured from persons well-affected, or from rebel pri-

soners, sufficient to describe the face of the country, the positions the enemy had taken, their real or supposed strength in numbers and appointment, &c.

He was present at the landing of the troops at Gravesend, on Long-Island, 22d of August, 1776. The people did not desert their dwellings, nor remove their live or dead stock; their

doors

doors were open, and they seemed to shew every appearance of confidence and good-will towards the royal army.

He had not the returns, but as well as he could recollect, the force under General Howe consisted of 15 or 16,000 men; ^{Howe 16,000.} that of the rebels under Putnam about 6000; in all, including ^{Putnam 6000.} those employed in defending the works on New-York Island, perhaps at the highest about 10,000 men.

The rebels paid one hundred pounds currency (56*l.* 5*s.* ^{A rebel recruit} sterling) bounty money for every recruit; the King's troops ^{56*l.* 5*s.*} but ten dollars, (2*l.* 5*s.* sterling). The rebels made no con- ^{King's recruit} siderable defence on Long-Island. ^{2*l.* 5*s.*}

After the retreat from White Plains, and the flight of the ^{Reb. army 3000.} rebels by Brunswick through the Jerseys to Newark, and when they crossed the Delaware early in December, they did not exceed 3000 men, hardly so many.

He knew the country from New-York to Albany extremely well, and the course of the North River, having so long re- ^{Operations on the North River} sided in its neighbourhood. It was not remarkably strong. ^{easy.} There were some woods, one in particular of six miles in length. He passed by this route in the year 1759 with the army then commanded by Lord Amherst. It was not a march of more than ten or twelve days by land. He knew of no particular impediment which stood in the way of successful operations, either by land or up the North River, if assisted by the co-operation of a naval or marine force.

He preferred operations to the northward to the southern ex- ^{Preferable to the Southern expedition.} pedition; such a measure, in his mind, carried with it every fair and rational appearance of success. Had he been present at New York in August 1777, he would have presumed to offer his advice to General Howe, to have proceeded by the way of North River in preference to either going up the Delaware or Chesapeak Bay, particularly as the Commander in Chief had received an account from General Burgoyne of the capture of Ticonderoga, and that he was proceeding in his way to Albany. Indeed, when he heard that the General who commanded the northern expedition was left without any effectual co- ^{Thought Gen. B. lost for want of a co-operation.} operation, to force his way single handed to Albany, he observed to his friends, that if General Burgoyne obtained his object, or even escaped destruction or captivity, it would be a greater escape than that made by Hannibal. Also used the same expressions in a letter to General Howe, after General Burgoyne's victory at Stillwater.

He was of opinion that a diversion on the coast of Massa- ^{A diversion on the coast proposed by burning two barns.} chusetts Bay, or any of the New England Provinces, would have proved of infinite service, in drawing the attention of the provincial militias to the defence of their own home. That he was of opinion he could give a proof. On his return to America in Autumn 1777, and meeting with cross winds off the coast

Evidence of MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON.

coast of New England, and having a reinforcement of 1700 men under his command, he consulted with the naval officers and others, whether they could put him on shore on that coast; they said they could: he accordingly put in for the land, and was determined to burn two barns within his view, and create an alarm, which he made no doubt would have answered very good purposes. The wind however shifting, he proceeded to the proper place of his destination which was New-York.

Examined by Sir William Howe.

Time of American loyalty.

He had little or no communication with the people of America since the commencement of the war. His allusions to their dispositions were chiefly gathered from his former knowledge of them, while in a state of peace and obedience; particularly that relative to their willingness to provide quarters for the troops, though not obliged to it. This was during the last war, upwards of twenty years since.

The conversations with people of weight and consequence in the country, were at the breaking out of the rebellion; were about the year 1775; were about eight months before actual hostilities; were before the battle of Lexington, on the 19th of April 1775; were before that battle three or four months; were in the year 1774.

The conversations with the Officers at New York were about the commencement of the rebellion; were about 1774 or 1775; he could not precisely tell the time; it was before the campaign 1776; he believed it might be about the commencement of that of 1775; he heard twenty thousand men spoke of, but whether previous to the campaign 1775 or 1776, he could not undertake to say; he knew a certain Officer's name was mentioned. (Lord Amherst.)

Army 6000 at leaving Boston.

The number of rank and file embarked at Boston, did not, he believed, exceed 6000. The Commander in Chief upon quitting Boston, had not a force sufficient to proceed to New York, nor could he have safely ventured to land, till his force was augmented by the Germans and the British from Europe. No improper delay happened from the General's remaining at Staten Island, till his debarking his force at Gravesend. The male inhabitants at Gravesend and Flat Bush had deserted their dwellings in a great measure, upon the arrival of the royal army, though not all; and he could not speak to the flight of the male inhabitants at Utrecht, because he was not there at the first landing of the troops; the doors were open, and some males, and almost the whole women and children remained in their dwellings.

He always understood that the rebels in their flight through the Jerseys, did not consist of, at the highest, 3000 men. He did not know the exact amount of the force under General Lee, who

who crossed the North River about the middle of December, nor of that under General Putnam. He had heard they consisted of about two or three thousand men each. He could not undertake to ascertain the rebel force in the Highlands. He never saw any authentic returns of the rebel force in its several distributions. He spoke from hearsay. He had not the effective returns of the royal army in 1776 or 1777; but if the corps were complete they must amount to the numbers stated by him.

He did not know the navigation of the Delaware, or by the way of Chesapeak. He knew the North River. There were no rivers of any consequence in the route from New York to Albany. There were some on the opposite banks, on which the enemy might take post; the route was in some places five, six, and eight miles from the river; the enemy might, if in force, turn the flank of the royal army, and compel them to hazard a battle at a disadvantage; but all that might be easily avoided by a water transport of the troops as well as the stores and provisions. The Highlands, with all the passes in it, must be secured. The army by water could be transported in two days, so as to defeat all the land operations of the enemy.

Knows North
R. navigation.

Army might go
by water in two
days in spite of
all opposition.

Washington had no magazines, he must draw his supply from a remote country; operations by water must have been successful. Sloops and craft on the North River might be procured; they were procured last war. They carried on a commerce or trade between Albany and New York; they were called Albany sloops or craft; they were of about seventy tons burthen; each of them would carry a hundred soldiers. He could not say whether a number sufficient to transport 15,000 men could be procured.

Vessels 70 tons
go to Albany.

There were roads and communications in the Jerseys for the troops marching in columns. To march in columns through woods, passages through the woods must be cut and cleared. Marching an army in a single column he allowed was very improper, because the army might be stopt by an inferior force; and before the line could be properly and regularly formed, the enemy might escape by flight. Lord Amherst met no enemy nor interruption in his march from New York to Albany, nor from thence to Ticonderoga. The French abandoned their lines, and the Fort at that place was soon after evacuated without resistance.

He believed a part of the grand army might have been spared to make a diversion on the coasts of New England. Four or five thousand men might have been well spared, after which the royal army would have been equal in number to that under Washington, who, he believed, had not even at the action of the Brandywine more than 10,000 men under his command,

4 or 5000 to at-
tack New Eng.
yet Howe then
equal to Wash-
ington.

*Examined by Mr. Burke.**June 9th, 1779.*

Mr. Burke.

The loyal Provincials in arms, amounted to between five and six thousand. He did not know the number of the Rebels. The loyal Americans consisted of corps, some of them mostly composed of native Americans, some mostly composed of emigrants from Great Britain, Ireland, and other parts of Europe.

Half the Rebel army Irish.

He had heard that full one half of the rebel army was composed of Irish. He did not believe, that if the royal troops were withdrawn from within his own government, (New-York) that the loyal Provincial military would be able to maintain their ground against the usurped power of the Congress. The province of Nova Scotia was very weak in point of internal defence, so would Rhode Island if evacuated. He could not speak of the Carolinas, Georgia, Canada, &c. but there were several Gentlemen, Members of that House, who could give full satisfaction on those points. The loyalists though more numerous, were unarmed, and the powers of government had

Two thirds of the Americans loyal.

been usurped. Two thirds of the people, though well affected to the British government, were not a match for the other third if armed, and in possession of the civil government. The loyal Provincials were good troops, and well disciplined. He believed the Congress did issue orders for arming all the inhabitants, but those who had the power in their hands, disarmed every person whom they suspected. If one third were for Great Britain, another for the Congress, and a third partly neutral, the Congress part would prevail for the reason before assigned: not that he thought that an inferior number, and in every respect upon equal terms with a superior number, could give law to the superior number.

Taxation was the cause of the rebellion; the people in general shewing an aversion to be taxed. If taxation had been given up, no rebellion would ever have happened. The people were zealously attached, before that claim was enforced, to the British government.

Loyal Americans plundered.

Sir William Howe was earnest, and took every method to prevent plunder, but plunder was committed. The loyal Americans were not properly protected, nor the necessary means taken for their safety. The General had taken every means in his power to protect them, but his endeavours had not always proved successful.

Howe's terms of pacification not known.

Did not know what promise was held out in the King's speech in 1775, for an intended pacification with America, nor what terms the Commissioners were charged to hold out to America. The people in general were eager to know the terms. He did not know them to that instant. He believed that Great Britain relinquishing the claim of taxation was the great object of

of expectation with the Colonies. He did not know when the Parliament met, or the prohibitory bill passed, or when the Commission left Great Britain. It was published for the first time in America in the following August. He did not know when the vote of independence passed, he believes it was about the time of publishing the Commission; he could not exactly say that it was in the beginning of July.

He believed a great majority of the people were inclined to return to their former state of obedience before the vote of independence passed; and he had heard, that if taxation had been given up, that vote would never have passed.

He believed the treaty between France and America was the chief, nay the sole cause of defeating the intended effect of the conciliatory act of last session, and the objects of the Commission which accompanied those acts.

He did not think of a descent upon the coast of New England before he left England, nor till he was at sea. He had no conversation with the American Minister on the subject, though he may have dropped sentiments of a similar nature to others. There were many of the parts of the coasts of New England vulnerable, where a landing might be effected, and a retreat secured.

He never gave any advice to the noble Lord at the head of the American department, but in one instance, respecting the plan proposed by Sir William Howe to Administration. He told the noble Lord, that a plan formed in America, transmitted to England to be considered, and afterwards returned with or without alterations, would be very improper, because, before the approved plan could reach America, circumstances might be considerably changed, and what would be a very wise plan of measures in one situation, that situation being changed, would perhaps in another be extremely inapplicable to the existing state of affairs, and be of course improper to be carried into execution. The noble Lord left General Howe to his own judgment.

Examined by Sir Richard Sutton.

There was a considerable quantity of stores left behind at Boston, when the royal army evacuated that town. They consisted of woollen goods, &c. which were of great service to the rebels; woollens, and several other articles being extremely dear and scarce in the rebel camp, and throughout the whole province. He could not say, whether there were means of bringing them off; he understood that every transport, or ship fit to go to sea, was employed in conveying the troops to Halifax; some however of the stores, merchandize, &c. that had been left behind, might have been brought away aboard the transports. A great number of ships and vessels, none he said,

100 vessels left. immediately fit for sea, had been left in the docks and harbour of Boston. He could not ascertain the exact number. Upon mere recollection, a hundred perhaps, or more. He did not know that any of those vessels were afterwards converted into privateers; but they might for what he knew to the contrary. It would not have been a proper measure to have proceeded to New-York without a sufficient force. The royal army had a communication with the well-affected at New-York. Vessels were sent from Boston to New York for necessaries; one or two of them returned with the desired supply; the third, he believed was wrecked. On the whole, he thought it would not have been adviseable for General Howe to proceed to New York; the transports were too much crowded; and the preference was clearly due to Halifax, as it was considerably nearer than New-York.

Battle 27, Aug. He was present at the action of the 27th of August on Long-Island. After the rebels were dispersed, the grenadiers and 33d regiment pushed forward, and would have stormed the lines at Brooklyn, if they had not been called off by the General. Neither the General nor he knew the strength of the lines at the time; but he had learned, from rebel prisoners and others,

Putnam could not have collected 300 men. that if an immediate attack had been made on the lines, that Putnam could not have been able to collect 300 out of the whole of the troops under his command to stand to their arms. The rebels had taken a strong position on some small eminences on the right of their lines, and some distance from them in front. He saw the General advance, and, by a movement round those heights, get between them and their lines, by which means he made about two thousand of the rebels prisoners. The rebels evacuated the lines by five o'clock the next morning. He saw the rear-guard cross the ferry. He had notice to march with the first brigade about eight o'clock. If he had had notice earlier, he would have obeyed his orders.

But a mile & an half from our camp to where the rebels embarked. If the royal detachments had received orders earlier, at six or seven o'clock, they might have come up with the rebels rear-guard. He did not know what degree of success might have attended such a measure. It was no more than a mile and a half, or at most an hour's march, from the lines to the place where the rebels embarked. He could not say what would have been the issue. It would be attended with some difficulty, as there were some heights possessed by the rebels, which commanded the place of embarkation.

Rebel retreat & magazines might have been cut off. After the flight of the rebels from White Plains and Fort Lee through the Jerseys, if a corps of two or three thousand men had been pushed over from Staten Island, and landed at Amboy, or Elizabeth Town, he was of opinion that they might have cut off the rebel magazines near Brunswick; and that, being cut off from their magazines, the same body of men might have

have intercepted them in their retreat towards the Delaware. Pursued by Lord Cornwallis from Fort Lee, and their force being so very small, no more than between two or three thousand men, cut off from their magazines, and positions being taken in their rear, or in their direct route, there was every fair probability of their surrender or destruction. A corps could be spared from New York for this service; and to him it appeared the most feasible scheme of putting an end to the war.

He was not present in the Jerseys on the opening of the campaign 1777. He knew the country. The rebels were near Washington's Morris-Town, and had taken a very strong position in their rear upon the mountain above Quibbleton. He believed they had no magazines, provisions coming in once in two days, or twice a week: if they had the magazines described by the honourable Member, and that such a movement as had been described by the honourable Member could have been effected, most certainly Washington must come down and hazard a battle in their defence, or endeavour to retreat over the Delaware, or take some other strong position. He did not know that part of the Jerseys sufficiently to be enabled to give a decided opinion one way or the other. The distance from Middlebrook, where the royal army was then stationed, to the Delaware was about twenty-five miles, and thirty from thence to Philadelphia. Sir William Howe might have marched by this route, without interruption, or obliged Washington to descend from the mountain and risk a battle; or if not immediately, to be compelled to fight in defence of Philadelphia. It would have been a march of but a few days. The country was open on the Jersey side of the Delaware; on the Pennsylvania side there were some woods, but the country was not so strong even on that side as to throw any remarkable difficulty in the way of the execution of such a measure. He did not know the exact distance from the head of the Elke to Philadelphia; he understood pretty near the same distance as from Middlebrook. There was but one river the Schuylkill in this line of march.

There was much strong ground, he was informed, between the head of the Elke and Philadelphia; more, he understood, than by the direct route over the Delaware from Jersey. He did not know, or pretend to judge, of Sir William Howe's reasons for chusing to go by sea to the southward; they might be very good ones, and he presumed they were. He was not present during any part of the campaign of 1777, being then in England, or on his return to America; but informed as he was by others, he was of opinion, that land operations promised more dispatch and effectual success than going round to Chesapeak; because, if the move to Philadelphia had been effected early in the campaign, a co-operation might have followed

Would have ended the war.

Washington's position and supplies.

G. Howe might go by land to Philadelphia, 55 miles.

Country not difficult.

Route from Elk more difficult than from Middlebrook.

Against Howe's sea voyage.

followed, in order to assist and forward the operations of the northern army.

Examined by Colonel Barre.

June 10th, 1779.

Col. Barre.

Description of
North River
route by land.

There were woods, morasses, and several rivers, he acknowledged, upon the route from New York to Albany.—Strong posts might be taken and defended by numbers much inferior. Some of the rivers which fell into the North River on the eastern side, were very deep; some of them were fordable. The deep ones could be passed over on floats, rafts, and in small craft; the shallow ones could be forded.

Water convey-
ance practicable

He could not say, whether it would or would not be safe to pursue such operations, in the face of an enemy, in force sufficient to dispute the passage. That would depend upon the degree of strength on one side, and resistance on the other, and the proper distribution and direction of the force employed. He could not say whether operations by water, by the North River were practicable. He was clear, that by the co-operation of the naval force and procuring a water-conveyance for the troops, that it might. He did not exactly know, whether sloops, craft, &c. could be procured for the purpose; but on the supposition that there could, he saw nothing to materially obstruct or defeat such a measure.

He had no intercourse with the people of America, since the breaking out of the rebellion. He was at Boston. He was present at Long Island, and staid at New York in his command, during the remainder of the campaign 1776. He was in England, or on sea, during the whole of the campaign 1777. He had, during his stay at New York, in 1776, autumn 1777, and the campaign 1778, several conversations with Americans of weight and consequence.—He had, under the above exceptions, given his testimony chiefly on the information of others.

Lord Amherst, he confessed, in his operations up the North River, had no enemy to contend with. He only spoke therefore on the grounds of probability, and what he had reason to believe would have been the issue of such operations.

He did not know, nor hear, that the British Cabinet had consulted any military men on the conduct of the Americans. They might, without its coming to his knowledge. The noble Lord at the head of the American department had consulted him in one instance, which he related to the Committee the preceeding day, concerning the propriety of sending plans from America to Great Britain, and transmitting them back altered or unaltered. He gave his opinion, that such a mode of conducting military operations, at so very great a distance, was improper. He always thought that a Commander in Chief ought

ought to be vested with very extensive powers, and present patronage. Such a command was always supposed to originate in high confidence; and it should of course be accompanied with what it apparently professed.

He did not think, that it was either the wish of this country, to subdue America, or, if it were, that it would be practicable. He never understood that America was to be subdued, but that rebellion was to be extinguished. He did not suppose that the loyal Americans, armed, were equal to restore legal and constitutional government, without the aid and co-operation of this country. He thought, that the loyal subjects in America might be employed as a balance against the rebels; and that the arms of Great Britain being thrown in, might preponderate the scale in our favour.

He did not see any intention of subduing America; but he believed, all circumstances considered, with old and experienced officers to command, America might be brought to her former state of obedience. He could not undertake to say, that he saw to the end of the American War, nor could fix any limited time to its duration. He believed, if there had been no taxation, there would have been no rebellion; that if taxation had been given up before the vote of independence took place, no such vote would have ever passed; nor if the conciliatory bills had reached America, even after Gen. Burgoyne's defeat, but previous to the treaty with France; Congress, however well inclined to reject them, would not have ventured contradicting the prevailing voice of the people.

He was no judge of the wisdom of the councils of this country; nor, if he had an opinion upon the subject, would it be decent, or consistent with his rank and situation, to give an answer to the Hon. Member's question in the terms in which it was proposed.

Tho' he cannot see to the end of the war, or how it will or will not terminate, he had no opinion how far it would be wise to pursue or desist from it. He looked upon Sir Henry Clinton to be a very able and active Officer. He had no returns, but he presumed the army, under his proper order and command, in the campaign 1778, was equal, or nearly equal to that under Sir William Howe the preceding campaign 1777. He believed his army was equal to the plan of the campaign, that of a defensive war, and being always prepared to seize and improve favourable circumstances. He could not speak to the exact numbers of the troops detached to the West Indies under General Grant, or the corps sent under Colonel Campbell to the southward. There were several members of that House, who could give the Committee better information on that head. He heard that the former body amounted to five thousand, and the latter to three, he had no returns in his possession. He did not know

Charact. of Gen.
Grey.

know of any offensive operations carried on by Sir Henry Clinton, but his marching against the rebel General Sullivan, then besieging Rhode Island, and the expedition to Martha's Vineyard, &c. by which the rebels were much distressed and alarmed. That expedition was commanded by Major General Grey, who, he confessed, was a most able, active, and spirited officer. So far from doubting of his zeal, judgment, and activity, he acknowledged that there was not a more capable officer in his Majesty's service.

4000 men sent
out.

He did not presume that more could be done with an inferior force, than what had been done with a superior one. He did not know that the reinforcement lately sent out, only amounted to about four thousand men, or that they exceeded the detachments sent to the southward in the course of the winter, or that another would be sent, in order to make up any supposed deficiency. He had no information on the subject. Circumstances being changed, the same number of British and Germans might effect more in one campaign than another, if the enemy were weakened, or the local assistance more general and effectual.

Examined by Sir William Howe.

On stores left at
Boston.

Q. The General says, that stores, provisions, vessels, &c. were left behind at Boston, when the King's troops evacuated the town?

A. There were some, he did not know what quantity, value, or number. It was not his particular duty to see that proper measures were taken for bringing them off. He presumed that no means were neglected for that purpose. He had obeyed such orders as were given to him. He had not the care of the stores or their embarkation; but of the troops. He believed the General did all in his power, and if the town and stores were not destroyed, he presumed the General had very good reasons for abstaining from that measure. He gave no opinion; he only spoke to a fact within his own knowledge. He neither drew any inference from that fact, nor wished that any inference whatever should be drawn from it.

Q. The General says that many of the male inhabitants remained in their dwellings at Gravesend and Flat Bush, when the royal army landed on Long Island?

A. He said some remained, but not in any great numbers. He did not see that the male inhabitants in any part of the seat of war remained in their dwellings but those of Staten Island, but he had been a very short time with the army.

Q. The General says that plunder was frequent?

Plundering
common but not
in his Brigade.

A. Certainly plundering was common. It was not permitted in the brigade he commanded, On a complaint being made to him of some excesses committed by that brigade, he issued the

the order now on the table of the Committee, made instant reparation to the sufferers, and an immediate stop was put to plundering in that brigade. He was only present from the 22d at the landing on Long Island, till his arrival at New York on the 16th of September, during which time he saw plundering frequently committed and had heard afterwards that it still became more frequent. He believed that the General did every thing in his power to prevent it. He heard him give directions to hang two plunderers, and was a witness to the execution. He did not know that plundering was committed in that part under the General's immediate command; but he heard it as a general complaint, so long as he remained in the army. He acknowledged that he heard it universally said, that the Hessians, when they left Germany, understood that they would be permitted to plunder; that they looked upon themselves to be in an enemy's country, and were entitled to enrich themselves with the spoil. He did not know that plunder was ever permitted in Europe during operations in an enemy's country; but he always understood, that, by the laws and usages of war, contributions were accepted, as a compensation or satisfaction for sparing private property. He presumed that the rebels had no money, but it would not be easy to persuade soldiers, particularly foreigners, if they could not get money, that they should not have some sort of equivalent. He never thought America an enemy's country; but the idea that it was, was not solely confined to the Hessians. He heard, that when Col. Rhall was surprized at Trenton, twenty-one wagon loads of plunder was recovered by the rebels, and was afterwards distributed by Mr. Washington among the sufferers, as far as they could be ascertained. He had every reason to believe that any enormity of this nature, committed either by British or Germans, was totally repugnant to the wish or approbation of the General.

2. The General has said, that great numbers of loyalists were disposed to take up arms, had they been properly countenanced and encouraged?

A. He did not mean to say, that the General was remiss in his duty. He stated a fact which afterwards proved to be true. He believed that several, who had arms put into their hands, turned them against us, and that several, who expressed a desire for them, were far from being sincere; but he was, nevertheless of opinion, that more arms might be distributed with safety, though in such a combustion of fear, and terror, and imposition, it was indeed extremely difficult to determine, who was, or who was not to be trusted.

2. The General, the preceding evening, said something of storming the lines which he did not perfectly comprehend?

A. He said, that as to the storming of the lines, he had agreed

H

greed

greed in opinion with Sir William Howe, as neither of them were acquainted with the strength of the lines. He advanced with the first brigade till he came within about 120 or 130 yards of the lines, where he halted, because he thought them much stronger than they were. His brigade was cannonaded in this situation. The balls mostly went over their heads. Some men belonging to his brigade were killed and wounded. Some of them were wounded by the musquetry. He sent his Aid de camp to the General, to know whether he should advance ; but before he could return to him, he was glad to have his judgment confirmed, by seeing that the General had ordered the grenadiers of the army, and the 33d regiment into their proper station. He had passed the road leading from Brooklyn and Flat Bush. He had proceeded so far as where both roads meet. He did not think that could be more than 120, or 130 yards. He did not see any other corps before him. He advanced, attended only by his Aid de Camp, to a house between him and the lines, some yards forward. He did not see the grenadiers, or 33d regiment before him, nor the 71st. They might be nearer the lines than the first brigade ; but not in the line of march. He did not recollect seeing the 71st posted in the house, which he alluded to, and which was in his front. He did not see the General forward with the light infantry. He saw only corps on his right and left, which might be nearer than he, but none directly forward between him and that part of the lines which were opposed to him. This part of the examination was rather delicate and critical.

Gen. R. within 120 yards of the rebel lines.

Troops recalled.

2. The General has said that if a movement forward had been made early in the day, after the rebels quitted the lines, that the royal army might have come up with the rear-guard ?

A. Notice was given of the evacuation of the lines between five and six o'clock. He had notice to ground with the first brigade. He sent word by his Aid de Camp to the head quarters, that he was ready, but such was the alertness of the General, that he was out before his Aid de Camp reached head quarters.

Saw rebels passing to N. York.

As soon as he understood that, he advanced, and saw the rebels passing over to Hell-gate. He did not see the General before him. He saw troops, but could not tell who they were. He could not say he was foremost in that movement, nor say he was not. He saw troops forward, and that was all he knew.

2. The General said, that the rebel army never consisted of more than 16,000 men, and that the royal army immediately under his order and command consisted of 40,874 ; he wished the General would inform the Committee, what documents he resorted to, in order to justify himself in maintaining either assertion ?

A. He never saw any authentic returns of the rebel army.
The

The numbers stated by him on a former occasion before the Committee, were taken from the returns of the Major of brigade, before he last left America, and by papers which had been put into his hand, since he received notice to attend at the bar. He imagined, that he would, in the course of his examination, be interrogated upon the subject, he had therefore applied at the several offices, where he thought he could procure the information he wanted. He accordingly applied at the proper offices, but he was obliged for the greater part of his information to the clerks in the Secretary of War's office. He had the copy of the returns in his hand; desired to read them—17,000 under Sir William Howe, 10,000 under Sir Henry Clinton, 3,000 at Rhode Island, 1,700 at Halifax, 1,500 at Pensacola. Total taken; and desired to say, how he made up the 40,874, after deducting nearly 2,000 from Sir William Howe's army in the Jerseys, which did not proceed with that General in his expedition to the southward, and which would render the real effective total but 32,000 and a fraction?—Answered, he did not know, but presumed the non-effectives, as well as the effectives, were included.

Q. Whether the loyal Provincials were included?

A. He believed they were.

Q. Whether he believed, that nearly 9,000 men, an half, or a quarter of that number, were ever at once in the hospital, without including the wounded?

A. He believed not.

Q. Whether he meant to include the non-effectives, when he gave his last evidence on the subject?

A. He stated what he had learned from the information alluded to, and no more, he never made a difference one way or other in his own mind.

Q. After deducting the troops at Pensacola and Halifax which were under Sir William Howe's order but not immediately under his command, does General Robertson believe that during the campaign of 1777, including officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, and drums, that Sir William Howe had ever more than 27,000 effective men, fit for actual service under his command?

A. He believed not; for he presumed the difference between the two returns arose from non-effectives, sick, prisoners, &c.

Q. Whether he saw the Commissaries return of the numbers mustered, or the rations issued for their daily allowance?

A. He had not.

This trying part of his examination was carried on by several members, particularly by Sir George Yonge, who taking up the items, made up the total, and first discovered that there was a difference of nearly 9,000 men between the two returns delivered by the witness at the bar.

H :

Q. Does

Q. Does General Robertson undertake to say that he knows the numbers of the rebel army, either from documents, or authentic information, at any one period, during the campaigns of 1776 or 1777?

A. He did not, further than from general report and hearsay.

Q. The General has said, that if a force had been pushed over from Staten Island of two or three thousand men, and landed at Amboy, or Elizabeth-Town, the rebel magazines near Brunswick might have been destroyed or secured, and the retreat of the rebels to Newark and over the Delaware, intercepted?

Should have intercepted the rebels.

A. He allowed the force within New-York island was not very numerous, but a corps of 2000 men might be spared. It might be hazardous to land at Coriel's Ferry, in the face of a posted enemy. It could hardly be expected, that a flying enemy would take post while they were pursued by a superior force. He did not know of any route but through Elizabeth-Town; he knew of no passes on the edge of the mountain; there might be bye roads, with which he was unacquainted. Elizabeth-Town was the high road. He could not say but the magazines might be removed; he rather imagined they could not. He had heard that the rebels made several stands, and took several posts in their retreat from Lord Cornwallis. The weather was very bad, the rains heavy, and the roads much broke up. He would not pretend to say whether it would be justifiable to detach to Rhode-Island and Elizabeth Town. The men could have carried ten days provisions on their backs, which would be no more than twelve pounds and a half, and would not be totally at a loss, though they should miss of possessing themselves of the rebel magazines near Brunswick. He did not know what force was under Lee, Putnam, or in the Highlands. It might not be proper to strip New-York. The General might have had private reasons; but informed as he was at New-York, he saw nothing to prevent such a move, and balancing the probable advantages and disadvantages, he saw nothing sufficient to alter his opinion that the experiment was worth making. He does not recollect that he ever communicated his sentiments on the subject to persons in power; he might have mentioned it in conversation; he did not particularly recollect that he had.

Men carry ten days provisions.

Saw nothing to prevent intercepting the rebels.

Sir William Howe now led the witness once more to his favorite scene of action, the North river and its vicinities, where he kept him till the clock struck twelve, very little to the edification of the auditory, or to his own satisfaction; the only direct answer the General gave being, that if the royal army had once possession of the Highlands, the proceeding to Albany in order to co-operate with the army under General Burgoyne, would be an operation attended with facility, and a moral certainty of success.

Previous to this Sir William led him into the Jerseys, relative to

to the opening of the campaign 1777, when the General was in England, in which he endeavoured to shew, that he was totally misinformed, and knew nothing of the actual circumstances, the witnesses being then absent in England.

Q. The General has alluded to an expression in a letter addressed to me, relative to the improbability of Gen. Burgoyne's extricating himself from his then situation; wished the General would say what day he arrived in America?

A. September the 25th.

Q. When the General wrote that letter, had not he heard of the action at Stillwater, September the 19th?

A. Did not recollect; could not say—he was indisposed at the time. The letter was wrote by his direction; but believed he had heard of the Stillwater.

He took up a considerable time in examining to the point respecting the evacuation of Boston, and to shew, if there had been any stores, military or others, improperly left behind, that it was the General's peculiar province, to see that that service was faithfully and punctually performed.

He next interrogated the witnesses closely as to the early part of the campaign 1777 in the Jerseys.

Q. If he thought the field could be taken without tent or field equipage?

A. He believed not.

Field could not be taken without tents.

Q. The General gave it as his opinion that the King's army might have passed through the Jerseys to the Delaware, and so have proceeded to Philadelphia, or obliged Mr. Washington to quit his strong camp near Quibbleton: Does the General know the country between Quibbleton and the route marked out by this movement?

A. He never said he did: he thought such a movement would have that effect, and he knew nothing yet sufficient to induce him to change his opinion.

Q. Does General Robertson know that there were sufficient boats, craft, pontoons, &c. with the army in the Jerseys, to enable them to pass over the Delaware?

Want of pontoons and craft no excuse.

A. He could not tell, being then in England, but there might be timber enough felled in a few days, and worked up for the purpose of transporting the troops across.

Q. Would such a measure be advisable, and an enemy on either bank posted in force?

A. He could not say; that would depend upon circumstances. It might lead to a general engagement.

Q. Would that be engaging at an advantage, in the midst of a strong and hostile country, and no posts or retreat secured in case of a disaster?

Curious interrogations and answers.

A. That would depend upon the judgment of the General.

Q. Is then General Robertson sufficiently informed of the State of the country, of the army, of Mr. Washington's position

tion at Quibbleton, to give a direct opinion, that forward operations in the Jerseys, cross the Delaware, and so on to Philadelphia, all circumstances considered, would have been an advisable measure?

A. He could not say. As a matter of opinion he gave it to the best of his knowledge. He was at the time in England, and he supposed that the General had good reasons for making the choice he did.

Q. General Robertson has said that the Delaware at Trenton is 700 yards across. He would desire the General to recollect himself, and consider, whether he would have that fact stand as part of his evidence?

Delaware at
Trenton 700
yards.

A. He did not pretend to speak with accuracy, he only said so by guess: he would not undertake to assert whether it was more or less, or was exactly 700.

Q. General Robertson, on the last day's examination, said, he was within one hundred and twenty or thirty yards of the lines at Brooklyn, the evening preceding their evacuation: he likewise said that he had advanced as far as where the two roads meet, on the road from Brooklyn to Yellow Hook: will General Robertson then undertake to say, that it was no more than one hundred and thirty yards from that spot to the part of the lines which opposed his front?

A. He believed it was about that distance, it might be more, it might be two hundred.

Q. Will General Robertson from his own knowledge say, that the distance from the spot described to the lines was not more than two hundred yards?

Accurate as to
distances.

A. He believed not: he had often rode over the ground, and by the best estimate he could make of the distance, he thought it could be hardly so much. There were no vestiges of the lines soon after they were taken; but he thought he had given the distances pretty accurately.

Q. General Robertson has said, that the morning after the evacuation of the lines at Brooklyn, he was waiting for orders; might not he have proceeded under the general order, and have taken his particular station according to his rank, &c.

A. He might, but he thought it his duty to have Sir William Howe's directions.

Q. What time did General Robertson first receive notice that the lines were evacuated?

A. Before seven o'clock.

Q. When did he understand that circumstance was known?

A. About six or before it.

Rebel evacuation
known at six.

Q. If the fact was known at six, what time would it take to put the army ready to move in force?

A. He could not say: a very short time.

Q. What

Q. What time was you ready to move with the first brigade?

A. Was ready to move at 8 o'clock; he heard the light troops piquets and advanced posts were detached, he did not see them; he saw troops forward, but could not say what troops they were. He believed there were not flat bottomed boats sufficient to transport 2 or 3000 men from New York to the Jerseys, in order to cut off the retreat of the rebel army and their magazines; but there were sloops and craft of various kinds to be had, which would have answered the purpose. Rebel magazines and army might have been cut off.

Examined by other Members.

From New York to Albany 170 miles; has run it in 20 hours. Has sailed from The craft called Albany sloops compute it a run of four tides. New York to Albany in 20 hours. The tide runs strong: he saw it flow as high as Albany full four feet. A frigate may go within 30 or 40 miles of Albany. Knows a ship loaded goes from London Bridge within 6 miles of Albany. The land road no where more than 5 or 6 miles from the river but generally close to it. The river runs nearly north and south. No land position can be taken to bring batteries to bear on the heads or sterns of ships. No great annoyance could be given by batteries parallel with their broadsides, wind and tide favouring. The Rose and Phoenix passed the rebel batteries that by the report, noise, smoke, &c. appeared not mounted with less than 200 pieces of cannon. If the rebels not stronger than when Sir Henry Clinton stormed Fort Montgomery in autumn 1777, the possession of the Highlands might have been effected without much risk or loss. King's Ferry at the foot of the Highlands two miles across. If ships of force can ride there, impracticable for Washington's army to pass. Little danger from batteries on shore.

JOSEPH GALLOWAY, Esq;

A Lawyer, 48 years of age, and late one of the American Congress.

Examined by Lord George Germain.

I came over to the royal army Dec. 1776; at first not a fifth of the people thought of independence; some had independence in view as early as 1754; these men made a stalking horse of the lawyers in the time of the stamp act, and of the smugglers when the tea act passed, to sound the trumpet in opposition to government; nay not one tenth had independence in view. The Congress prevailed on a small part of the people to take up arms, then they disarmed all who were against independence. The clamour of the people to treat, obliged the Congress to send three Commissioners to meet Lord and General Howe. Not a fifth part of the Americans from choice have supported the present rebellion. The last Delegates from Pennsylvania to the Congress, and all the officers of that rebel state, were chosen by less than 200 voters, tho' there are 30,000 at least. One of the province of Rebels made tools of the lawyers. Not a fifth of the Americans for independence.

New

A Congress man New York Delegates for 1774 was chosen by one vote only * ; chosen by a single voter. and he was received by Congress, and sat in that assembly.

Congress recruits cost from 40*l.* to 100*l.*

Rebel army only 3,300 in Jersey.

Congress flies.

From the excessive tyranny of the present rulers of America, from the distresses of the war, from the loss of trade, from an aversion to French connections, which the people in America fear will end in a loss of their liberties civil and religious, from their old attachment to the Mother Country, and I believe an earnest desire to be reunited to it, more than four fifths of the Americans would prefer an union with Great Britain to independence. Many at first deluded by the Congress and its adherents have felt every degree of distress ; from those feelings they now reason, and would prefer their former happy situation to their present misery. The Americans would be distressed if they thought an opinion prevailed at home that they were in general hostile to Great Britain. The Congress have not found it easy to recruit their armies ; they have used every method that art or force could suggest. They have drafted their militia ; some have been driven into the field by the bayonet ; for substitutes and recruits from 40*l.* to 100*l.* has been given ; they manumitted every servant who entered. These were the methods by which the rebel armies were chiefly raised, since the people were convinced the Congress meant to establish independence. When General Howe landed on Long Island, the best information I could get made Washington's army 20,000 ; these were more militia than continental troops. After the success of the British arms on Long Island, New York, White Plains, and Fort Independence, Washington's army diminished rapidly. The rebel army when Washington crossed the Delaware, and Sir William Howe marched to Trenton, was not more than 3,300 men. They were panic struck and deserted in great numbers. I was at that time in Pennsylvania, many who fled passed by my house, I conversed with them, and they appeared to me in the extremest panic. When Sir William Howe was at Trenton, the people of Pennsylvania were disposed to submit, a very few of the most violent excepted ; very few of the militia would turn out ; they expected the British army in Philadelphia at that time ; the rebel Congress and all their officers fled in a panic from Philadelphia ; before they fled, two out of three gentlemen informed me that they were deputed by a number of respectable inhabitants to wait on Congress and inform them, that if General Howe passed the Delaware they would implore his protection. The Congress answered they could not blame them, for they could no longer protect them.† I had good opportunities of knowing the state of the middle Colonies, viz. New York, New-Jersey,

* Only two persons were at the meeting for King's County, Mr. Simon Boerum and his friend ; Mr. Simon Boerum appointed his friend Clerk, and then the Clerk appointed Mr. Simon Boerum a Delegate to Congress.

† Several gentlemen now in London know the Congress lost all fortitude, declared they were ruined, and in the greatest distress wept at their folly.

Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, the Delaware Counties, and Virginia. Gentlemen of fortune and integrity informed me, that the panic extended through all those parts, and few hoped of supporting independence. Had Sir William Howe pursued Washington cross the Delaware, I verily believe Congress would not have been able to raise 5000 men at the opening of next campaign; every gentleman I conversed with in Pennsylvania was of the same opinion. The defeating the Hessians at Trenton had a mischievous effect on the British service; it removed the panic, enabled the Congress to return to Philadelphia, revived the spirits of the disaffected, induced many of the militia to turn out, and contributed greatly to raising the rebel army next campaign. Yet Washington in the winter at Morris Town had not 6000 men, and the compulsory measures formerly mentioned were used. The British army did not find difficulty in procuring provisions when on the banks of the Delaware; I drew up invitations to the country people and in a little time a considerable magazine was formed at Burdettown; but the taking of Trenton obliged the troops to leave that post. Had Sir William Howe wintered at Philadelphia, the country was full of provisions; in 1777 when the British army was there, and Washington had four times the troops he had at Trenton, such of the inhabitants, army, and navy, as chose to eat fresh provisions were supplied by the country from without our lines. For 1777 the Congress voted 88 battalions, 750 men each, all 66,000 men, but they did not bring into the field 16,000, the men were not to be had; in Canada, at Boston by sickness, killed in battle, prisoners, and by deaths in their hospitals southward of New York, upon good enquiry, they lost nearly 40,000 men. Not a moiety of their army volunteers. By account kept 2300 deserters came in to our army at Philadelphia, and there might be 7 or 800 more. In all at least 3000 came in. Perhaps half as many more deserted into the country to their friends. Of those who came in, the names and places of nativity were taken down; one half of them were Irish, scarce a fourth Americans, the other fourth English or Scotch. The provincials in the British army when disciplined are very good troops; a recruit had five hard dollars. [22 lb. & 6 d.] Congress for their recruits gave twenty paper dollars, besides eight more to the person who procured a recruit. Paper dollars are now from fifteen or twenty for one.† I have known from 40 l. to 100 l. continental money given for a substitute.‡ I have been informed 6 or 7000 provincials are now serving in our army. We embodied a militia in Long Island; but none in the Jerseys

Consequences of Trenton defeat.
Provisions plentiful in Philadelphia.
Rebel exertions and losses.
3000 rebels deserted.
100 l. for a rebel substitute.

I
nor

* The rebels during the rebellion have lost in battle and by sickness in their naval and military service nearly 100,000; reckoned a fifth of the able bodied whites in America.

† When our army entered a province, rebel paper was in a manner annihilated; the people ventured openly to refuse it.

‡ Two hundred pounds have been given for a substitute.

nor in Philadelphia. I numbered the males and females by ⁴⁴³¹ males in fire of Sir William Howe, in Philadelphia and its suburbs ⁴⁴⁸¹ males between 18 and 60 years of age; part were Quakers; but I know no reason why the others might not have been induced to take up arms for defence of the city. I disarmed the disaffected in Philadelphia by orders from Sir William Howe. The well affected inhabitants had not in general arms put into their hands. I procured arms for 80 or 90 who came in from the country, and another body from the Jerseys had arms given them. In North Carolina by the rebel account 1600 men* took up arms in support of government but were defeated by the rebels. In the Peninsula between Chesapeak and Delaware 2000 took up arms. In the same place on another occasion several hundreds. In Monmouth County in the Jerseys about a hundred. Above Albany some districts took up arms and prevented the rebel part joining General Gates, declaring if they did they would join General Burgoyne. Cecil County in Maryland where General Howe landed much disaffected. About the head of the Elk numbers deserted their houses and carried off their effects, but not all; after advancing 8 or 10 miles, not 10 or 15 houses at most deserted on the march to Philadelphia at least 70 miles. The inhabitants shewed every mark of pleasure at the arrival of the troops. Fourteen days provisions were said to be landed. § The army left Pencadder September 8th, the first provisions received from the fleet in the Delaware was on October 3d. During that time the army were supplied with large quantities of provisions by the inhabitants, and took a magazine of flour at Valley Forge which I understood was destroyed. The army lay at Philadelphia 9 or 10 months; inhabitants 25,000; these with the army and navy did not want fresh provisions of all kinds. Part of that time Washington was at Valley Forge in great distress for want of provisions; deserters said they were several days at half allowance; some said they had furloughs to go in quest of provisions. Washington's supplies in great part were brought from Virginia and North Carolina up the Chesapeak Bay, landed at Elk, and carried in waggons to Valley Forge. The inhabitants adjoining were averse to Congress and did not supply him. General Howe in some measure relied on me for intelligence. I sent to my friends on the Susquehannah and the Delaware. I sent out many spies. The intelligence must have been good, whilst Washington complained of want of intelligence, and said he was in an enemies country. Persons came to me from all quarters of the middle Colonies. Washington wanted flour, bread, grain, and forage. He issued a proclamation ordering the farmers to thresh out their grain. It was not obeyed. He sent and took the grain without paying for it. He got few carriages but what he took by force. The people broke their wheels and disabled their waggons. The deserters in 1777 came

4431 males in
Philadelphia.

Attempts by
loyalists to op-
pose the rebels.

People pleased
on the arrival of
our troops.

Washington's
distress in Penn-
sylvanians

* Some had guns, the rest only clubs.

§ Army landed August 25th, but did not march till September 8th. Most of these provisions must have been expended.

came in nearly naked, except the Virginians and a few from the northward. Some without shoes, very few with whole breeches and Stockings. Washington seized a quantity of cloth in Bucks County for his army, but some of our American light horse and refugees took it and brought it to Philadelphia. Washington's army very sickly, the principal Physician told me for want of salt to their provisions, cloaths, and good appointments; at one time not less than ten hospitals. At Valley Forge end of February and beginning of March [1778] had not 4000 effective men, this from officers of his own army, occasioned by sickness and desertion. A much greater army than 15,000 might subsist in a march through the middle Colonies, unless lately much altered; they are Colonies of provisions; plenty of cattle, hogs, Indian corn, wheat, rye, oats, and barley. The army and its attendants, 20,000, fed by the country in the march from Elke to Philadelphia. General inclination of the middle Colonies in spring 1778 to give up their new rulers and unite with this country. Gentlemen from almost all the counties in the peninsula below, and from Philadelphia County, Bucks, Lancaster, Chester, Cumberland, and some of the Jersey counties, sent me assurances, that as soon as Washington was driven over the Susquehannah or Delaware, if supplied with arms, they had no doubt of restoring the several districts to the peace of the Crown. I do not say I gave these facts to Sir William Howe, but I did to Sir Henry Clinton.

At Valley Forge
not 4,000 men.

Loyal assurances
in Pennsylv-
vania.

When Sir William Howe arrived off the Delaware, no obstruction to landing below the Chevaux de Frise unless the water guard may be so deemed; no regular force in Pennsylvania at that time; the distance between the Bite of Newcastle and the road from Elke head to Philadelphia 7 or 8 miles; Washington then in the Jerseys; he did not pass the Delaware till about 10th or 12th August, and thro' Philadelphia about the 23d.

From a conversation with Lord Howe I suspected General Howe intended going round by Chesapeak. I saw the difficulties; I put them in writing; Captain Montresor approved of them; and undertook to deliver them to the General. In substance they were, the distance from Sandy Hook to Elk; the prevalence of southerly winds at that time of the year; as a motive to prefer the Delaware, I mentioned the distance from Newcastle to Lancaster where Washington had his Magazines was nearly the same as from the head of the Elke, the country more open and roads better; that supposing these Magazines his object, going up the Delaware would cover his design, as the enemy would naturally conclude Philadelphia was his object and not the magazines. About 8 or 10 days after Sir William Howe asked me if my objections rested on the difficulties of the Chesapeak navigation. I said, they did not.

Mr. Galloway's
Reasons for
landing in the
Delaware.

The evacuation of Philadelphia struck the inhabitants with great dismay and distress.

Mr. Schoemaker told me that Sir William Howe had advised him

Geh. Howe ad- to go over to Washington and make his peace. At the request of the vices many per- Magistrates, I waited upon Sir William Howe, and he gave us the sons to go over same advice, and told us to apply to Sir Henry Clinton for a flag to to the rebels. go out. After consultation we unanimously agreed not to follow it.

Probable effect if they had.

I communicated the whole to Colonel Innis, he was alarmed that we should be advised to go over to the enemy; he went to Sir Henry Clinton who said he could not grant a flag on such an occasion; that the game was not up; that the war was not over; it would still be vigorously carried on; and desired us not to entertain a thought of going over to the enemy. If the Magistrates had gone over to the rebels it would have had every pernicious effect. The people would have believed what the rebels industriously propagated, that the contest was given up, and that America was to be evacuated. They would, or at least great numbers of them would have taken the oaths to the rebel States, and become their perfect subjects.

Rebels permitted to escape.

I attended the army from Brunswick to Trenton in 1776; the army marched early and arrived at Prince Town at four in the afternoon. Washington's main body then at Trenton, part at Prince Town. Washington left Prince Town an hour before the British army arrived. Our army marched next morning between 8 and 9 o'clock and arrived at Trenton at three in the afternoon. Washington's force about 3300; this from returns made to Washington the day before he passed the Delaware. Had Sir William Howe marched from Prince Town at 4 o'clock morning as he did from Brunswick, or at 3 o'clock as he did from Philadelphia to White Marsh, he would have been at Trenton 4 or 5 hours sooner. Washington's last boat had not reached the opposite shore when the British Van arrived at Trenton.

Examined by several Members.

No difficulty in passing the Delaware.

No difficulties appeared to me to prevent the British army passing the Delaware December 1776; Washington's force was small; that river about Trenton from 3 to 400 yards wide; the ground high, and perfectly commands the opposite side far beyond cannon shot. I know of no difficulty except want of boats or pontoons. I enquired about Trenton for materials to construct pontoons, boats, or rafts. I found 48,000 feet of boards, a quantity of iron, and there was timber enough about Trenton for that purpose. There were two boats would carry from 50 to 60 men each.

No distinction in plundering.

A Proclamation was issued by Sir William Howe in the Jerseys, offering pardon to such as took the oath of allegiance, and promising to protect their persons and properties. Many, by far too many, were plundered by the British and Hessians troops whilst they had in their custody these written protections. Friends to Government and the disaffected often shared the same fate. The people came to me in tears complaining they had been plundered of every thing, even the pot to boil their victuals. Mr. Sharp of New York, a friend to Government,

was plundered of many thousands of Madeira wine. This was settled. The rebels made many affidavits of our plundering, which they circulated over all America.

2. Do you know any roads leading round Washington's camp at Middlebrook on the north, by which Sir William Howe might have passed round between him, the Delaware and his magazines?

A. I never passed the road from Brunswick to Middlebrook.*

When the armies were at Middlebrook Washington's artillery magazine was at Norrington, 15 miles from Philadelphia; his magazines of provisions at Lancaster, Manheim, Carlisle, Lebanon, and I believe some at Reading. Washington might have remained in the Jerseys, tho' General Howe crossed the Delaware, had he been determined to abide the consequences that might have attended the loss of his magazines.† Pontoons were built at New York for crossing the Delaware and a number of flat boats prepared; these were carried to Brunswick and left The Delaware there. The Delaware is fordable in a great variety of places; fordable. in June, July, August, September, October, the passage is occasionally interrupted by heavy rains; when the rain ceases the freshes generally subside in 4 or 5 days. I cannot tell whether the rain we had at Hillsborough made it unfordable or not.

I was refused a pardon as unnecessary. [*Mr. Galloway's plan of accommodation which he proposed in Congress, was, that the government should be administered by a President General appointed by the King, and a Grand Council chosen by the different Assemblies once in three years. No more need be said of it, as he does not propose it as a perfect plan, nor altogether as a plan of his judgment.*]

I did sign the American association to prevent Congress taking more violent measures. I have never read it since I signed it, signed rebel association, and I liked it so little. I am ready to answer all questions tho' they may tend to criminate myself, if the Committee approve of it. I sat in the Committee of Grievances. The violent party in Congress sent me a halter and a letter threatening me with death if I did not make use of it. The Congress entered their resolutions as unanimous, though sometimes one third of the members present voted against the question. In Congress I opposed every

* The Chart of New Jersey will show that there is a road from Brunswick to Bound Brook, and thence to Easton; and it is known there are many roads leading round Washington's camp on the right and left, by which Sir William Howe might have passed to the Delaware. Sir William Howe could not be ignorant of these facts, as the Surveyor of the district in which Washington was encamped, was at that time in the British army.

† Had Washington remained in the Jerseys and permitted General Howe to pass the Delaware, his magazines must have been lost; and all Pennsylvania must have submitted. He would either have fought in the Jerseys, or passed the Delaware to defend the objects on which the existence of his army materially depended: for these he fought at Brandywine in August; and for these he must have fought in New Jersey or Pennsylvania in June, or lost them.

ry violent measure. Of the ten resolutions considered by the Congress as their Bill of Rights, I opposed the 1st and 4th; 2d and 3d I don't recollect; the 5th and 6th I did not; the 7th I do not recollect; the 8th I must have opposed; I was of a contrary opinion to the 9th and I believe opposed it; as to the 10th I do not recollect. Mr. Duane and I opposed approving the opposition entered into by the Massachusetts Bay.

But opposed violent measures.

In Pennsylvania the people took up arms with great reluctance; there are near 30,000 souls in Philadelphia, but the militia was never above 15 or 1600 men; Bucks County short of that number; not a greater proportion in Chester County; three of the oldest first settled Counties. In Pennsylvania Sir William Howe had I think a very strong army considering the force in opposition to him. The enemy at Brandywine were not more than 15,000 men officers and all the army attendants included, save about 1000 militia for whom they could not get arms.

At Brandywine rebels 15,000.

The people in West Jersey had been deserted, it is not natural to think that people of property will join an army merely passing thro' the country without some protection left with them. The army occupied Philadelphia 26th September 1777, and left it I think June 18th 1778. Washington possessed the country without the British lines, if the people had risen he could easily have suppressed them, as the well affected had been disarmed before. Could Sir William Howe have remained a month at Elke or about Newcastle, the Counties from Elke to the Capes, about 200 miles, would in my opinion have risen in arms. I understood from Mr. Robinson, a gentleman of the first weight and consequence in these Counties, who came to Sir William Howe at New York, that if he was provided with arms and a few men, that he would land on the Peninsula, and in course of the fleets going round to Chesapeake, he would engage to raise men enough to disarm the rebels in that quarter and meet Sir William Howe at the head of the Elke. He often regretted that he had not been put on shore. I kept a journal of material transactions from leaving my family to entering Philadelphia. I kept none of the proceedings of Congress. I held the office of superintendant at the request of General Howe. My life was attainted by an act of the rebel States, and my estate not short of £ 40,000 Sterling confiscated. I receive a very small pittance from Government compared with what I have sacrificed.

Mr. Robinson's spirited offers.

A strong charge by Lord Howe. 2. [By Lord Howe.] Did not you advise every one of your friends, who you thought could remain in safety with the rebels, to stay in Philadelphia, and were not two persons who followed that advice, afterwards put to death?

Denied by Mr. Galloway.

A. There was not a person who had taken an active part, to my knowledge, but I advised to come away with the British army. As to Roberts and Carlisle the persons alluded to, the first never consulted me; Carlisle I positively advised to quit the City, because I knew he would not be safe.

FUGITIVE

FUGITIVE PIECES

RESPECTING THE

American War.

Lord Howe in a speech April 29th, gave the following reasons for demanding an enquiry. His conduct and his Brother's had been arraigned in Pamphlets and in News Papers, written by persons in high credit and confidence with Ministers; by several Members of that House, in that House, in the face of the Nation; by some of great credit and respect in their public characters, known to be countenanced by Administration: and that one of them in particular, (Governor Johnstone) had made the most direct and specific charges.

The Pieces alluded to by his Lordship are here inserted to give the Reader a full view of the Subject.

LETTER from BOSTON.

July 5th, 1775.

A Constant hurry, a succession of unexpected events, and a crowd of reflexions during my few leisure hours, have till the present day prevented my writing. But I shall begin regularly. General Gage was both well informed and prudent in fortifying Boston neck. The rebels had laid a plan to surprise the town, to cut off the troops, and the loyal subjects. This Plan to cut off the army in Boston was discovered through the strong inveteracy of some of the conspirators, who could not help enjoying before hand, in conversation, the pleasure of the massacre. Proper measures were taken to prevent it; but no search made for concealed arms. The evening of St. George's day was the time fixed; the officers doors were to be particularly marked. A hint from the Bible.

The 18th of April, at eleven at night, 800 grenadiers and light infantry embarked at the common under Lieut. Colonel Smith, and landed at Phipps's Farm. The object to destroy a rebel

Action at Concord.

rebel magazine at Concord about twenty miles distant. On their route early next morning at Lexington, they were opposed by a body of armed men, who from fences, fired upon our advanced guard, but were soon dispersed. Arriving at Concord we executed the purpose for which we were detached, throwing into the river near an hundred barrels of powder, a quantity of salted provisions, flour, &c. and destroyed some gun carriages, three guns, &c. Capt. Parsons sent forward from the bridge with three companies, on his return found Capt. Laurie who had been left to possess it, driven off; luckily for him and his party the rebels did not break up the bridge, or he and his men would have been cut off. On this spot they found three of Laurie's men who had been wounded, dreadfully mangled by the rebels; they were scalped, their ears cut off, and gouged, this last is pushing the eyes out of their sockets, and yet these miserable men were still alive.

Our wounded scalped, and eyes put out.

From Concord back to Lexington, we sustained a constant fire from every fence, house, hollow way, and height as we passed along. Here Lord Percy joined us with the first brigade. He had left Boston at 9 o'clock that morning. It was a necessary reinforcement, for the whole country was in arms, and all the picked men for forty miles round. We got back to Boston with the loss of upwards of fifty men, and many more wounded. This finished our excursions after rebel Magazines. I cannot tell the rebel loss.

Two strange blunders.

Our secret had been ill kept, the rebels knew our intention and were prepared for us. Lieut. Col. Smith's party would have been destroyed had not Lord Percy joined him, and even he was almost too late from two stupid blunders we committed. The General ordered the first brigade under arms at four in the morning; these orders the evening before were carried to the Brigade Major's; he was not at home; the orders were left; no enquiry was made after him; he came home late; his servant forgot to tell him there was a letter on his table; four o'clock came; no brigade appeared; at five o'clock an express from Smith desiring a reinforcement produced an enquiry; the above discovery was made; at six o'clock part of the brigade got on the parade; there they waited expecting the marines; at seven no marines appearing, another enquiry commenced; they had received no orders; it was asserted they had; in the altercation it came out that the order had been addressed to Major Pitcairn who commanded the Marines and left at his quarters, though the gentleman concerned in this business ought to have recollected he had been dispatched the evening before with the grenadiers and light infantry under Lieut. Colonel Smith. This double mistake lost us from four till nine o'clock, the time we marched off to support Lieut. Colonel Smith.

On

On the 17th of June, at day break, we saw the rebels at work throwing up intrenchments on Bunkers hill ; by mid-day they had completed a redoubt of earth about thirty yards square on the height ; and from the left of that, a line of about half a mile in length down to Mystic river : of this line 100 yards next the redoubt was also earth, about five feet high, all the rest down to the water consisted of two rows of fence rails, the interval filled with bushes, hay, and grass, which they found on the spot ready cut.

Early in the afternoon, from a battery in the corner of the redoubt, they fired seven or eight shot into the north end of the town ; one shot went through an old house, another through a fence, and the rest stuck in the face of Cobb's hill.

At this time their lines were attacked by Major General Howe at the head of 1600 men, composed of 20 companies of grenadiers and light infantry, 40 men each, with the 5th, 38th, 43d, and 52d regiment. General Howe commanded on the right with the light infantry, Brigadier General Pigot on the left ; while Pigot attacked the redoubt, Howe was to force the grass fence, gain the rebel's left flank and rear, and surround the redoubt.

Our troops advanced with great confidence, expecting an easy victory. As they were marching up to attack, our artillery stopped firing, the General on enquiring the reason was told they had got twelve pound balls to six pounders, but that they had grape shot ; on this he ordered them forward and to fire grape. As we approached, an incessant stream of fire poured from the rebel lines, it seemed a continued sheet of fire for near thirty minutes. Our light infantry were served up in companies against the grass fence, without being able to penetrate ; indeed how could we penetrate, most of our grenadiers and light infantry the moment of presenting themselves, lost 3-fourths, and many 9-tenths of their men. Some had only eight and nine men a company left, some only three, four, and five. On the left Pigot was staggered and actually retreated ; observe our men were not driven back, they actually retreated by orders : great pains has been taken to huddle up this matter : however, they almost instantly came on again and mounted the redoubt. The rebels then run without firing another shot, and our men who first mounted gave them a fire or two on their backs. At this time Warren their commander fell : he was a Physician, little more than thirty years of age ; he died in his best cloaths ; every body remembered his fine silk fringed waistcoat. The right flank of the rebel lines being now gained, and not the left as was intended, their whole body ran along the neck to Cambridge. No pursuit was made.

We have lost 1000 men killed and wounded. We burned Charlestown during the engagement, as the rebels from it ex-

K

ceedingly

ceedingly galled our left. Major Pitcairn was killed from it. Too great a confidence in ourselves, which is always dangerous, occasioned this dreadful loss. Let us take the bull by the horns was the phrase of some great men among us as we marched on. We went to battle without even reconnoitering the position of the enemy. Had we only wanted to drive them from their ground without the loss of a man, the Cymetry transport which drew little water, and mounted 18 nine pounders, could have been towed up Mystic channel, and brought to within musket shot of their left flank which was quite naked, and she could have lain water borne at the lowest ebb tide; or one of our covered boats, musket proof, carrying a heavy piece of cannon, might have been rowed close in, and one discharge on their uncovered flank, would have dislodged them in a second.

Could have dislodged the rebels without the loss of a man.

Or taken them all prisoners.

Had we intended to have taken the whole rebel army prisoners, we needed only have landed in their rear and occupied the high ground above Bunkers hill, by this movement we shut them up in the Peninsula as in a bag, their rear exposed to the fire of our cannon, and if we pleased our musketry: in short, they must have surrendered instantly, or been blown to pieces.

But from an absurd and destructive confidence, carelessness, or ignorance, we have lost a thousand of our best men and officers, and have given the rebels great matter of triumph, by shewing them what mischief they can do us. They were not followed though Clinton proposed it. Their deserters since tell us that not a man would have remained at Cambridge, had but a single regiment been seen coming along the neck.

Or stormed their works with a tenth of the loss.

Had we seen and rejected all the advantages I have mentioned above, even our manner of attacking in front was ruinous. In advancing, not a shot should have been fired, as it retarded the troops, whose movement should have been as rapid as possible. They should not have been brought up in line, but in columns with light infantry in the intervals, to keep up a smart fire against the top of the breast work. If this had been done, their works would have been carried in three minutes, with not a tenth part of our present loss.

A Dalilah the cause of the artillery blunder.

We should have been forced to retire, if General Clinton had not come up with a reinforcement of 5 or 600 men. This re-established the left under Pigot, and saved our honour. The wretched blunder of the over sized balls sprung from the dotage of an officer of rank in that corps, who spends his whole time in dallying with the Schoolmaster's daughters. God knows he is old enough—he is no Sampson—yet he must have his Dalilah.

Another circumstance equally true and astonishing is, that General Gage had undoubted intelligence early in May, that the rebels intended to possess Bunkers hill, yet no step was taken to secure that important post, though it commanded all the north part of the town. He likewise had an exact return of the

the corps that composed the rebel army then investing the town; of every piece of cannon they possessed; of their intermed lines of blockade; and of the numbers expected, and on their march from the other Provinces.

We are all wrong at the head. My mind cannot help dwelling upon our cursed mistakes. Such ill conduct at the first outset, argues a gross ignorance of the most common and obvious rules of the profession, and gives us for the future anxious forebodings. I have lost some of those I most valued. This madness or ignorance nothing can excuse. The brave men's lives were wantonly thrown away. Our conductor as much murdered them as if he had cut their throats himself on Boston common. Had he fallen, ought we to have regretted him?

LETTER from NEW YORK.

March, 9th, 1777.

As probably you may not have heard the true particulars of our flight from Boston, about this time last year, I shall give it you. Soon after our victory as it has been called on Bunkers Hill, General Howe succeeded to the command of the army. This for some time gave pretty general satisfaction, as General Gage was thought too tame, and by some suspected of a predilection for the Americans, arising from his family connections. The critical situation of our affairs demanded men of vigour and enterprize. Some complained of his complaisance to the Boston select men, of his saying they were good sort of people and saved him much trouble; and of his gossiping with the Commissioners. These people, you may believe, admired General Howe for the opposite qualities, which they said, or imagined, he possessed. He was an officer of experience, and tried courage; the Select Men would be proscribed, every American distrusted; and the Commissioners would not be permitted to thrust their noses into his house. All tittle tattle and gossiping were to be at end at Head Quarters. Even the blunders at Bunkers Hill were forgotten, so happy were most people at the change. His reserve and retirement were imputed to an indefatigable attention to the duties of his station, and his personal gloom and moroseness were apologized for from the vexation that a great mind, always intent on important objects, must feel from frivolous or impertinent intrusions. It was a considerable time before this was discovered to be only a fancy picture. The man's retirements, were found to be not the retirements of business; and his habitual moroseness, not the moroseness of a great mind disturbed by impertinence. We remained the fall and winter waiting reinforcements. In March the rebels appeared on Dorchester Neck, which com-

Opinions on General Gage.

On Gen. Howe.

Letters real character.

Should have
possessed Dor-
chester heights.

Secret capitula-
tion at Boston.

Sullivan's odd
scheme.

Good speech of
General Howe.

A blunder loses
us 700 men.

Gen. Howe lets
the rebel army
escape.

mands the South part of Boston, as Bunker's Hill does the North part. We had once a detachment on this height, but abandoned it. The rebels discovered its importance, and as soon as the season permitted, occupied it. We embarked 2000 men to attack them, but a violent storm prevented the execution. Next day, the rebels were thought too strongly posted; and soon after, orders were given for an evacuation. Thus by a palpable neglect of our own, were we forced to desert a town with disgrace, which had cost us at least 2000 men to keep; and that too just on the eve of our receiving the expected reinforcements. In fact, our safe retreat was owing to a secret capitulation with the rebels. They were to allow us to run away quietly, and we were not to burn the town. It is impossible to enumerate the immense variety of goods that were left, particularly woollens and linens. A rich, and what is more, a much wanted supply for the rebels. Had we attacked at Dorchester, we most probably should have been repulsed. Our detachment was too weak; and the rebels, by Sullivan's advice, had got more than 100 hogsheds filled with stones to roll down the hill and break our lines as we advanced. When it was determined to run away, the General convened the principal officers and made a speech to them on the occasion, and some even of them who disliked him most, confessed their was real merit in it, which greatly perplexed them, as they were sure it was not his own, and yet they could not discover where he got it.

Though our reinforcements were by this time thought to be at Sea, no care was taken to leave a sufficient force off the harbour to prevent them running into the mouth of the enemy. Indeed the Renown, Capt. Banks, was left in Nantasket Road, but it never appeared he had proper orders, for on the first salute from only one piece of cannon, he made the best of his way for Halifax; whereas, he should have continued cruizing off the harbour, to give information of our retreat. This was a capital blunder, the result of the most impenetrable stupidity, and lost us Lieut. Col. Campbell and 700 men, who run right into the harbour of Boston, not knowing but that place was still in our hands.

Our voyage to and from Halifax was just like any other sea voyage, where troops are too much crowded together.

Last August on Long Island we rejected an opportunity of terminating the rebellion; the rebels when defeated ran into their lines in the utmost disorder, our grenadiers were following them with great ardour, when the General after much difficulty, called them off. Had our troops been allowed to go on, not a soul of the rebels would have escaped. A lady, whose husband and brother were rebel officers, on their defeat rushed into the house, and desired her to fly with her child, as they expected every moment to be cut in pieces. She did so; but could

could not get within a quarter of a mile of the ferry ; the rebel croud was so great, and they were in such trepidation, that those in the rear were mounting on the shoulders and clambering over the heads of those before them. What a glorious opportunity did General Howe here reject of finishing the war with eclat. We threw away three days in regular approaches, during all which time the rebels were ferrying themselves over, for it was the morning of the 30th before their rear embarked.

Lord Howe could send two frigates up the North River, for a whim of his own, and expose them to the fire of at least 100 pieces of cannon, but he lay almost within sight of the ferry, and let the rebel army cross it, tho' it was a branch of the sea near a mile wide, for three days, or at least two days and half, without sending any of his numerous squadron to annoy them. So does Lord H.

I asked a warm friend of the Admiral's, why his Lordship did not bring his heavy ships against the batteries on the East River, and cut off the rebel retreat as well as risk his frigates for no purpose up the North River ? The reply was the Admiral did not chuse to risk his Majesty's ships. Thus his Lordship will not risk his Majesty's ships ; the General will not risk his Majesty's men ; for these reasons the rebels escaped, and the rebellion continues. So the rebellion continues.

Every day presents new blunders, we have lost three regiments of Hessians in the Jerseys this winter, and nearly an equal number of our own men from our foraging parties ; all from not supporting and protecting our line of cantonment formed the end of last year. Our Commander has been enjoying his pleasures while every thing has been going to wreck in the Jerseys. What do you think of the favourite sultana losing 300 guineas in a night at cards, who three years ago would have found it difficult to have mustered as many pence ? Don't you think this Boston Lady in high luck ? As to the husband, his various places are reckoned 6000*l.* a year : it is said he does not save a shilling :—But he looks fat and contented. Losses in Jerseys
The profusion of the Sultana
Her husband fat and contented.

REMARKS on General HOWE's own account of his proceedings on LONG ISLAND, in the *Extraordinary Gazette* of October 10th, 1776.

UPON any undue miscarriage in our land or sea service, every man's love of justice, and regard for the public interest, will lead him to wish, that wheresoever the fault lay, there may fall the public censure and disgrace : that the innocent may not suffer, and the guilty may not escape. If a measure

Caution in judging of Generals and Ministers.

sure

sure has been originally wrong and ill concerted, or was in itself too hazardous or impracticable; and we lay upon the commander the blame of not having succeeded in it, we may lose a good general, and retain a bad minister. If, on the other hand the measure, as originally planned, was right and proper, and we blame the minister, because the general misbehaved in the execution, in that case we may lose a good minister, and retain a bad commander. Every honest man must see, that the public interest is much concerned in the making this necessary distinction.

Conduct of all
oppositions.

The conduct of all oppositions is little different. In every miscarriage their invariable rule of practice has been to justify the commander, and to lay the blame on the minister. Far from feeling any concern for their country, and expressing a just resentment at any misconduct in the commanders; they hold themselves rather obliged to them for disgracing the service, and furnishing them with a fresh ground of attack upon their rivals.

Obliged to Of-
ficers who mis-
behave.

False charge of
oppos. in 1741.

Upon the miscarriage at Carthagea in 1741, ministers, they said, had starved the war, and tied up the hands of the commanders. Afterwards, their own letters, which Vernon published, proved the leaders in opposition knew the falshood of this charge. But it served their purpose to give it out, and the people were made believe it.

Mr. Pitt's opi-
on of Byng.

Upon Admiral Byng's misbehaviour in 1756. Mr. Pitt told the House, in his own favourite and absurd idiom, he found no criminality in Mr. Byng. Mr. Pitt himself, when he came to be minister, upon the misconduct at Rochfort, experienced something of the same kind. But as the Newcastle party had, as he said, lent him their majority, the opposition was too feeble to make head against him.

His saying
when in power.

A good plan and
sufficient force
the Minister's
duty.

The Executive
part the Gene-
ral's duty.

If in projecting any distant expedition, a minister shall have formed a good and proper plan, and furnished a sufficient force for the execution of it, he has discharged his part, and done all that is incumbent upon him. The manner of making use of that force, and of carrying the plan into execution, that lies with the commander.

Our low ebb
when Ld. G. G.
became Secreta.

When Lord George Germaine became secretary, the British interest in America was at its lowest ebb. Our troops had been ingloriously pent up in Boston, and still more ingloriously driven out of it. The whole American empire was reduced to Halifax and Quebec, and Quebec itself was besieged. In this low state of our affairs, Lord George Germaine took the seals, and gave a vigour to our councils unknown to them before. By engaging a large body of foreign troops, and sending the earliest succour up the river St. Lawrence, the whole of Canada was recovered, a fleet was built at St. John's, and the rebels were beaten from off the lakes.

His vigorous
councils.

General

General Howe, at the head of between twenty and thirty thousand men, and attended by a great fleet, landed on Long Island a force superior in number, and much more in discipline to that which opposed him. By a just disposition the out-posts were all forced; ten thousand of the rebels, as the General himself counts them, were defeated; beside the killed, wounded, and drowned, eleven hundred of them were made prisoners, and the rest fled with the utmost precipitation into their lines, pursued by the victors close up to their trenches. Filled with all the ardour of success, the troops would instantly have entered their camp, when the General thought he had, for that day at least done the rebel army damage enough; and chose to give them time to recover from their fright. See his own account of the affair.

"The grenadiers and 33d regiment being in front of the column, soon approached within musket shot of the enemy's lines at Brooklyn; from whence these battalions, without regard to the fire of cannon and small arms upon them, pursued numbers of the rebels that were retiring from the heights, so close to their principal redoubt, and with such eagerness to attack it by storm, that it required repeated orders to prevail on them to desist from the attempt. Had they been permitted to go on, it is my opinion they would have carried the redoubt; but as it was apparent the lines must have been ours at a very cheap rate by regular approaches, I would not risk the loss that might have been sustained in the assault, and ordered them back to a hollow way, in the front of the works, out of the reach of musquetry."

Can the reader wonder, that the troops were thus eager for the attack, and that it required repeated orders to prevail upon them to desist, when the General himself was of opinion, and every other man plainly saw, that the lines must have been forced, and the whole rebel army taken or destroyed? Even without any previous defeat, the army which attacks another in their trenches, is generally thought to have the advantage. But there is scarce an instance to be found, of a defeated army precipitately flying into their trenches, ever defending them against a victorious army of near double their number. The French generals ascribed their losing the battle of Turin to their staying behind their lines. Prince Eugene had certainly never won it, if when he had got up to them, he had delayed the attack, and had thought only of besieging them with regular approaches. King William lost the battle of Landen by trusting to his lines, which Marshal Luxembourg attacked as soon as he came up to them, without giving him time to cross the river in the night and escape him.

Had the commander in chief chosen to follow the judgment of the other generals, and stormed the lines, the rebel army was at their mercy, and the war would have been at an end.

Battle of Brookl.

Rebels defeated.

Troops eager to storm but called off.

Gen. H's opinion they would have carried the redoubt.

Remarks on this conduct.

Troops attacked in their lines generally beaten.

Exemplified in the French at Turin.

And King Will at Landen.

Gen. Howe's not pushing his victory, not the fault of Minst. it

it the fault of the ministers at home, that the rebellion was not brought to so happy a period?

It was not the Minister that called off the troops. Was it the minister that suggested the giving up all these advantages, by calling off the troops in the midst of victory, and the hiding them in a hollow-way, out of the reach of musket-shot? and then, after two days delay, deliberately opening trenches at six hundred yards distance?

Marlborough storms the strong lines at Donawert. From this slow and solemn preparation we might think, that these lines were as strong as those of Donawert; which yet the Duke of Marlborough stormed the same evening that he came up to them. But did we ever hear of a great and victorious

Rebel lines 3 miles long, ditch only 3 or 4 feet deep. army's being stopped in the midst of conquest, for forming regular approaches against the ditch of a line, which was three miles long, and only three or four feet deep? Did not the rebel fugitives run over the ditch and breast work, wherever their pursuers suffered them? and could not British troops as easily

As the rebs. run over them, they might have been followed. have followed them? Were these lines guarded by any such rocky precipices, as those which the Hessians stormed at Fort Washington? Had the redoubt, for which the success of

Forts Washington & Montgomery much stronger yet stormed. twenty thousand victors was stopped, a tenth part of the strength that nature and art had given to Fort Montgomery? which yet General Clinton stormed, with one quarter of that number; without losing three minutes upon regular approaches.

Opinion of other Generals. The loss of a hundred men, which other generals thought would be the greatest they could sustain in forcing the camp; and the putting an end to the war, by the deletion of the rebel army, would have been the saving of ten thousand brave men's lives, which have been lost by protracting it.

Reb's escape by land and sea. But it was apparent, we are told, that the lines must have been ours at a very cheap rate by regular approaches. Doubtless—but they helped him to a much cheaper one: and that was, to move off and leave them to him. Were not the same boats, which carried the rebel army from New York to Long Island, lying ready to bring them back from Long Island to New York? Had the admiral destroyed any one of them? Could they wish for more than three days leisure to collect and add to them all the vessels in New York, and the adjacent places, to carry them off? Could he think that they would not exert their utmost diligence to save themselves from the destruction which they hourly expected.

12 or 14,000 men, and all their baggage & stores, cross an arm of the sea unmolested by the Admiral or General. Instances do not often occur of a General's vigilance being thus eluded. And we may justly wonder, that a whole army of twelve or fourteen thousand men, with almost all their baggage, and stores, should move off, across an arm of the sea, twelve hundred yards over, without the General or Admiral knowing any thing of the matter; that their very centinels, to say nothing of their artillery, should be drawn off, and our advanced

advanced centinels give no notice of it. There are, indeed, who say ;—But let others write what they hear ;—I would confine myself to the General's own account of his suffering them thus to escape.

One of the greatest military achievements of the Prince of Parma's life, was his conveying his army across the Seine, after being shut up by the French in a Peninsula of that river ; and nothing ever happened more mortifying to Henry the Fourth. But our sea and land commanders suffer a beaten army, instead of a victorious one, to ferry over an arm of the sea, without making any the least apology. The General having at his own cheap rate gotten possession of the lines, seems quite at ease ; and, far from expressing any mortification at their escape, treats their flight out of the island as rather a matter of triumph.

The noble Admiral's account runs in much the same strain. Lord Howe's conduct. " The Roebuck, Capt. Hammond, was the only ship that could fetch high enough to exchange a few random shot with the battery on Red Hook ; the ebb making strongly down the river soon after, I ordered the squadron to anchor. On the night of the 29th, the rebels abandoned all their posts and works on Long Island, and retired with precipitation across the East River to the town of New York." Ebb stops the fleet.

If a crow had fled over the passage, could he have spoken of it with a calmer indifference ? Remarks on it.

The reader will observe, that the journal of the fleet's proceedings ends on the morning of the 27th : whether, and which way the wind veered during the three following days, is not said. All, which we at this distance can know, is, if the tide of ebb made it necessary to cast anchor, to prevent the ships being carried down ; that in those three days there were six tides of flood to carry them up. But 3 days, six tides of flood might have carried them up.

The expression, " leaving their cannon in all their works," manifestly leads us to conclude, that they did not take any away. If this was the case, and we look to the list of the cannon taken, in what a contemptible light must all these lines, redoubts, and batteries appear. The brass pieces were taken in the rout of the 27th. From that day therefore to the 30th, a great army, with forty pieces of artillery, beside their field equipage, attended by a fleet carrying many hundred guns, are all stopped in the full career of victory, and kept in awe for three days together, by lines, redoubts and batteries of three miles extent, containing all of them put together only twenty-six pieces of iron ordnance. Lines of 3 miles extent containing only 26 cannons. stop us 3 days.

All these various movements, necessarily attending the retreat and embarkation of ten or twelve thousand men, with the best part of their cannon, baggage and stores, were performed without any the least interruption from either army or fleet, which lay so near : and that too on the very night of a full moon. The rebels move off without interruption.

L

I do

If Lord Howe could not intercept, Gen. Howe should not have permitted them to escape. I do not however put the dilemma. Either the ships, on one of the foregoing days, could have pushed up beyond the ferry, and prevented that vast transportation; or, they could not; because I suppose, that the batteries on the two shores, and on Governor's Island, rendered it impracticable. But then the General could not but know this. And the public might have expected that he would have pressed the enemy so much the more, and given them no time to escape from him at land; since he knew he could not intercept their passage at sea. The nation surely need not repent the having put this gentleman at the head of an American establishment for fifty-four thousand troops, attended with ninety-six ships of war.

America establishment under Gen. H. 54,000 men, with 96 ships of war.

LETTER from NEW YORK.

December 10th, 1777.

Burgoyne's ruin imputed to Gen. Howe. If you was in this town, you would be surprized to find the Howes so unpopular; they have been so here all this campaign. The total loss of General Burgoyne's army can only be imputed to them.

Military division of America. By thistime, to possess the lakes and the North River, and, by that means to separate the northern and southern colonies, seems to have been the expectation of the King, Ministry, Parliament, and the nation.

Had General Howe gone up the North River, instead of acting to the Southward, that line of separation would have been formed in July; General Burgoyne's army would have been saved, and both armies, conjunctly or separately, might have acted against New England, which would have been striking at the heart of the rebellion.

Plan to conquer it. Had this been done in December, the rebel inhabitants of Connecticut must have taken shelter in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and there they must have all starved or submitted in the space of a few months, as those provinces never yet maintained their own inhabitants.

All this might have been done; admitting, however improbable, that Washington had forced our posts on the North River, and passed it, which is not likely he could do, not having boats, and having both our armies and shipping opposed to him.

Supposing therefore, as the most probable case, that he could not pass the North River, he must either remain a tame spectator of the conquest of New England, or attack Staten Island; for New York he could not approach without passing the North River. That island might easily have been defended, as very strong positions may be taken on it, it is greatly protected by the shipping, and the posts there could easily be reinforced

forced and supported. Besides, Washington, in attempting the North River, might, in the course of the campaign, have given General Howe an opportunity of attacking him with success.

General Howe might then have either conquered or destroyed Connecticut, and then the rest of the northern rebel colonies, must either have starved, or sued for pardon. The conquest of the Southern provinces, would the year ensuing, have followed of course.

Now all the business is to begin over again on our part, under infinite disadvantages, the defeat and capture of General Burgoyne's army having raised the insolence of the rebels to the highest pitch, and they now boast that they are invincible.

In fact General Howe's round about voyage to Philadelphia, and turning his back on the very place where he ought to have acted, has done more to strengthen rebellion than all the Committees and Congresses among the rebels, and their confederates at home.

General Howe in his retreat from the Jerseys, in his embarkation, in his stay on board the transports, before he sailed, in his voyage to the mouth of the Delaware, where he played at bo-peep with the rebels, and, in his circumbendibus to Chesapeak Bay, expended near three months of the finest time of the campaign; and all this to go out of his way, to desert his real business, and to leave Burgoyne, with 6000 regulars, to fall a sacrifice.

There never was a campaign so injudiciously conducted. By going up Chesapeak, and marching to the Delaware, he was under the necessity of sending his store ships and transports round again to the Delaware, to meet him, and there the troops were nearly starved, as well as the inhabitants that remained in Philadelphia; the rebel craft and frigates, under the protection of Mud Island and Red Bank, cutting off his communication by water, with the fleet, for more than two months.

In short, except the mere matter of fighting, and his victories have never yet amounted to any thing, the rebels taking post on the next hill, and defying him, all his campaigns exhibit only a succession of blunders.

He defeated Washington at Brandywine, but was himself surprised at German Town, during a thick fog, and the consequences might have been fatal, had not Lieutenant Colonel Musgrave, with six companies of the 40th regiment, made a surprising stand in a stone-house; this gave time for our line to advance and repulse the enemy. Fifty-two men lay dead round the house, four of them on the steps of the door. The rebels had time to bring five pieces of cannon against it, but, fortunately for us, it was cannon proof, none of the shot entering but at the windows.

After this, the Hessians were repulsed, in an attack on Red Bank

Loss of the Hessian Bank, with 22 officers, and 371 men, killed and wounded. The gallant Col. Donop, the best officer of the Hessians, was mortally wounded; two Hessian grenadiers, attempting to carry him off, were shot dead under him, and he was left, by his own desire. He died about eight days after, on the 29th of October, and was interred by the rebels, with military honours.

Gen. H's saying on the loss of Burgoyne. Let General Howe's successes on the Delaware be ever so great, they will never sufficiently apologize for the desertion of our army from Canada, by his going to the Southward, and spending almost a whole campaign at sea, and within sight of the steeples of Philadelphia. His insignificantly shrugging up his shoulders, when he heard of General Burgoyne's disaster, and saying, with an air of indifference, "Well, it will only make the war last another campaign," will not be considered by his superiors, and the nation, as a proper vindication of his own conduct.

Clinton's weak effort. General Clinton made a weak effort to assist General Burgoyne by going up the North River, but too late to be of any service. He and his friends indeed say, that his not going sooner was want of leave from General Howe; that he sent to the Delaware three times for leave to make a push up the North River: that General Howe's answer to the first request was, "To mind his former orders;" to the second, that "he would think of it;" to the third, that "the trial might be made, but he thought it would be of no service." The fact is, he might have gone up the River a month sooner than he did, without the parade of sending three times to Pennsylvania; but that time was spent in going with three separate parties into the Jerseys a cattle-hunting. In the cattle exploits he never thought of sending for leave.

He should have gone up a month sooner, instead of cattle hunting with 4000 men.

Imprudence of Gen. Tryon. The injudicious conduct of General Tryon, formerly Gov. Tryon, has been of infinite prejudice to the cause of the Mother Country. On the first arrival of the army here, he followed the army wherever it marched, administering oaths of allegiance to the inhabitants. These oaths were readily taken; and from the Gazettes we find, that the Governor did not lose such a favourable opportunity of puffing off his assiduity. As the army did not remain long in one place, the rebels again took possession, and barbarously murdered several of Governor Tryon's converts, forced others to join the rebel army, and plundered the effects of all who refused. This, has in a great measure, deterred even the most loyal subjects from taking the oaths till they find they are to be protected.

A thousand recruits lost. In General Clinton's excursion up the North River, near a thousand stout fellows came to claim the benefit of their proclamation, and proposed to enlist in the new corps; but General Tryon, who never let slip any opportunity of appearing consequential, immediately assembled them together, pronounced a pompous speech to them, and tendered the oath to them with much formality. The country folks took the oath with great pleasure

pleasure, and then having got their protections in their pockets, they thought it best to return home to their own habitations, till his Majesty's troops had conquered the rebels. In this manner were so many able-bodied recruits lost.

General Tryon takes another method to convert the rebels; ^{Sends sermons} he sends out officers with flags of truce, loaded with sermons, ^{to convert the} to distribute among them. The Chief Priest of the Moorfields ^{rebels.} Tabernacle could do no more. With these sermons, the rebels light their tobacco pipes, or expend them in other necessary uses.

It is universally felt, that our native troops are far superior ^{Why our native} to any other for the war carried on here. The foreign troops ^{troops are supe-} may be as good as them in Germany, but they are not so here. ^{rior to foreign.} This may easily be accounted for on the principles of human nature; our men, in fighting for their country, feel an interest, which cannot be supposed to possess or actuate foreign troops; and on that account, they attack with more alacrity, and resist with more firmness. It has been the policy of the rebels, always when opportunity offered, to attack the foreigners in preference to the British; as on them they found, by experience, they could more readily make an impression. This was strongly verified in General Burgoyne's different engagements. The Hessian Grenadiers are noble troops, and form an exception to these observations in some degree.

For the reasons above given, we do not wish for any more foreign troops in this country, unless it should be thought proper to send out Hanoverians; who as they would fight for their own Prince, may naturally be supposed to feel a stronger interest than those who are only influenced by pay and military renown.

But if Howe is to waste the national strength in campaigning, to no manner of purpose on the Delaware, the English nation had better give up the point at once, than sacrifice so many thousands of brave men, merely to pamper his folly.

Such a man as Lord Percy, who would have followed the ^{Ld. Percy would} true interest of his country, without jealousy or envy, would ^{have done more} have done more last June and July, by going up the North ^{in 2 months,} River, than General Howe has done in three campaigns, or is ^{than Howe in} likely to do in three more, unless he is better instructed or ^{3 campaigns.} changes his plan of operations.

Next campaign, Howe, if he should still command here, and should be so obstinate as to continue on the Delaware and its environs, will draw out the war till the English are wearied out.

Even should he be victorious in that quarter, his victories ^{North River &} will not be of any service, as Washington can always be sup- ^{Lakes the key} ported both from the Northern and from the Southern Colonies. ^{of America.} It is presenting himself to the rebels, where they are most im-
preg-

MISCONDUCT of HOWE.

Howe unfit or
unworthy his
command.

Futility of his
operations ruin-
ed his character.
A resignation
his only choice.

pregnable ; and where they can concentrate all their forces and all their resources, and where victory itself can bring no other advantage with it to him, but possession of the field of battle. No line of separation between the Southern and Northern rebels can be formed from the Delaware. The North River, and the Lakes George and Champlain, form the key of America. If General Howe went to the Delaware out of ignorance, he is unfit for the command ; if he went out of any other motive, he is unworthy of it. If he is continued here, he will either remain on the Delaware, expending the blood and treasure of the nation to no purpose, or he will move to the Northward, leaving a garrison in it, and not less than 10,000 will protect it ; or he will abandon it altogether, which is hardly to be expected, as that would be confessing in the strongest manner, the futility of his former operations. By this you see, he has only a choice of difficulties, if he supports his great conquest of Philadelphia, or disgrace if he deserts it. In deserting the northern army, he has inextricably ruined himself, he has no choice left but to resign ; and his character, as a great officer, is gone for ever. Besides, in a fortnight from this, it is probable he will be frozen up for two months ; so that we are not likely to hear any thing of him, or the army under his command, till the month of March next year. The Delaware generally freezes about the beginning of the year, and the ice, for the most part, renders the navigation impracticable, or very dangerous, till sometime in March. The people here have no hopes from our present commanders ; they have been sufficiently tried ; the only expectation left us is, that better men next campaign will pursue better measures.

LETTER from NEW YORK.

December 16th, 1777.

Gen. Howe's
misconduct.

It is an unanimous sentiment here, that our misfortunes this campaign have arisen, not so much from the genius and valour of the rebels, as from the misconduct of a certain person.

Our Commander in chief seems not to have known, or to have forgotten, that there was such a thing as the North River ; and that General Burgoyne, with his small army, would want support in his attempt to penetrate to Albany ; as the inhabitants of that country were the most rugged and hardy, and the best accustomed to arms, of any of the Northern rebels.

If General Howe had been so happy for himself and his country as to have moved up the North River, instead of going to sea in the middle of the Campaign, all America could not have prevented the junction of our two armies ; and that of General Burgoyne's would have been saved ; and a strong line of

of communication from St. Lawrence to New York would have been formed by the lakes and posts on the North River, dividing the northern from the southern provinces. Had this been done, the rebellion would have been half over, even without a battle. But some people seem never to have looked at the map of America; or, if they did, they have proved to us they did not understand it.

Since Philadelphia was taken, General Howe has never been able to get out of sight of it; and the whole campaign appears to have been spent in taking that single town, which if we keep, will cost us an army to defend.

In truth, merely through misconduct, instead of our expected successes, we have met with nothing but misfortune and disgrace.

The deserting Burgoyne has lost us 10,000 men and upwards, Cost of 10,000 in regular troops, Canadians, and Indians, and in loyal subjects adjoining to Albany and the Lakes; and the glorious acquisition of Philadelphia, will cost us a garrison of 10,000 more, unless General Howe, while this rebellion lasts, means to protect that darling conquest with his whole army.

Whereas, if the communication had been formed by securing Advantages of the North River and the Lakes, the operations of our army to acting on the the northward would have covered New York, Long Island, North River. and Rhode Island, which would have enabled General Howe to take the field with at least 10,000 men more than he has been able to do in Pennsylvania.

In that case he would only have had the northern rebels to contend with; for Washington could not have passed the North River while the Eastern Banks were defended by our posts, and the whole river occupied by our armed ships, floating batteries, gun boats, and other craft. Then the taking of Connecticut, a small but fertile colony, and the storehouse of New England, would have ensured the conquest of the northern colonies. They must have thrown down their arms or starved; for I cannot suppose, that a body of militia could have defeated an English regular army, amounting at least to thirty thousand men, and as well appointed in every respect, as any army that ever took the field; and the men of that army, roused to the highest pitch of enthusiasm in the cause of Old England, and inspired with indignation against the rebels, for their multiplied acts of treachery and barbarity. But the spirit, the vigour, and the lives of many of our brave fellows in the main army, have been lost by pursuing the most ill advised measures, the carry- The reverse on ing on the war from the Chesapeake bay and Philadelphia, the Delaware. places in which the rebels can bring their whole force against us, and where all the advantages we may gain can avail us nothing further than keeping possession of the ground on which our army encamps.

In

ON CONQUERING AMERICA.

In fact, there is not a common soldier in the army but knows; that deserting the North River lost Burgoyne and his army; that his being fought down has given the rebels tenfold confidence, and thrown a gloom over the aspect of our affairs in America.

The errors of last campaign are now considered as trifles, having before our eyes the gross and mortifying blunders of the present.

Confidence in
the Minister for
America.

We anticipate here the astonishment and depression, the clamorous lamentations, the bitter complaints, and the general indignation, that will successively arise at home; but we repose the greatest confidence in the steadiness of the ministry, and in the vigour and abilities of the noble lord at the head of the American department.

On the defensive
till strongly re-
inforced.

I have not time, and besides it would be tedious, to mention all our expectations. I shall only say, that till reinforcements are sent us, our operations in this country are likely to be for the most part defensive; and the success of our future measures will greatly depend on the military genius who is to conduct us next campaign.

Advice to repeal
Habeas Corpus
act regarding
treasons com-
mitted in Eng.

Our losses this campaign will greatly animate opposition and the rebel Partizans in England; and we expect to see little else in the London prints, than croakings of the downfall of England and the triumph of America. It would not be an unadvisable measure to suspend the Habeas Corpus act, with respect to treasons committed in England; that would go a great way towards uniting you at home.

Rebels will de-
tain Burgoyne's
army.

General Burgoyne, with the wreck of his small army, has been some time near Boston, between Charlestown neck and Cambridge. Our transports are now at Rhode Island with an intent to take them on board. I sincerely wish them all embarked, for I am much afraid the rebels will make use of some subterfuge to detain them.

Way to conquer
America.

The more one reflects on the manner this campaign has been conducted, the more one is astonished. If the intention is to conquer a country, there is an absolute necessity for occupying the principal passes; more especially if that country is extensive, and the inhabitants numerous. In doing this you divide the forces and resources of the enemy, and, as I have already remarked, you may beat them in detail.

Now the grand pass in British America is the North River, and the Lake's George and Champlain, which must be possessed if there is a serious intention to bring this rebellion to a speedy conclusion.

But if you would rather have a ten years war, and a hundred millions additional debt, then you may continue to indulge General Howe or any other General, who may succeed him, in amusing himself and the army with a sea voyage in the
middle

middle of the campaign, and in leaving whatever armies you may send via Canada, to be swallowed up by the New England men.

It is not any apology to the nation, in General Howe and his friends saying, that Burgoyne thought himself strong enough; his duty, if he understood any thing of his profession, was to be on the North River, and not to spend the campaign and waste his own army, in a part of the country where even his victories are useless.

If any thing effective is intended next campaign, the war must be brought back to the North River. After occupying that with shipping and small craft, and possessing some of the strongest posts on its banks with troops, you may then carry your whole force into New England, which would not resist a vigorous campaign, or allowing it did, however improbable, the reduction of Connecticut would starve the rest of that country into submission: you then have only the southern colonies to subdue: they would not make a desperate resistance after the conquest of their northern friends.

If General Howe intends to keep Philadelphia, which has cost him a whole campaign, and the nation 14,000 men, including Burgoyne's army, and the killed and wounded, sick and dead of his own army, he must either remain near it himself, or leave a small army to defend it. If he remains near it, I cannot comprehend how America is to be conquered; nor can I conjecture how he is to march forward, as Washington is only twelve miles from him, so strongly posted that he does not chuse to attack him. It is true he may, by crossing the Delaware on his right, return again to the Jerseys; or, on his left he may pass into Maryland; but in either of these Provinces, after having patrolled the country, with Washington at his heels, he will do no good without coming to a battle and gaining a decisive victory, unless he should chuse to surprise the whole world again by another sea trip.

Must bring the war on the North River.
Gen. Howe's dilemma.

Whichever of these methods he follows, an army must be left at Philadelphia, so that our conquest becomes a burthen; for the troops required to garrison that single town, would have supported the communication on the North River, which would have disunited the rebels, and gone a great way to quell the rebellion.

You see I do not presume to think he will abandon Philadelphia; as that might subject him to be asked, why he spent so much time, men, and money to take it?

January 1st, 1778.

I suppose that Lord Howe has arrived at Rhode Island by this time. He has sailed to that quarter, on purpose to expedite

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dite

Rebels will keep
Burgoyne.

dite if he can, the embarkation of General Burgoyne's troops. I am much afraid the rebels will invent some scheme to detain them altogether.

Mortification &
resentment of
the army on
shipping them
off for the
southward.

Our gallant commander has expended at least 14,000 men this campaign; and to console us for that loss, has had the honour of appointing Mr. Galloway, formerly one of the rebel Congress, sole superintendant of the port of Philadelphia. Perhaps such a grand stroke, and the pleasure of reading his letters, minutely displaying his retreat through the Jerseys, which made our brave fellows almost gnaw their own flesh out of rage, may also console you. By God, had you seen our common men, when they ferried them over to Staten Island, they would have struck you with such a complicated picture of mortification and resentment, as would have left a lasting impression.

It took the nation till the third year of this rebellion, to place a body of troops in this country sufficient to conquer it; the intent of sending Burgoyne to Canada, was for no other end than to penetrate by the way of the Lakes, while General Howe went up the North River; yet the moment that this is brought within our view, Howe, as if afraid of joining Burgoyne, turns tail, goes to sea, and deserts the very business upon which the whole nation was intent.

General dissatis-
faction.

There is a general dissatisfaction here and at Philadelphia. All the territory we possess in Pennsylvania, is the point of land formed by the confluence of the Delaware and the Schuylkill, measuring nearly five miles in length, by two in breadth. The town itself is included. This, and the ground on which our army encamps, are the sum of our conquests this year.

Howe's conquest
1777, five miles
by two.

You will observe, that your humble servant does not despair of the Commonwealth. Indeed, whining and despondence are inexcusable, when the times demand firmness and vigour. In defiance of ill conduct and the times, were you to see us sometimes you would laugh heartily; in our barrack the army list is produced, more than once a day, to conjecture upon a commander in chief; for we no longer look for one in America, since Burgoyne is in the hands of the enemy.

LETTER from NEW YORK.

May, 5th, 1778.

General Clinton failed for Philadelphia the first of this month to succeed General Howe in the command of our army. Our situation is such at Philadelphia, that we ought not to think of any decisive action in that quarter. General Clinton indeed may very easily, and it would be a credit to our arms, march across the Jerseys to New York, and reunite all our forces, in readiness to act as the exigency of our affairs may require; but if

if he should retire by sea, it must give the rebels additional confidence, and be a proof either of the weakness of the army, or the imbecility of our new commander. There never was, since the existence of time, an army more ardent for battle than ours now in America; they only want to be led on, to prove that they will conquer or die for their country; they think that the concessions lately made at home to the rebels, arise from a want of confidence in them, which irritates them exceedingly. They say they have often been presented to the enemy;—have sometimes been permitted to attack them;—but never have been led to follow their victory with effect. They have had a soldier, but not a General.

Army opinions of Gen. Howe's conduct.

General Howe's dependents here say, that he had his plan of operations from home, and that he was not to deviate from the orders sent him. These gentlemen have been easily confuted by reading to them the following paragraph of General Howe's own letter, dated June 3d 1777. "The campaign will now immediately take place in the Jerseys; and I shall proceed as occurrences may arise, according to the plan *made known* to your Lordship in my former dispatches." This extract always silences them;—it proves that he formed the plan of the campaign 1777, and only deigned to communicate it to Administration.

His plans proved his own by his letters.

Another circumstance ought not to be forgot: he complained in the same letter of the camp equipage not arriving till the 24th of May; and his letter would lead us to conceive it had retarded the opening of the campaign. After this, the army was marched up to Washington's entrenchments in the Jerseys, and marched back again, and embarked for Philadelphia by the romantic navigation of Chesapeake bay. The camp equipage was most certainly carried on board the ships, but it was not landed with the troops at the head of the Elke, but sent round by sea to the Delaware, in which river it remained till the end of the campaign. It would appear that the commander, as his own letter states it, was relieved from much anxiety by the arrival of the equipage, but that when it did arrive, he did not think proper to use it for the accommodation of the troops.

His excuse for not opening campaign 1777 proved not to be valid.

If General Howe had acted with vigour, and in concert with the Canada army, all the force of the rebels could not have withstood them. Instead of that he subdivided our forces, leaving Burgoyne with 6000 men to attack a country inhabited by near a million of people; and with 18 or 20,000 men went a summer voyage by sea, to land in a country, and take a town, which he never durst, or never thought proper to quit for more than one days march. If all these forces had been properly combined the rebellion would by this time have been over.

Injudicious conduct.

Indeed there is no military man who understood any thing of his business, but foresaw inevitable destruction to the cause and

Despondence on
his going south-
ward.

glory of his country, whenever it was first whispered that the embarked troops were bound to the southward. For some time at New York we were at a loss for their destination, as pilots one day were shipped for the northward, and another day for the southward, and all carried off in the fleet. As soon as their plan transpired, an universal despondence among the loyal Americans took place; men of moderation were silent and looked stupified; and men of vigour and penetration, expressed their doubts, sorrow, contempt, and abhorrence, just as the circumstances of things presented themselves.

The honour &
glory he lost.

If General Howe had carried the war up Hudson's river, he would have saved Burgoyne's army, crushed the rebellion, and re-established our tottering empire: for himself he would have gained immortal glory. His grateful country would have covered him with honours, and our latest posterity would have revered his memory. But unhappily for us, we have seen in part, and are likely to continue to see, the melancholy reverse of all this. Yet amidst the distresses of our country, one cannot help lamenting the fate of that man, whose very heart must be rent, when he reflects on the honour and glory that awaited him, but have now for ever passed away.

LETTER *from* NEW YORK.

May 17th, 1778.

Gen. Howe in
Philadelphia.

The great line of ill conduct in this quarter, you must have already felt at home. By the most injudicious division of our forces in America, the cause of England has, for the present, been ruined. With an army sufficient for the conquest of this country, General Howe, instead of going up the Hudson, left one third of his army to garrison New York, and with the rest went to Philadelphia, to perambulate its environs during most part of the campaign, and then composedly took up his winter quarters in that town; whilst Washington, with not more than 7000 men, stationed himself at Valley Forge, only twenty-four miles distant, and was still in the same position by the last accounts which arrived here only a day or two ago.

Blocked up by
half his own
number of raw
troops.

Every body in this place, and at Philadelphia, are in amazement that 7000 raw troops, speaking comparatively with our own, and these raw troops half naked, should block up a veteran army double their number.

You have asked me in more than one letter, what were our reasons for going to the southward at the very time that our northern army was approaching the head of the Hudson? This is as incomprehensible to us as it is to you; for we see by the King's instructions to General Burgoyne, and Colonel St. Leger, which we had by the last ships from London, that they

they were never to lose sight of a junction with General Howe, ^{his conduct ap-} which of course implies, that he was either to favour their parently contra-approach by moving up the Hudson, or by attacking Wash-^{ry to his instruc-} ington in the Jerseys early in the spring, or summer; at least hinder him from detaching any of the continental troops to reinforce the northern rebel militia. This I aver is evident from the instructions which have been lately printed in this town.

At this critical juncture, their two Excellencies go to sea ^{Rebels ridicule} with the whole fleet and grand army, leaving our northern, ^{him for giving} or Burgoyne's army to perish for want of that support which ^{them Bur-} his Majesty and Administration, and the nation had undoubtedly-^{goyne's army.} ly ordered, and expected would be given them. The rebels, who are not deficient in penetration, laugh, and say, "Your
" General, by his movements, made us a present of Burgoyne's
" army and left us also a greater one in New York, if we
" had mustered force enough to take it.

Supposing that Washington had any genius, God knows, he had no occasion to exert it against us; our folly, ignorance, or envy, did every thing for him!

It was impossible, in the whole extent of America, to fix on ^{National ho-} a more disadvantageous spot than Philadelphia to carry on the ^{nour lost.} war from. That town, as soon as taken, must have been abandoned, or protected by the whole army. Indeed, the going there, and the covering it, have lost us a campaign, all our northern army, some thousands of our southern army, and what is infinitely more to be regretted, our national honour.

It is a mercy, a saving grace to the General that you have recalled him; for he never seemed inclined to abandon his charming conquest. He and his army, his brother and his fleet, have done little else for the best part of eight or nine months, than hover round it, forming the great Mr. Galloway's satellites.

You will observe that the reasons against carrying on the war ^{Imprudence in} from Philadelphia were numerous: by going there, our army ^{voyage southw.} was divided; New York with an imminity of King's stores, and other valuable property endangered; our northern army consigned to destruction; Philadelphia, a town which could not be kept without an army; that country just in the centre of the rebel provinces could be equally supported by the northern, and southern rebels, and of such a nature, that no commanding post could be taken, either to divide, or over-awe the enemy; the river a long, and dangerous navigation, full of shoals, and subject to freeze in the winter; so that our fleet must either remain blocked up in the winter by the ice, or separate from the army, by moving off before the cold set in; and, the rebels in possession of both shores, could, from their various harbours, act with the greatest prospect of success against our merchant-ships, and transports, either going up, or coming down.

On

Propriety of acting on the North River.

On the contrary, by acting on the Hudson, our army remained in full force; Gen. Howe could have begun the campaign with at least 6000 more troops; his operations to the northward and his possessing the Hudson, covering all our posts, he would have cut the rebel country in two; against either half of which Burgoyne and he united, might in the ensuing campaign have carried on the war; he would have saved Englishmen from the greatest and most mortifying disgrace that ever befel them as a nation, and he himself would have been the greatest man in our annals—he would have acquired immortal glory.

How the voyage to Philadelphia came to be undertaken, a movement so contrary to common sense, to the general judgment of the most intelligent people here, to the most obvious rules of war, and apparently contrary to express instructions from home, and at the first glance so evidently ruinous to the cause of England in America, is a question, which, I believe, their two excellencies only, can explain.

Character of Lord Howe.

Lord Howe certainly came out with the most compleat idea of his own weight, and importance: it cannot be doubted, that, on his arrival here, he imagined that condescensions from him would far outweigh any exertion of our national strength. But we are now confident, he is recovered from that idea: he certainly had a great predilection for the Americans; his brother's monument in Westminster-Abbey, at the expence of New-England, it is supposed, led him to believe, that all America revered himself, and would gather round him as their sole mediator. But Franklin who had made a tool of him in England, as well as of many others, soon convinced him of his want of importance.

The following circumstances may give you some notion of the situation of the refugees here. You must understand, by refugees, the gentlemen who have been driven off, on account of their uniform attachment to government; not your rebels, who came in upon proclamation, to regain their estates, that were in possession of the King's army.

His strange reply to the refugees.

A number of refugees, long settled in the southern colonies, and mostly Englishmen, who had been stripped of the greatest part of their fortunes, applied to his Lordship for letters of marque, to cruize against the rebels; but he sternly replied, "Will you never have done with oppressing these poor people? will you never give them an opportunity of seeing their error?"—This was the answer of the King's Admiral to a body of his Majesty's loyal subjects, whom these poor people (as his Lordship called them) had treated most barbarously, had banished from their habitations, and sequestered their estates, in order to carry on the present rebellious war. This conduct, however, could not hold long; letters of marque have been since granted. I do not give this as a secret; it has been long publicly talked of here,

here. The gentlemen who received such a rebuff, you may be sure, were not silent on the occasion.

His Lordship's great error is, in thinking himself equal to An excellent every thing. We do not know that he communicates with any moral character. person but his brother. Their measures, therefore, are purely their own. In making him a politician, they have put him quite out of his latitude. Yet after all, as a man, he is deservedly esteemed. His moral character is unimpeachable in every respect: he is quite the contrast to a certain person; and, in the naval line, he has not a superior. The bravest man could not wish for a more able, or more gallant commander.

In some instances we have not been remarkable for our good Vanity of Tryon conduct in this neighbourhood. Governor, now Gen. Tryon, who is the pink of politeness, and the quintessence of vanity, chose to distinguish himself by petitioning that the Provincials under his command should occupy the out-posts at Kingsbridge; he had his wish for a long time, by which we lost numbers of our best recruits. The man is generous, perfectly good-natured, and no doubt brave; but weak and vain to an extreme degree. You should keep such people at home, they are excellent for a court parade.—I wish Mrs. Tryon would send for him.

I have not entered on the scenes of dissipation and gaming Hints on gam- that have been practised and countenanced, or, as the General's ing & the ladies friends correct us, "permitted." I have drawn a curtain around wanton wives and daughters; for a public man ought to stand or fall by his public actions; if these are right, we may smile at his private amusements; besides my respect for the ladies will not permit me to enter on this subject, though a rich one; and yet it is a tempting story—so animating—so seducing, that I must drop the pen to preserve my own principles.

LETTER from NEW YORK.

May 18th, 1778.

It must be confessed, that the rebels triumph greatly in Howe's defici-
battling Howe's army, at Philadelphia; but that ought not ency.
to make us despair; for, if his bad generalship divided our forces, instead of combining them, by which we suffered the loss of Burgoyne, and had our grand army pent up in Philadelphia; that is no evidence of our weakness, or the rebels strength, but simply a proof of Howe's deficiency in military knowledge; who deserted our northern army, which was co-operating with him, and failed to a town that took his whole army to guard it. You must conquer the rebels, and bring them back to their allegiance. You have no other alternative but victory or destruc- We have no al-
tion. I make no doubt, but many of the people of property ternative but
among them, would be glad to come to an accommodation, as victory or ruin.
the

If we grant independency.

We shall lose Newfoundland.

And the West India Islands.

Danger to all maritime States.

To Britain in particular.

the burden of maintaining the rebellion falls chiefly to their share; but the rabble, of which the army is mostly composed, having all the power in their own hands, must be beat before any thing like a submission can take place. Your own safety, and existence, as a nation, will not allow you to desert this business, were you so inclined. If you was to adopt Dean Tucker's plan, and grant them independency, you would commit an act of political suicide. You ought to be sufficiently convinced, that no tie can bind the rebels but force. You would soon lose your Newfoundland fishery, or be under the necessity of entering into a new war for its protection; you then would have all the work to begin again, under infinite disadvantages. Your West-India Islands would soon follow; Nature herself seems to have attached them to the American continent, and, whoever possesses this country, must eventually command the islands. France, though she now supplies the rebels, may have cause in future to curse her folly. It is neither the interest of France, nor Spain, to enable the colonies to shake off their dependance on Britain; but I do not say it is not their interest to weaken us by keeping up the ferment. If your European politicians were as wise as they ought to be, they would have foreseen, that the Freebooters of the United States of America, would be infinitely more formidable, than those of the petty states of Africa. All the commercial states are deeply interested in this business. Supposing the Americans independent, and that they should think proper to seize the Dutch ships, or the French, or the Spanish, or the Portuguese, what remedy could any of those powers have? I conjecture none of them would fit out fleets and armies, and send them so far as this to the westward.—But they might appoint convoys—That is true—yet the Americans, when left to themselves, will soon have a fleet equal to any of the above states. In fact they could enrich themselves alternately with the plunder of every mercantile nation in Europe, without any of those nations being able to do them a material injury, or obtain any adequate satisfaction. Such will be the blessed effects of American independency to all the European commercial states. A more ruinous circumstance however awaits Great Britain: America is a rich, fertile, healthy country; provisions, in time of peace, are not at a fourth of the price they are in your kingdom. Your manufacturers, your labouring men, your people of small fortunes and large families, and others of good fortune, but an enterprising mind, would all flock to the New Independent States; for though provisions are only about one fourth the price, yet labourers and workmen's wages are four times higher than in England. Your people who come, may get land for nothing, or for a small quit rent, next to nothing; and the turbulent politics of our new republics, would afford an extensive field for men of vigour and

and enterprize to struggle in. No laws you could pass at home Exertion & c could keep your people. Never was a nation so bound to ex-quest, or ruin & ert itself as Great Britain in the present crisis; if, for the sake contempt. of a momentary but delusive quiet, you patch up a rotten accommodation with the rebels, the glory of Britain is set forever; and from the terror, she will become—the contempt of nations.

MATTER of FACT.

Addressed to Lord George Germaine.

To combat the whole force of official representation conveyed to your Lordship, would be a task from which I should shrink, was I not fully convinced of your Lordship's zeal for the public service, and the penetration with which you can distinguish truth.

I assure your Lordship, in the most solemn manner, that I have no other motive for the trouble I now take, but a hearty zeal for the honour of the nation. I am totally unconnected with any of the parties which distracted the public service in A- Faction at homemerica last campaign: I am neither under the bias of obligation the tutors of nor resentment towards any of the three generals; nor have I Congress. the smallest wish either to abet faction on this, or rebellion on the other side the Atlantic. To the eternal disgrace of those concerned in both, history cannot furnish a single example of so wanton and ungrateful a rebellion, or of so unprincipled an opposition to government. Having been an eye-witness to the proceedings of the Congress to the period when they took the desperate step of declaring independency, and personally acquainted with many of the principal members, I beheld them daily taking their tone, and forming their measures, from the conduct of the faction at home. In the declaration of independency indeed they stepped before their friends here a little, but these soon followed.

Leaving both to the infamy that must attend their proceedings, I shall pursue my design of pointing out to your Lordship some part of the blunders, the venality, the insolence, the incapacity, and the tyranny which pervade almost every department of the army in America.

I need not say a word to convince your Lordship of the mis- Misconduct inconduct on Long Island, in permitting a beaten and dismayed allowing the re-army, cooped into a corner of an island, to pass a wide ferry, bels to escape by small embarkations, without the loss of a man. It is from Long Isl. acknowledged the rebels were there at the mercy of the Royal army, but that a reluctance to shed the blood of his Majesty's subjects restrained it. Possibly it may be pleaded, that the same reluctance prevailed in allowing them to escape from the city of New York, and afterwards from King's Bridge; that it per- And New York.mitted them to retreat leisurely from the action at White Plains, And White PL where N

where M'Dougal's brigade was defeated; and finally, to induce the Royal Army to retreat, when they had driven the Rebels into a situation of the greatest distress and dismay, ready to have dispersed, had any attack been made upon them. Here we left them to return and storm Fort Washington, after we had allowed Mr. Washington to pass the North River in our view; occupy Fort Lee, and escape from thence with more than double the garrison of Fort Washington. Possibly this was a piece of generalship, as we took those garrisons prisoners; but it was changing the system upon which we had before acted, unless it was thought beneath the courage of the Royal Army to take Rebels, until we had suffered them to get safe into their very strongest post.

And the Jerseys. Allowing Mr. Washington to escape through the Jerseys when he had not above five-and-twenty hundred poor, dispirited, naked fugitives to attend him, is a thing without example. I beg your Lordship will look upon the map of New Jersey for a moment, and then endeavour, if possible, to conceive why a body of troops were not detached from New York to Newark, Elizabeth-Town, or even Amboy, to cut off his retreat, put him between two fires, and oblige him to surrender, and by that means put an end to the war, which the Rebels themselves have often confessed it would certainly have done. Was not this something worse than a blunder, or even indolence? I can assure your Lordship, that many of the most judicious leaders among the rebels were even astonished at it, and were so free as to declare to me, that they supposed the war would have been too short, had it been put an end to in one campaign.

On the halt at Brunswick. A halt at Brunswick, for want of orders, when the fugitives were in view, allowed them time to retreat to the Delaware, and to cross that river, to the astonishment even of themselves. Yet has this march through the Jerseys been extolled to your Lordship, and the public has been insulted with the publication; whilst every man in America stood astonished, and every loyal subject there was chagrined and disappointed—fully convinced that nothing less than blindness directed by ignorance, could have allowed such an enemy to escape in such a situation. But,

Our astonishment suffers no rest. as has constantly been our lot, our astonishment was not suffered to rest long upon the past, the future misconduct soon called it off. A line was formed from Mount Holly on the Delaware, to the village of Newark, by occupying open villages. The same army which would not detach a part to intercept Mr. Washington in his flight, was extended in a line of nearly a hundred miles, without a single redoubt to cover any one post. A brigade of Hessians commanded by a drunken madman, was placed in Trenton; the most important post, forming the angle of the whole line, and nearest the enemy; whilst the British light infantry, the best troops in the universe were, (contrary to

to all custom and order) placed thirteen miles in the rear at Prince-Town.

General Grant having intelligence that Mr. Washington intended to attack Trenton, instead of ordering up the light infantry from Prince Town, sent only twenty light horse, and twenty-four light infantry to Trenton the day before. Rhall seeing so little precaution taken by the general, looked upon the intelligence as false, and got drunk as usual.

Gen. Grant and Col. Rhall cause of Trenton loss.

The consequences which almost naturally followed were such, and they are at the same time so notorious, that I shall spare your Lordship the pain of seeing them recited. It is sufficient to say, that those naked, dispirited runaways, whom we allowed to slip out of our hands a few days before, returned upon a victorious army, and in two or three successful actions, killed and took half their own numbers, obliging us to abandon all our posts in Jersey, except Amboy and Brunswick, and a regiment stowed into the few houses in Bonham Town to keep open the communication.

Consequences of this misconduct.

Thus, from being in full possession of that whole province, we were reduced to those three villages, the farthest extending fourteen miles into the country. Here the army remained all winter, obliged to fight for every mouthful of forage and fresh provisions which they obtained: with what loss the returns of the army will best shew. And permit me to ask your Lordship, was it not most shameful? I will venture to assert, that in the history of all the wars which ever yet existed in the annals of all military misconduct which ever yet appeared, there is not a single example to take shelter under.

Great military geniuses have often changed the nature of a war from the defensive to the offensive, by some stroke of military skill in the field, or have with an inferior force insulted their enemy in his winter quarters, and even obliged him to relinquish them. But this was where troops were superior in native courage, or excelled in discipline; where they were in want of none of the necessaries for making war, and had fortified towns to cover them in case of a defeat; or where the enemy could not be reinforced. But in the instance before us, not one of all these causes can be pleaded. Washington was but three thousand strong when he attacked Trenton, and those men so fatigued and benumbed with the cold, that they were unable to handle their arms; and it was with the greatest difficulty any of them recrossed the Delaware, and near half of them died, or were rendered unfit for duty. I speak from *authentic information*, my Lord. At no time during the winter was the rebel army above five thousand strong, often not three, and those in want of almost every article of cloathing. Yet with that inferior, naked force, Mr. Washington blockaded our army in their quarters, and remained the whole winter in unmolested possession

Strength & condition of the rebel army in winter 1776-7.



Gen. Howe retreats from Jersey without recovering his honour.

Ruinous conduct of G. Howe in the Jerseys.


Proclamations Protections and Pardons all annihilated.

Bad effects on our affairs.

sion of every town within ten miles of them, often nearer, occupying a circle of at least sixty miles. In which situation he continued until he was reinforced in spring, when he approached within a few miles of Brunswick; and was permitted, though still inferior, to post himself in so strong a position, that it was not thought prudent to attack him. The army therefore quitted Jersey, relinquishing a whole province, of which they had been in full possession six months before, without ever having made a single effort to recover the honour they lost at Trenton (though Washington was often reduced to two thousand men at Morris Town) leaving the rebels all the advantage and credit they obtained by that action, which alone enabled them to recruit a single man.

Before I quit Jersey, allow me to point out to your Lordship some other parts of our conduct, and the consequence attending it. Upon the army entering Jersey, a proclamation was issued, promising protection and pardon to all such as should remain in their houses. The people pretty generally remained, and many thousands received printed directions, signed by order of the commander in chief. But neither the proclamation nor the protections saved the people from plunder, nor from insult; their property was taken or destroyed without distinction of persons. They shewed their protections. Hessians could not read them, nor would not understand them, and the British soldiers thought they had as good a right to a share as the Hessians. This I assure your Lordship was very generally the case while the army was advancing into the country, was and were in possession of it. In their retreat it was still worse; all who did not leave their wives and children, and abandon their property, were considered as rebels. When the rebels repossessed themselves of the country, they treated all who had taken protections with the utmost severity. Thus was this whole province either irritated against his Majesty's government, by a breach of faith, or abandoned to persecution, where they had shewn any loyalty. No step was taken to conciliate their affections. The disloyal were not disarmed, nor arms put in the hands of the loyal, though both might have been done with the greatest ease. No steps of sound policy were pursued to secure the country; it was finally abandoned, and a proof given that proclamations and protections were no assurances of safety fit to be relied on.—An awful example! which the leaders in rebellion have not failed to avail themselves of, and which I can assure your Lordship I have beheld the bad effects of on more occasions than one. I will not pretend to say that Jersey has not always been as rebellious a colony as any of the thirteen, but I assert that there always has been many thousands of loyal subjects in it, and that there would have been at this hour double the number there are in it, had it not been for the misconduct I have

now



now pointed out to your Lordship. In such cases the people ^{The People} should never be deceived, much less abandoned to destruction, ^{should never be} when they were promised protection. Protection ought never ^{deceived.} to be promised by government, but it should be afforded at all risks; much less promised without even an intention of performing; which I am sorry to see, from the correspondence your Lordship has published, it was not in this case, as it there appears that it was not intended to keep possession of Jersey.

Having conducted the Commander in Chief out of the Jerseys, I shall leave him to perform his seven weeks ~~voyage~~ to Elke River (after having first taken a peep of a week into Delaware Bay, to know if it was navigable) while I shall beg your Lordship's attention to the affairs of the town and province of New-York. I do not like to treat of public scandal; I will not let fall a single word upon any man's intrigues, where they do not ^{Gaming a ruinous} interfere with the public good; where they do, the public has ^{example in} a right to know the cause of supineness and inattention in a General, or of corruption in a Commissary. Gaming must ever prove of the very worst consequences in an army, and totally ruinous if the example should happen to be set publicly by the Commander: it then destroys subordination and respect, encourages licentiousness, and all discipline falls of course. A young Officer who beholds his General every evening at a pharo-table, I will not say lose his temper, though certainly subject to fret like other men who play a game of chance, in which there can be no amusement but as it gratifies avarice—I say, the young Officer who beholds his General in such a situation, will soon lose the respect to his station which he has lost to his person, when he is allowed to sport as freely at his elbow on his slender income, as the General does upon his princely revenues. He is ashamed not to do it; he expects to make his court by it. There is little œconomy in an army where high gaming is allowed; it is beneath the man who plays at night for hundreds, to trouble himself next day how he is to live upon his pay: He runs in debt for his necessaries, and the Country must be plundered to supply his mistress. I ask ^{Bad effects on} you, my Lord, can the General, or any other Officer of rank, ^{the officers.} pretend to restrain, much less punish, an inferior for plundering, when he perhaps won all the poor gentleman's money the night before? To this cause, perhaps, as much as to the example set by the Hessians, may be attributed the scandalous height which plundering is arrived at in the army. And yet, my Lord, I cannot suppose that this was the cause of Officers of very high rank taking large quantities of wine, tobacco, and valuable effects belonging to Merchants at New-York, who were known to be loyal, and who eagerly embraced the first opportunity of joining the King's troops. This must have been done under the impressions of that favourite idea, “that Parliament

Military inter-pretation of an act of Parliam. "liament has declared America to be in rebellion, and that therefore every man in it has *ipso facto* forfeited his estate, and holds it entirely at his Majesty's mercy," that is at the disposal of the army.

Loyalists plundered.

Speaks from facts.

Curious fact of Gen. de Heister.

Of a British military genius.

Your Lordship will be astonished when I assure you that this is not only a prevalent opinion, but almost universal one. That it has been eagerly embraced and supported by a certain governor now in a military character, and I have been well assured that it is cherished even at head quarters. Thus my Lord, have endeavoured to assign reasons why many loyal and respectable citizens have been plundered of their furniture and effects under this comprehensive mode of forfeiture. Plundering under such an idea, is only making free with what belongs to the King. The gentlemen cannot have read the act they speak of, nor distinguished that, it only says, numbers of persons, not all; and even if it did that it would be necessary to try a British subject by a jury, in order to confiscate his estate. I speak from undoubted facts, my Lord, facts that will be heard of in a yet more serious mode. I point them out generally, in hopes that your Lordship, in your humanity and justice, as well as for the honour of your country, and the British arms, will take some speedy and effectual method of putting an end to such pernicious and disgraceful proceedings. All such as have resisted the torrent of rebellion, and thrown themselves upon the protection of his majesty's troops, should be shewn that they have acted wisely as well as virtuously; and that the army was sent there to protect, not to plunder and insult them. That arch plunderer, General de Heister, offered the house he lived in at New York to public sale, though it was the property of a very loyal subject, who had voluntarily and hospitably accommodated him with the use of it. This may be nothing astonishing in a Hessian. But I have seen the furniture of good and loyal subjects, men who are suffering restraint or imprisonment among the rebels, sold by public auction; the carriages of gentlemen, of the first rank, seized upon; their arms defaced, and the plunderers arms blazoned in their place; and this too by British officers. An officer of high rank took forcible possession of a gentleman's carriage and horses, after it was well known that he had received his pardon from the King's Commissioners: he used it for several months, and was with difficulty prevailed on to give it up. This was acting under the strongest delusion, to speak of it in the mildest terms; not even allowing the King's pardon to save American property from the general passion for confiscation. It was the same officer who made so free with another gentleman's wine, and even offered it in presents by the pipe to his friends: a man, who from ostentation and weakness, has vibrated between the desire of popularity as a magistrate, and the vanity of being considered as

a military genius. I conceal his name, because he really has good qualities, which break sometimes through the cloud of imperfections that surround them. I have thus particularized some instances, lest your Lordship should suspect the truth of my general assertions.

From this irksome subject allow me to draw your Lordship's attention up Hudson's River. There we see forts stormed with the intrepidity and spirit which ever accompanies British troops, when properly conducted; but with a loss of brave men, which must be the more regretted, as we gained nothing but mere honour by it,—the ground being left to the rebels to improve upon their past errors. Why a delay was made of eight days before the army proceeded further up the river, we are ignorant of. Your Lordship will recollect that the Highland forts were taken the sixth of October; *Æsopus* burned the thirteenth; and that General Burgoyne did not sign his Convention till the sixteenth. I have been assured by undoubted authority, that the city of Albany was totally defenceless, serving only as an hospital for the rebels, and as a lodgment for their small magazines of provisions. The river is undoubtedly navigable for frigates within twelve miles of Albany. There was no force even to oppose open boats; gondolas could have guarded them to the wharfs of the town. Why then did not the troops proceed immediately to Albany? the taking of which might have been effected without the loss of a man; and would have obliged Mr. Gates to have returned hastily, or to have crossed Hudson's River for want of provisions. The latter would undoubtedly have been the case, as it is certain he had not two days provisions collected for his army, except what was in Albany. Putnam could have been no impediment, as he could not possibly cross the river to attack Albany, had he been in a condition. This measure would have infallibly enabled General Burgoyne to retreat in safety, or to have formed a junction with the forces from New York at Albany, and thereby have saved the honour of the British arms. If it had not been found practicable to keep possession of Albany, the passage to New York was safe and easy.

Your Lordship will plainly perceive that there was time sufficient between the sixth and the sixteenth to have effected all this. Perhaps it will be pleaded that Sir Henry Clinton was restrained by his orders, "to remain on the defensive." This did not operate more strongly against taking possession of Albany, than against storming the forts in the Highlands. Whatever it proceeded from, the army only amused themselves with burning *Æsopus*, and the houses of individuals which stood close to the river's bank. If fire be necessary to accompany the sword, permit me to ask your Lordship, why was it reserved for the province of New York, beyond all comparison the most

Clinton's expedition up the Hudson nugatory.

His delay.

Albany defenceless; frigates can go within 12 miles of it.

Had Clinton gone forward, Burgoyne's army had been saved.

His plea of restraint refuted.

N. York treated worst, tho' 10500 have taken arms for Britain.

most loyal colony of the thirteen? Why was it distinguished by an unnecessary destruction? Why did no sort of declaration whatever accompany the army as it penetrated into the country, acquainting the inhabitants how to conduct themselves, holding forth safety to the loyal at least, many thousands of whom your Lordship is well assured are in that Colony? Why have these loyal people been treated the worst? I pray your lordship to enquire into the state of that Colony, you will find that 1500 loyal subjects joined Gen. Burgoyne in his short progress into it; that near 5000 from it have joined the other armies, and that 4000 have returned their names in the city of New-York, to serve as militia, for the defence of that town.

In pity and in justice, my Lord, I hope you will enquire why these things have been done? And that, instead of a continuance of such conduct, the loyal and repenting will have some distinguishing indulgence shewn them, should the army move that way next campaign. Policy enjoins it. That province so gained, would insure the reduction of the rest, as the loyal there would greatly encrease and essentially aid his Majesty's army.

If after what has been already seen in the provinces of Jersey and New York, the public could be surprized at any misconduct or proof of incapacity, the expedition to the Head of the Elke River must surely produce that effect. Great geniuses in a variety of difficulties choose that which is most easy and practicable. It belongs only to the conductors of the King's armies in America to choose that which is most difficult, tedious, and uncertain.

Gen. Howe in Jersey, only 24 miles from Delaware.

By this land route the rebel magaz. would have been seiz'd.

I will pass over the absurdity of declining a march of twenty-four miles from Somerset Court House in Jersey to the River Delaware, which might have been performed in one night, and the river crossed before a timid and greatly inferior enemy would have ventured to quit his strong hold. Such a step would have put us in possession of Philadelphia in three days, instead of three months, and subjected that whole province to the royal army; and it would also have put every magazine the rebels had formed in that country at once into our hands, to the total ruin of their cause.

Should have landed at Chester 16 m. only from Philadelp.

Why the fleet did not proceed up the Delaware River, instead of losing five weeks in sailing round to the Elke—is one of the most unaccountable parts of all our misconduct. It is well known that the danger of the navigation in the Delaware is not greater than in Chesapeake Bay, and that the former is wider and more commodious for ships at Chester, which is within sixteen miles of Philadelphia, than the River Elke is so far up; it was also equally unfortified; the banks of the Delaware are low and easily commanded by ships of war. Had the fleet proceeded up the Delaware to Chester, seven weeks time would have been saved; the horses belonging to our army would have

have been fit for use ; little land carriage would have been necessary, from the place of landing being so near to Philadelphia ; and the fleet would have been near to the army ready to have afforded all necessary aids, and even to have secured a safe retreat in case of any disaster.

An action so decisive as that of Brandywine would have enabled the King's army to have pursued the fugitives the same day to Philadelphia, as the boats would have been at hand ready to have crossed the Schuylkill, the only river in its way. The great quantity of stores laid up in Philadelphia would have fallen into our hands, and probably in the general confusion, the Congress themselves. A great deal of time would at least have been saved, which proved to be so necessary at the close of the campaign ; and it would also have been the saving of several vessels loaded with baggage, cloathing and merchandize, which were lost in the river, owing to its being so late in the season before they could be dispatched from New York after we were certain the army would be able to keep possession of Philadelphia. Had either of these plans been pursued, the business of the campaign would have been so forward, and with so small a loss from sickness, that the troops which were called away from New York might have been spared, and thereby ensured a junction with General Burgoyne.

A Quick march would have given us variety of stores, and perhaps the Congr.

What a different face would our affairs have worn in America at this hour ? Your Lordship must be convinced, from your own information, that the rebellion would have been at an end. Behold the reverse of all this. Five weeks were lost in going round to Elke ; the horses of the army were almost intirely rendered unfit for service ; the troops were landed in one of the most unhealthy countries in America, in the most sickly season : and obliged to halt near a fortnight in order to collect horses, and to refresh, after so tedious a voyage. The landing was made sixty miles, instead of sixteen, from the principal object of the campaign ; the troops subjected to a long march through a very difficult country, and obliged to attack the rebels at a very great disadvantage, crossing a river in their front, separated in two distinct bodies, and ever liable to be encountered by the whole force of the rebels. The fleet could not co-operate with the army, but was dismissed to go round into the Delaware ; no possible retreat was left in case of any disaster ; if they had been repulsed, it must have been fatal, as they were unprovided with provisions ; victory, in short, was absolutely necessary to their preservation. They must be masters of the country, in order to exit. The bravery of the troops saved their commander the disgrace, and the nation the misfortune, which seemed due to his indiscretion.

Disadvantages of Chespeak voyage.

There is great unanimity and true courage, in firmly encountering dangers and difficulties when the service absolutely

O

requires

Reflexions on
General Howe.

requires it; but where a General exposes his army to it unnecessarily, and by that means protracts the war; when a plain, safe, and expeditious method offers, it is incapacity or madness in the extreme. Fortunately the fleet had a more expeditious Voyage returning from Elke, than it had going thither, and sailed safely up the Delaware, which a few weeks before had been deemed so dangerous; or the army would have been in a very disagreeable situation, notwithstanding the victory they had obtained.

Rebel army run
30 m. in 14 h.

Few victories were ever more easily won, than that at Brandywine; and no army ever fled in greater confusion or dismay than the rebels: in fourteen hours after his defeat Mr. Wallington was on the banks of the Schuylkill, near thirty miles from the place of action; the inhabitants of Philadelphia were in the utmost consternation; large quantities of stores were lodged in it; the royal army had but to march on, and all must have fallen into their hands, without another shot. Instead of this, the army moved with the greatest caution in pursuit of a broken and dismayed enemy, who no longer thought of disputing a pass with the intrepidity of the King's troops.

Our up & down
marching let
them escape.

Instead of marching along the plain and broad road to Philadelphia, the army filed off, and marched slowly and cautiously across the country, then up the Schuylkill, and then down again; by which means sufficient time was allowed the rebels to recollect themselves, recover their spirits, and remove their stores from Philadelphia.

Conjectures
why the army
not allowed to
complete their
victories.

At last when nothing remained in it worth taking, the city was entered in triumph, fifteen days after the victory at Brandywine. If this conduct does not proceed from a total want of capacity, I hope it is to be attributed to nothing worse: courage certainly was not wanting; yet the ardour of the troops has been constantly restrained. Upon every defeat we have given the rebels, we seem to have been afraid of a vanquished and broken rabble, that we despised before we defeated them. This, my Lord, is a paradox which people endeavour to account for in various ways; some attribute it to indolence, others to over-caution, and some even to a fear that the war would be too short. I own I cannot agree in the last, with regard to the person who has the chief command, tho' I may suspect some of those in his confidence.

On the battle of
German Town.

The action at German Town needs no other comment, than that it was similar to all the battles we have fought. His Majesty's troops gained a complete victory, and yet they were so much restrained in the pursuit, that the rebels escaped with a very inconsiderable loss. The victorious troops were not thought sufficient to pursue the enemy they had defeated, until the grenadiers were brought up from Philadelphia, eight miles distant; the pursuit was then permitted, but the rebels had

had by that time collected themselves, and got to such a distance, that it was totally ineffectual.

The forts on the Delaware were taken after such a delay, such a series of blunders, and with such loss, that they were indeed a very dear purchase. The expedition to White Marsh, is, in the opinion of many, a most singular instance of incapacity. The King's army marched up to the front of the rebel encampment and finding it fortified too strongly to be attacked, without further examination, were led back to Philadelphia. Here was another occasion lost of crushing at a blow the rebel power. I Had Gen. Howe assert, as an undoubted fact, that the rebel camp was totally attacked the rebels in rear at White Marsh, success certain. unfortified in the rear; and had the King's army turned their left flank, and attacked their rear, success was certain; nay, their destruction must have ensued, as the rebels were greatly inferior even in numbers. If the General had but remained in their rear only two days without attacking them, Mr. Washington must either have decamped before him, or have marched out and given him battle, as it is well known he had not above one day's provision in his camp. This we learned, even before we got back to Philadelphia, and ought certainly to have known it sooner, did not a dislike to business, and indolence, retard our success. It is inexcusable in a General, at all times, to be so ignorant of his adversary's situation: in a civil war, when intelligence is so easily obtained, it is criminal.

Thus we have twice allowed Mr. Washington to shew all the world, that he is capable, with an inferior force, to choose such a camp as he can remain in with safety. Such camps, my Lord, are to be found in almost every parish in America. What then is our situation? Must we not either relinquish all hope of conquering America, or change our commanders, and with them such a disgraceful system? The idea of fighting upon any sort of equal terms, is totally exploded among the rebels; the best we can expect is, that they should wait for us in a camp which they deem secure, in which we should either surround them, and cut off their supplies, or we should embrace the occasion like men accustomed to victory; feeling our superiority in valour and discipline, and even in numbers, we should storm their camp, and at a blow annihilate rebellion. Your Lordship knows that in such cases it is even safest to be the assailants; the idea of superiority, with which it inspires every breast, almost ensures success, and few attempts have failed in storming a fortified camp. Instead of declining it, it is a situation which we should wish the rebels to place themselves in. I assert that this is the general language, and even the murmurs of the royal army at this hour in America. Bunker's-hill and Trenton have had very unhappy effects upon all our military proceedings in America. It belongs only to men of genius to draw advantage from their past errors; a mere
O 2
soldier

foldier is incapable of it; he falls into despair and inaction, for want of mental resources.

In the winter quarters, before the disaster at Trenton, the troops were too much extended; ever since they have been so much collected, as to lose the advantage of our victories. At Bunker's-hill we despised situation; we have ever since fallen into the opposite extreme.

Southern expedition absurd.
Want of ability in our operations

I think it totally unnecessary to dwell longer upon the expedition to the head of Elke river, or upon the operations of the army until they went into winter quarters. I am persuaded your Lordship, and every man of the least information in this country, must be convinced of the absurdity of the one, and of the dilatoriness and want of ability in the other. The public may see that from these two causes the advantages of the campaign to the southward have been very unequal to their hopes, or indeed to what they had a right to expect, even if it had not sacrificed General Burgoyne's army. The people give their money freely; the zeal and intrepidity of the troops are unquestionable; but that the advantage which ought to arise from both should be lost, through a total want of capability in planning, and activity in executing, must mortify every good and loyal subject in an extreme degree. I acquit your Lordship of having planned the southern campaign; I know it was sent home recommended by many in respectable rank and situations, particularly from Amboy. You gave way to the deception, (your Lordship perceives I speak from information) and large promises were made, that many thousands of loyal subjects would join the Royal Standard as soon as it should make its appearance in Pennsylvania. The deceiver now lays the fault upon the general for not extending his forces, and affording a greater appearance of protection. He may be right, as he is in high trust and favour under him. An unlimited power over the liberty of his fellow citizens is intrusted in him. He who never was esteemed by one of them, is now placed over them.

Ld. G. G. did not plan southern expedition.

Folly of occupying Philadel-

The town of Philadelphia, my Lord, is all we have for millions expended last campaign. How far such a conquest is advantageous to us, or facilitates the future progress of our army, I leave to your Lordship to judge from the official dispatches you have received, and the report of every officer who has arrived from America. From its natural situation, Philadelphia is incapable of being fortified. An army must be left to defend it; and a fleet to keep open the communication with it by water; the banks of the river are equally hostile as before, and difficult to guard; and after all what does it command? is there any natural boundary which can be established? any important post which can be seized upon by the possession of it? it is divided by the Delaware from the Jerseys; a small guard of militia on the opposite bank watches every motion made in the town with impunity

impunity; and the passage for boats is obstructed near three months in the winter. The country westward from Philadelphia is one of the most difficult in America. In short, the army is at sea in that country; the general finds it so, and knows not how to proceed; he is at his wit's end.

Gen. Howe at
his wits end.

After having taken this review of the proceedings towards conquering America by arms, permit me to call your Lordship's attention to the means made use of to effect it otherwise. A message was sent by Sir William Howe to Congress, offering to treat upon such terms, as could not be justified upon any other grounds than absolute despair. The time chosen for this too, was when they were flushed with the defeat of General Burgoyne's army. This message was sent by one Brown, through the medium of Mr. Willing of Philadelphia. Brown was a clerk to the house of Willing, Morris and company. Morris is one of the members of Congress, has been one of the most active, and without whose assistance it is confessed that the Congress could never have established a credit in France. His brother, one of the house, is now their factor in France, and the Congress are supplied under the name and credit of Messrs. Willing, Morris and Company; though I do not believe that Mr. Willing himself has any share in the business. Happily the Congress treated the message with contempt, and imprisoned the messenger. I say happily, because I assert, that had a treaty been disgracefully concluded with Congress upon the terms offered, Great Britain would only have retained the shadow of sovereignty over America; and that even would not have lasted ten years. I assert this to be a truth;—the public will comment upon it.

When General Howe landed at Elk river, he published a declaration, assuring those who should remain peaceably in their houses, protection both in person and property. I will not enter into the scandalous detail of plundering during the campaign, but shall confine myself to what has passed since the troops have been in winter quarters.

The property of loyal subjects has been taken at the will of commissaries, who have paid or not for it as they pleased; flour was purchased from several persons when the army was in great want of it, before the navigation of the river was cleared, and generous prices were promised; yet twenty shillings only were paid at a time when the worst flour was sold at fifty shillings per hundred; and some persons were even threatened with being sent prisoners to the Provost, because they presumed to ask for any payment at all. A great and generous salary has been settled upon a commissary to place him above the corruption of his office. It was not considered that this man was taken from the school of the India House, and familiarised to the peculations of the East. This gentleman too, the friend of the virtuous Duke

Oppression of
Commissaries.

One appointed
familiarized to
the peculations
of the East.

of *Thos. Mactenzie*
Secy to Gen. Howe

of Grafton, talks of the rights of America, declares himself a Whig under the American acceptation of the word: he even presumes to assert, that the General is of the same sentiments. I know it is absolutely necessary that the army should have comfortable quarters; but is it just, my Lord, that loyal subjects should have their houses crammed with soldiers, while many who have been rebels, and still would be so if they dared, are exempted? this I aver is the case in too many instances; even the houses of those gentlemen, who are now prisoners in Virginia, have been filled, and none excused. Is not this inequitable and impolitic in a high degree? is not this shewing, that to have been in rebellion is the best road to favour and kind treatment? there is but one way of accounting for such conduct.

Aburd government at N. York

If we turn our eyes to the city of New York, we see the most singular and absurd system of government imaginable. There we behold the governor of the province acting as a general officer only, while a military governor commands with absolute power in the city; and the Mayor acting under him, exercises a civil authority, under a military controul. Still the government of New York is far preferable to that of Philadelphia.

Great character of the military governor.

The military governor is a man of rank and character, unconnected with provincial party, and uncontaminated with rebellion; it is not necessary for him to make a show of too much zeal to cover his past misdeeds. He is a man inferior to none for good judgment and humanity, and a knowledge not only of that town, but of America in general: he acts as a father to the people over whom he presides.

Remarks on an indolent & dissipated General.

The luxury and licentiousness of the army have reached your Lordship's ears too frequently to make it necessary for me to expatiate on that head. What can the nation expect from a luxurious and licentious army, and an indolent and dissipated general? our affairs absolutely require the industry, œconomy, and regularity of an Amherst; with the fire and genius of a Wolfe.

A regiment of idle Commissar.

A regiment might be formed of idle, useless commissaries, quarter-masters, agents, and forage masters; there are twenty of these appointments now, where there was one last war in America. The rebellion will never be at an end, while there are so many idlers fattening upon the spoils of England and America. While our West India islands are in the utmost distress for lumber, at least five hundred thousand staves are suffered to rot in cellars, and on wharfs at Philadelphia, under pretence of a scrupulous adherence to law, though licences are granted to the vessels of favourites to import cargoes from different places, contrary to all law and good policy. And though no merchant could obtain permission to export these staves, yet the commissary general was allowed to do it to Corke, under the pretence that it was for the use of the contractors. These

Indulgence to favourites & to the Commissary General.

were

were hoghead staves, my Lord, to make beef barrels.—The trick is too glaring!

I have spoken freely, my Lord; I have done it from a conviction arising from the fullest information, and from the most hearty and zealous desire of seeing the present rebellion in America speedily crushed, and law, order, and constitutional liberty restored to that unhappy and deluded country, under the British government.

Remarks on Sir Andrew Snape Hammond's Evidence. By a Sea Officer on the Chesapeake Voyage.

Reading the other day in the papers, the examination of Sir Partiality ob- And. Snape Hammond in the House of Commons, relative to servable. the expedition of the Chesapeake Bay; I could not help observing a certain partiality in the evidence.—Though I have a high opinion of the worthy Knight's abilities as a sea officer, yet the vulgar proverb of *Ask my brethren if I am a rogue*, struck me most forcibly. Can it be supposed, that one whom the noble Lord has raised to the highest pinnacle of honour he could, would not applaud his conduct? if *he* is admitted on one side, why not call *some* who have felt his implacable resentment on the other side by way of a balance? or to proceed in the fairest way, call in those who are *above prejudice* (several of whom were present on the expedition,) and they are the only people to give the honourable house the most satisfaction. From whom to obtain fair evidence.

I could have wished to have heard the opinion of the truly heroic Sir James Wallace on this expedition, and several others I could point out, but 'tis too late.

'Tis well known in the navy, that Sir Andrew Snape Ham- The Chesapeake mond, in preference to older officers, had the command of the voyage Sir Andrew's own advice. fleet at Philadelphia all the winter. Before this he was Lord Howe's oracle! It was he that advised him, very sagaciously, not to attempt landing in the Delaware; he says the rebels might have come down with their gallies, and annoyed our landing;—he likewise observes that they were *only three weeks* longer on the passage to Chesapeake.—The first supposition is impossible, provided the fleet were properly disposed of, and the detention by the different places was *full two months*.

I must now observe that I had the honour to belong to the navy on that expedition, and beg to ask a few questions, and give a plain narrative of some facts just as they fell out.

Did not Capt. Lindsay, in his Majesty's frigate the Pearl, His opinion of danger in the Delaw. refuted. chase the whole force of the rebels from the Capes of Delaware to very near Reedy Island?

Did not the Roebuck, Sir Andrew's own ship, and Liverpool, when attacked by the gallies, though one was astern, oblige them to desist?

Did

Did not the Roebuck, Camilla, Liverpool, and Pearl, keep the advanced post for a month at Billingsport, both before the Eagle arrived, and for some time after, when the whole formidable rebel navy, with fire ships, rafts, &c. were there, and the several attempts made with fire-rafts, &c. all proved abortive, and only obliged the ships to cut once?

Landing at
Newcastle
would have
saved 2 months.

The rebel army were then some on the Jersey shore, and the Eagle at Chester, nineteen miles above Newcastle.—As we had with us four sail of the line, two 50 gun ships, six or seven frigates, besides galleys, armed vessels, tenders, &c. could not the frigates advance three miles above Newcastle, and the army land under cover of the large ships and other vessels, any of which could go within pistol shot of the town, or any parts contiguous to it?—Or, if it was found necessary, the large ships might have advanced, some of them, and left the rest to cover. Round Newcastle is a fine level country.

Here the army would have been within forty miles of Philadelphia, I don't say three weeks, but two months sooner than when they began to march at the head of the Elke, which is more than three times the distance.

And 1500 men.

We were three weeks on the passage to the Elke, and detained there near a month longer before the army was ready to march; in the course of which, by death, sickness, seamen, and soldiers, taken straggling, desertion, &c. we were fifteen hundred at least less to do duty than when at the Delaware.

We sailed from New York the latter end of July, were off the Delaware in one week, and before we left Chesapeake, 'twas the latter end of September; from thence to Delaware again we were twelve days, in such weather, that the fleet was separated; one transport foundered, and many of the small armed vessels were in danger of being lost. I would then wish to leave to any impartial judges, whether the expedition did honour to the two great officers, or credit to the nation.

Whether honour or credit
gained.

As the detention of the army, for near a month after the landing in Elke River, may excite curiosity in some, and raise wonder in others, I shall endeavour to give a short account of that politic business.

Army detained
a month.

The transports, with the small men of war, anchored about ten miles below the head of the river Elke; and in about an hour and half after they anchored, the whole of the troops were on shore. The stores, provisions, &c. were not landed here, but for weighty reasons, ordered up in the small vessels to the head of the river; a very shoal and intricate passage.

I should have supposed, provided every thing necessary had been landed where the troops were at first, that a week, or ten days at most, might have completed the army for their march.—As a proof that I cannot be very much out in my judgement, I must beg leave to remark, that Sir Henry Clinton, after march-

marching across the Jerseys, from the time he began at the heights of Navesink till every matter was compleated, was only a week; but we were not in such haste! for after the flat boats had carried up tents, tent-poles, heavy baggage, &c. they were very advantageously employed another week in bringing them down again. The Commanding Officer by this time having settled within himself that no heavy baggage should proceed with the army.—As it was ten miles from the transports to the head of the river, these amusing orders, and counter orders, must of course take up some time in the executing.

When the fleet arrived in the Delaware, the Roebuck, Pearl, Camilla, and Liverpool were advanced as far up as Billingsport, a strong post, which the rebels had evacuated on the approach of our troops; and as they brought down some artillery in the night, and fired on our ships, to favour an attempt made by their fire-rafts, it was not only thought, but found very necessary to secure a post here. Some marines with a detachment of the 7th regiment were accordingly sent.

The rebels did not evacuate this post without some better view, for they were now seen to be very busy throwing up works on a place called Red Bank, a high steep place; which not only commanded, and secured a communication with Mud-Island, but protected their shipping, and entirely secured them from any attack we could have made. The General might have seen this every day himself: for it took them sometime before they compleated it. He was told of it, but it availed nothing! he was determined they should finish it before he would attack it!

—and they did; for the brave Count Donop, with 2000 Hessians attempted it, and near four hundred soldiers were killed and wounded.—This was not the only loss we sustained, for Capt. Reynolds who was then lying at Billingsport, perceiving the attack, and fearing the rebel gallies might annoy our troops, weighed immediately, and endeavoured to get as near as possible to the fort and gallies to divert their attention from the attack, but unfortunately got on shore. The Merlin sloop of war also shared the same fate; a cannonading began between the Augusta, Roebuck, and the Mud Fort, which lasted pretty briskly, for near two hours. The next morning it was renewed, but the Augusta was not only too far from the fort, but lay in a very disagreeable situation; about eleven o'clock she took fire by the accident of her own wads, and as the lower deck guns were loaded, and going off every minute, it was impossible for the boats to go along-side; however, every thing was done that could be done to save the people; many who could not swim perished, and all the poor men that were wounded, were blown up in her. There were missing above a hundred of her crew;—may we not ask with propriety if the post had been secured in a proper time, if we should not only have saved

14 days lost in landing and re-shipping tents.

Red Bank fortified before Gen. Howe's face.

But not attacked till compleated.

Hessians repulsed.

Merlin lost.

And Augusta burnt.

Misconduct of not possessing Red Bank.

GOV. JOHNSTONE'S SPEECH.

many lives, but have taken Mud Island with very little trouble, as it entirely commanded it, and likewise saved the trouble of often risking the flat boats with provisions under the guns of the Mud Fort in the night, to keep the army from starving; as they never were above five or six days provisions before hand, till the Mud Fort was reduced, which was six weeks? The rest of the proceedings for the reduction of the island are well known.

GOVERNOR JOHNSTONE'S SPEECH.

On Lord Howe's Conduct in America.

March 22d, 1779.

As I differ from the noble Lord (Howe) who spoke last in almost every thing he has said, I will consider the heads of his discourse separately, and give my reasons to the house for this disagreement. His Lordship first alledged that no reinforcement was sent to him, because of the two line of battle ships mentioned by the noble Lord at the Admiralty, one was intended to attend on the Commissioners in case they thought proper to return immediately, and the other was destined to bring his Lordship home; still the two ships, Trident and Ardent, were there; the Admiralty had a right to reckon upon them, as it could not be supposed that either the Commissioners, who sailed in the Trident from England a week later than d'Estaing sailed from Toulon, or the Ardent, who sailed with the convoy a little before them, could possibly have left the ports of North America before the packet, which sailed the 5th of May, would announce the approach of the French squadron, and therefore they were ships to be considered as on the spot, to be used and depended upon as the event has proved.

Ld. Howe reinforced with two ships.

G. P. M. 64. 10. 24

Did not collect his force.

The admiralty had further, reasons to expect that the whole of Lord Howe's force would have been *collected*, especially the two decked ships, because they had sent his Lordship very early notice of the sailing of Monsieur la Motte Piquet, and of the certainty of a war with France: in this case his force was far from being despicable. *Why* the two decked ships were not collected after two months notice, is a question on which I am persuaded his Lordship will be able to give very good reasons. I can vote upon the subject, because I am sufficiently acquainted with the facts necessary to form my judgment, but I question if an hundred members in the house know the actual force Lord Howe had under his command, or the confidence the admiralty could have that this force would be collected.

The next point the noble Lord states, and the honourable gentleman who made the motion has enforced the same argument, is, that in case Moni. d'Estaing had found our army at Philadelphia,

Philadelphia, and our ships in the Delaware, that the army would have been starved, and the shipping destroyed. This opinion is general throughout the nation; it has been favoured by the friends of administration, to enforce the wisdom of their measure in abandoning Philadelphia so opportunely as they did. It has been agreed to by this side of the house, to magnify the risk which our fleet and our army run by their bad management. But on this subject, as I may probably do on many others, I differ from them both. I maintain, as I always have done, that the abandoning Philadelphia at the moment we did, was most fatal to our affairs in North America; and that supposing no such orders had been given, and Mons. d'Estaing had arrived off the Delaware as he did, that neither the ships in that river, nor the army at Philadelphia, run any risk from that circumstance, for six or eight weeks at least, by which time we must have been relieved from any impressions of restraint, by the navigation of that river being interrupted.

We should have kept Philadelp.

First, I say, that the navigation of that river is so intricate, that supposing the buoys cut away, the best pilots of the country could not have traced out the channel to have ascended the river with such ships as those under Mons. d'Estaing, in eight or ten days.

Reasons against d'Estaing's succeeding in the Delaware.

Next I assert, that none of the 74 or 80 gun ships, without being lightened, could have passed the flats, as the Trident went on ground twice at the top of high water, not from missing the channel, but from the shallowness of the water, and this ship draws three feet less water than any of the French 74 gun ships.

Thirdly, I assert, that supposing Mons. d'Estaing, with his whole force, had actually ascended the Delaware, above the flats, that all our ships, both men of war and transports, could have been moved into safety above the chevaux de frize; or the transports could have been removed above the chevaux de frize, and the ships of war moored in a half moon below, with flanking batteries on each side the river, which was in possession of our army. We should also have had the advantage of sending fire ships down the stream among the enemy. The river is not so broad as the Thames at Gravesend, and d'Estaing, after passing through a hot fire in ascending, must have been repulsed in the same manner which experience has demonstrated we were capable of doing by the late attack at St Lucia, where Admiral Barrington, with a very inferior force indeed, has shewn what men, not willing to despair, can accomplish.

Admiral Barrington given as a noble example

For my own part, after considering the subject on every point, again and again, I really think, so far from any danger by the direct application of the force of the enemy in the Delaware, that there was hardly any risk from any thing that could have been done by them, in that river, against the resistance of our ships and army; New York would have been the place in

danger.

danger. But it is always to be remembered, if orders had not been given for leaving Philadelphia, our great ships of war would not have been in the river Delaware, and therefore New York was equally capable of receiving the defence, which they actually did present when d'Estaing came off that port. So that on every alternative, the operations of his force would have been equally abortive.

But the noble lord says, the army would have been starved. To my knowledge, there was five weeks provision for the army at Philadelphia, and still greater quantities in the river when we arrived there, though it had been determined to leave the place.

Lord Howe's character lowered with him.

I know how justly high the character of the noble lord stands for naval reputation; no man could esteem it in a higher degree than I did myself, *before* the transaction I am going to speak of. Perhaps my disappointment was the greater on that account, and the estimate I made of the force of the enemy, was less from the opinion I had of the vice-admiral who commanded our fleet. I understand his conduct has received repeated applause from officers of high reputation in this house, while I was absent from sickness; but this shall not prevent me from speaking my own opinion freely on this, and every other subject. I have been told the two noble admirals (Keppel and Howe) have been pouring incense on each others heads in very copious streams. I agree they stand in the most respectable light on account of their *former* services; and I also agree with my friend below me, that in case any minister has been guilty of any improper conduct, that has driven such men from the service of the state at this critical moment, when the exertions of all good men are so much wanted to repel the common enemy, that such a minister should feel the indignation of this House, and of his country at large. But if it should appear on the other hand, that any set of military men, in their several pretensions, are become too high for the state, I hope there is still left in the nation, virtue and spirit sufficient to repel such claims, and ability enough to be found in the naval department to resist the power of our enemies, even if the two noble admirals were no more.

Two Admirals pour copious streams of incense upon each other's heads.

They are too high for the State.

Administration has certainly great credit in dispatching the two packets from Falmouth, to give the noble lord notice of the sailing of the Toulon squadron, and the packet that did arrive in America having fallen in with that squadron, from every particular which the captain related, it was evident to me, beyond a doubt, that they were bound to sweep the coast of America, from Virginia northward.

Lord Howe informed of the French, June 29.

The packet arrived the 29th of June, and certainly gave sufficient time for every preparation to be made for receiving the enemy, who did not arrive off New York till the 11th of July. Whether

Whether those preparations were made, or otherwise, is a question I shall not now enter into.—I mean at present only to take notice of some assertions in a pamphlet that has been circulated with great industry, as preparatory to mislead our judgments in the question of to-day.

This performance I can hardly attribute to the noble lord to whom it relates : it is too fulsome flattery to suppose he had any share in it, or that he can give it the least countenance now ; nor should I have envied his lordship any of the praises bestowed by so idolatrous an author, if he had not taken notice of so insignificant a person as myself, and misrepresented my opinions. His patron might have enjoyed the glory of making a bridge of boats to pass the army over the rill that separates Sandy Hook from the main, with the assistance of all the boats from fifty sail of pendants, four hundred transports, and two hundred flat boats, without any interference. I am willing the House should understand this marvellous work was equal to every thing in ancient story, and even superior to Cæsar's bridge over the Rhine ; but in that part which respects myself I cannot so easily submit.

Falsely flattered.
Makes a bridge over a rill, assisted by about 1000 boats.

Now, Sir, I assert, before you and the whole world, that what is imputed to me by the author of this pamphlet, is not true. I never obtruded myself into the society of any set of men ; the moment I heard the French fleet had appeared, I thought it my duty to go down to Sandyhook in the night to offer my poor services ; neither did I ever bewail our deplorable situation from the circumstance of the French squadron coming on the coast of America. I thought it a lucky circumstance. I expressed that sentiment to all with whom I conversed. I am glad I did not know the imminent danger we were in until I came to this city, the centre of all true intelligence, otherwise I might have passed more uneasy hours. I also deny, that ever I asserted Lord Howe had a superiority over the French squadron when they appeared off the port of New York. If the noble Lord can remember any thing that passed between him and a person of so little consequence as myself, he must know, that so far from entertaining that sentiment, when the noble Lord talked of *going out* of the harbour to *give them battle*, I said that I thought he was not of sufficient force to hazard an engagement ; but I always thought with a proper disposition of his force, he was fully capable of defending the entrance of the harbour. What I said then, and what I assert now, is, that after the junction of the Cornwall of 74 guns, the Raifonable of 64, the Renown of 50, and the Centurion of 50, all heavy metal ships, Lord Howe was *equal*, if not *superior*, in force to the French squadron. I give it also as my opinion, with deference to better judgments, that when his Lordship appeared off Rhode Island, though he did not take the whole of his force with him, that

Gov. Johnstone offers his service to Lord Howe in America.
Ld. Howe equal if not superior to d'Estaing.

that he was fully equal to Monsieur d'Estaing, and I reckon in the following manner:—His fleet was the best manned that ever went to sea, commanded by brave, judicious officers; the French were ill manned and sickly, and damaged upon entering and returning through the fire of the batteries on Rhode Island. I shall read the list of the two squadrons, and the manner I class them:

Lists of English and French fleet.	Guns. Pounders.			Guns.
I esteem the Cornwall	74	18 &	32	{ a match for Cæsar 74 beat by the Isis of 50 Guns.
{ Eagle of	64	18	24	Languedoc 84
{ Experiment	50	12	12	
{ Trident	64	18	24	Tonant 80
{ Roebuck	44	9	18	
{ Raifonable	64	18	24	Guerrier 74
{ Phoenix	44	9	18	Hector 74
Somerfet	70	18	32	Protecteur 74
{ Nonfuch	64	18	24	
{ Richmond	32	12		Zelee 74
{ Sr. Albans	64	18	24	Marseilles 74
{ Venus	36	12		Valiant 64
{ Ardent	64	18	24	Provence 64
{ Pearl	32	12		Fantafque 64
{ Preston	50	12	24	Sagittaire 50
{ Apollo	32	12		[9 & 18 pounders.
{ Isis	50	12	24	
{ Vigilant	20	24		
{ Centurion	50	12	24	
{ Sphinx	20	9		
Renown	50	12	24	

Note. Lord Howe had, besides these, the *Nautilus* sloop of 18 guns, *Caracas* and *Thunder* bombs, *Strombolo*, *Salphur*, and *Volcano* fireships, four row-galleys, and two tenders, besides the *Leviathan*, capable of mounting 70 guns, and actually carrying 44 guns, left at Sandy-Hook; and the *Nabob* and *Supply*, two old East-India ships, taken into his Majesty's service, and mounting 36 guns each, and 236 men, who sailed with the fleet, but which Lord Howe sent to the West-Indies. If too weak, why leave the *Leviathan* behind? Why detach the *Nabob* and *Supply*? Will any seaman say that the ships, as they are arranged, can be deemed inferior in any point of the line? But the *Languedoc* was dismasted and lost her rudder in the storm. The *Marseilles* was dismasted in the storm. beaten by the *Cæsar* was beaten by the *Isis*, and driven into Boston. The *Isis* of 50 guns. *Monmouth* of 64 guns, another of Byron's Squadron, had joined Lord

Proofs Lord H. did not think himself too weak.

Lord Howe at Sandy-Hook on the 18th, yet d'Estaing lay at anchor in the open sea for eight days, where he raised jury-masts, within twenty leagues of Sandy-Hook. Lord Howe waited from the 17th to the 24th of August before he followed, though he had then confessedly so superior a force.

Ld. Howe when superior tries away 8 days, when d'Estaing lay dismasted within twenty leagues of him.

But it may be said although Lord Howe had a superiority by the addition of his heavy frigates, yet it was impossible they could be brought to act in the disposition in which I have placed them. This I admit, but at the same time I contend, that Lord Howe had a complete line of heavy ships capable of lying along-side the French ships, and in half an hour's action, every one knows the line of battle must be broken, when all the frigates could have come to have acted to the utmost of their force. If this is not admitted, it would be impossible for Lord Howe, or any other officer, to have availed himself of the advantage of any number of larger ships; for supposing his frigates had all been fifty gun ships, still no greater number than the ships opposed to the enemy's line can act at the beginning, until they are broken and scattered, which must always happen, as I said before, in half an hour in every sea engagement. The generality of mankind are confounded in their opinions by the weight of metal, and the number of guns stated, without knowing the real circumstances attending those apparent disproportions. I reckon an English 64 gun ship a match for any 74 gun ship out of France. The difference between the actual force of two such ships is not so much as people imagine. They generally count the difference of ten guns, but in fact the difference upon the real efficient batteries is only two guns, the rest arises from the guns on the quarter-deck and fore-castle, which are light and are not of such consequence, and are often in the way of working the ship. Respecting the weight of metal, I think the English 64 has a great advantage over the French 74. Experience has convinced me, that the French 36 pounder (equal to our 42 pounder) is a gun that cannot be managed sufficiently quick. Whatever gun is above the size of being loaded by one man to a sponge, and breeched about by one man to a handspike, I esteem too large for action. I believe the 18 and 24 pounders, which all our 64 gun ships carried, to be the fittest guns for use in a close engagement; the quickness of their fire, and the certainty of pointing them well and easily, does more than compensate for the difference of damage when they hit. I do not say this will be the case in an engagement like Mr. Keppe's, on contrary tacks, where the ships came up scattered, and the enemy have time to load again before they meet. Here the heavy grape shot does great mischief to the sails and rigging. I speak of a close engagement on the same tack, in the usual manner. I think

On bringing frigates into a general action.

English 64 equal to Fr. 74.

French guns unweildy.

Engl. 50 equal think also, that one of our new 50 gun ships, with 12 and 24
to French 64 pounders, is nearly a match for a French 64. What happened
in this very transaction will vindicate my opinion. The Isis,
one of the worst of the 50 gun ships of Lord Howe's squadron,
fell in with the Cæsar, the finest 74 of d'Estaing's fleet, and a
flag ship too, and in a fair engagement the Isis beat the Cæsar.

Gallant example Much praise is undoubtedly due to the Captain, officers and
in Capt. Rayner seamen of the Isis, for this extraordinary gallant action, but it
shews at the same time that my opinions are not extravagant. The

And Capt. Reynolds. Jupiter, one of our 50 gun ships, very ill-manned, has lately
had an engagement with The Trident of 64 guns, and the issue
has been favourable to my opinion. The battle was drawn
without any claim to a superiority by the French ship. I could
give many proofs in the history of naval engagements, that my
opinion is justified by experience, nor do I know any instance
where it can be contradicted upon any trial that has been made.
But the House will observe by the list of squadrons which I
have read, that no such disproportion of force existed, because
any difference that may appear in the ships of the line was fully
compensated by the assistance they would derive from the fri-
gates, three of which were two decks, and one (the Vigilant)
an old India ship, of 20 twenty-four pounders. All the others,
excepting the Sphinx, were heavy metal frigates, of 36 and
32 guns, carrying twelve pounders on their main battery.—
These, Sir, are the opinions which I am ready to avow, and I
have a certain conviction in my own mind of the truth of
what I advance.

Ld. Howe might I am still at a loss to know whether the noble Lord himself really
have beaten thought his squadron was inferior in force to that of Monsieur
d'Estaing. I have never heard this asserted by any officer
who served in the fleet. I have always heard it alledged, that
his Lordship was manœuvring for the wind, and meant to
give d'Estaing battle, but was prevented by the storm. If so,
I conclude he expected to defeat his opponent, which would
have proved his superiority, and I sincerely believe this would
have been the case had the two squadrons engaged.

No famine nor As to all the dreadful consequences of famine, or surrender
surrender as Ld. of the army, which the noble Lord has enumerated, supposing
Howe feared. Monsieur d'Estaing had got possession of Sandy-Hook, I can-
not subscribe to them in the extent he has stated. I have been
informed, that by driving Long-Island there would have been
Six months pro- found six months subsistence for the troops, besides the various
visions on Long means of obtaining supplies through the Sound, while the bloc-
Island. kade of that port could not have continued without relief above
six or eight weeks at most.

Remarks

REMARKS on Gen. Howe's Speech, and Conduct.

The General says, "His only view is to justify himself—that Gen. Howe's
 "many severe censures have been thrown out against him, and Speech.
 "ministers have been silent—that when he was calumniated, he
 "should have been vindicated by the noble Lord."

Let me ask the honourable general who were the calumniators? where were the censures past? there has been no charge brought against him in parliament; and he expressly says, "That his
 "conduct has been approved of, and that the minister conveyed that approbation." Whatever were his deserts, he cannot complain of want of support from administration. The pa- Flattering at-
 pers before the House are replete with the most flattering marks tion.
 of attention from the noble Lord at the head of the American department; he not only conveys the approbation of the sovereign, but is himself lavish of praise and personal civility. Did not the King honour him with a red ribbon unasked; and can any thing be more strongly marked than the attention that has ever been paid to his recommendations? almost all his aid de- Aid de Camps
 camps, who were captains at the beginning of the campaign of Captains 1776
 1776, are now lieutenant colonels, and many of them have now Lieut. Cols.
 been promoted by the King, without his even asking it. He expressed his wish for particular officers to be sent out to serve Every thing
 upon the staff; they were all sent as he desired. He wanted to done to keep
 have Mr. M'Kenzie, his secretary, appointed paymaster to him in good
 the provincial forces, a very lucrative office; it was done. In humour.
 short, every thing was done that could be done to keep him in good humour.

But says he, "I have been severely censured, and ministers
 "have been silent." Does he allude to anonymous publications? he surely could not expect the ministers to vindicate his character against such attacks as these! the noble Lord might as well expect the same favour from the General. He could not be so weak as to suppose that ministers could stop the mouth of Ministers can-
 calumny, or influence the public opinion! they would undoubtedly be very glad to be able to exercise such a power; it might be not influence the
 often very convenient for them; but the misfortune is, that in this public opinion.
 land of liberty, people will speak their sentiments in spite of ministers, or any body else. It is true, the general's conduct has been His conduct u-
 censured—severely censured, or rather universally condemned. niversally con-
 It has not been in news-papers alone, and anonymous publications, that he has been attacked, but his inactivity and his blunders, have been subjects of general conversation: people of all ranks and descriptions have spoken their minds freely upon the matter, and have testified their disapprobation and uneasiness without reserve. But are ministers to be blamed for this!

If the general thinks that a vote of the House of Commons will
 Q whiten

A vote of the House will not make him a great commander.

Meaning of a Parliamentary enquiry instead of a court martial.

Sir William's charges disingenuous.

The King leaves Gen. Howe to his own judgment.

whiten him, and convince the world that he is a great commander, he does very right to move for a parliamentary enquiry. Indeed it is the only chance he has left, poor as it is, of rescuing his character, as an officer, from total perdition. Conscious as he must be that his conduct in America will not bear the strict examination of a military enquiry, and encouraged by the flattering success that others in his situation have met with, I am not surpris'd that he has chosen the safer method of laying his case before a good natured and indulgent House of Commons, rather than demanding a court-martial when he found himself "censured" and "calumniated." For though the sentence of a military court, and that only could acquit him in the eyes of military people, yet as members of parliament are, *ex officio*, competent judges of military operations, as well as of all other matters, whether political or professional, he might think that their approbation might stand in lieu of a regular acquittal, and then there would be no risque; for if he did not succeed, he could always impute it to the undue influence of a wicked and corrupt administration, and his character would not be at all the worse for his having failed. Opposition would always be ready to receive him with open arms, and the merit of having rendered abortive the plans of the present ministry, however well they might have been contrived for the public good, could not fail to intitle him to a high seat among those worthy characters who stile themselves patriots, and the guardians of the liberties of this country.

We shall endeavour to answer all Sir William Howe's charges against administration, and prove that they are disingenuous and ill-founded.

He says "his orders should have been clear"—not whispers across the Atlantic;—"not so ambiguously expressed, that they might always be explained away." He complains of wanting the confidence and support of his superiors—the want of a plan from Home, &c. yet at the same time acknowledges, that his own plans and measures met with such approbation from the minister, that he could justify himself under it, if "he thought proper."

Is it not a strong proof of confidence in a General, when unhampered by instructions and uncontrouled by any superior power, he is left intirely at liberty to follow his own plans, and prosecute a war according to his own ideas? and was it ever before a matter of serious complaint against a minister, that he did not furnish military plans, in detail, to a commander in chief; especially when every plan proposed by the General was sure to meet with approbation? The secretary of state, in his letter, dated October 22, 1776, expressly says, "His Majesty does not intend that the general should, in his plans of operation, be confined to any particular province: his choice of situation

"situation must in that respect be governed by his own judgment." How many times in the course of a few months did Sir William Howe alter his plan for the campaign of 1777: between the months of November and April, no less than four, essentially different from each other, were proposed, and yet by the General's own account, each of them in its turn was approved of. The minister, in his letter of the 3d of March, says, "I am now commanded to acquaint you, that the King intirely approves of your deviation from the plan which you formerly suggested." And again, May 18, "As you must, from your situation and military skill, be a competent judge of the propriety of every plan, his majesty does not hesitate to approve the alterations which you propose." Indeed the nature of the American service requires that the General should be at liberty to vary his plans of operations, according to the varying circumstances of the war; and to any, who will take the trouble to cast his eye over the American correspondence, it will plainly appear, that the most ample and generous confidence was placed in Sir William Howe, from the time he came to the chief command till he asked leave to return to this country.—He was not only supported with the whole weight of government, but was indulged in all his wishes both for himself and his friends.—Unasked favours and honours were heaped upon him with the most liberal hand—and he was intrusted with every power, both civil and military, that could add weight and dignity to his situation, or claim respect from those about him, and from the world.

G. Howe changes his plans four times, and each approved.

Generous confidence placed in him.

But though he was left thus entirely at liberty to act as he thought proper, and as exigencies might require, yet he was by no means ignorant of the ideas of administration respecting the future operations of the war. The minister did very often take the liberty of humbly proposing his plans, though he never presumed so far as to give any positive orders in consequence of them. Indeed sometimes the King went so far as to suggest his ideas, and his royal will and pleasure has been signified by the secretary of state. I confess that this in any other service would be construed an order, but I hope the General will not complain of it as such, as he never thought proper in any one instance to pay the least attention to it, any more than to the plans suggested by the minister. Sir William Howe and his noble brother have the entire merit of every military plan that was executed during his command, not excepting the famous one of the voyage round the capes of Virginia and up Chesapeake bay, which brought on the loss of Burgoyne's army, the present war with France, and every subsequent evil that has arisen from them to this country.

No attention even to the King's orders.

Has lost Burgoyne and raised a new war.

The General in his speech complains of the minister for having sent him a copy of his Letter to Sir Guy Carleton (con-

A junction with
Burgoyne.

taining the arrangements for the Canada expedition) without any instructions whatever to himself. I am astonished that an officer could hazard a charge so unmilitary. Could any instructions be necessary when the copy of the secretary of state's dispatch made him perfectly acquainted with every circumstance relating to the northern army? Does not the Letter say that Sir Guy Carleton was to "detach Lieutenant General Burgoyne with direction to proceed with all possible expedition to join (him) General Howe, and to put himself under his command?" That with a view of quelling the rebellion as soon as possible it is become highly necessary that the most speedy junction of the two armies should be effected? And in another place, "I shall write to Sir William Howe from hence by the first packet; but you will nevertheless endeavour to give him the earliest intelligence of this measure, and also direct Lieut. General Burgoyne, and Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, to neglect no opportunity of doing the same, that they may receive instructions from Sir William Howe." Surely no order could have been framed that, in the eyes of a military man, could appear more binding upon the General than the copy of this letter to Sir Guy Carleton? it made a part of a general plan, from which he could not deviate without *hazarding* or *devoting* an expedition, whose movements he had not time to countermand, and whose operations he knew were begun. The moment these troops crossed the lakes, they became a part of his army, and their subsequent misfortunes, if they arose from the want of support and co-operation, are as much to be laid to his charge as the surprize and defeat of the Hessians which he left exposed and unsupported at Trenton.

Answerable for
Burgoyne's loss.

Turns accuser.

General Howe, in the beginning of his speech expressly declared, he only meant to "justify himself;" yet we afterwards find him turned the accuser, and obliquely charging administration with crimes of the most serious nature—that of hiding from Parliament the true state of our affairs in America, and promising success when they knew there was no reason to expect it.

Mr. Fox's speech

This ground Mr. Fox took up after him, and with his usual virulence charged ministers directly with having "treacherously and traiterously deceived this country." He said they had declared to the House of Commons, "that they had reason to expect a successful campaign, when they knew, and when they had it in their pockets under the General's own hand, that nothing was to be expected."

Gen. Howe's
speech.

The General's words were not so pointed as those of Mr. Fox, nor did they convey a charge so directly; yet their meaning is the same. They were as follow; "The noble Lord said he learned from his intelligence the difficulties the rebels were under in raising troops, that he hoped I should be able to get a sufficient force in Pennsylvania for the defence of
" that

“ that province ; and he still hoped that this campaign would
 “ be the last. So that in spite of my positive assurances from the
 “ spot, the minister’s delusive hopes and conjectures were to
 “ influence him in opposition to my certain knowledge.”

However delusive the minister’s hopes and conjectures may have been, his intelligence does not appear to have been materially different from that of the General, notwithstanding this round assertion to the contrary.—Let us hear what the General’s letters say upon this subject—those very letters which Mr. Fox charges the minister with having had in his pocket when he told the House he had reason to expect a successful campaign. April 2, 1777, he writes from New-York, that “ it is his opinion the rebels will not be able to raise their army
 “ voted last autumn, &c.” And again, “ I have reason to
 “ expect, in case of success in Pennsylvania, there will be
 “ found a considerable part of the inhabitants who may be embodied as militia, and some as provincial troops, for the interior defence of the province, which must be a great aid in
 “ the further progress of the war. “ And in the same letter he
 “ says, “ Still I think it probable that by the latter end of the
 “ campaign we shall be in possession of the provinces of New
 “ York, the Jerseys, and Pennsylvania.” In his letter of the
 of the 20th of December 1776, the General tells the Minister, that, “ the opinions of people were much changed in Pennsylvania, and their minds in general, from the late progress
 “ of the army disposed to peace ; in which sentiment they
 “ would be confirmed by our getting possession of Philadelphia.”
 —And he says in his Speech, “ In the mean time from all the
 “ intelligence I received, the reduction of Pennsylvania appeared very practicable, though I should have but an army
 “ of 19,000 men.”

Ill founded promises of Gen. Howe.

I will not insist upon the fact, that the rebels did actually find difficulties in raising troops, but will, for the sake of the argument, suppose the minister ignorant of what every body else knew ; nor will I lay any stress upon the *great abilities* of the General, nor his activity and “ impatience to begin the campaign,” which are mentioned by the minister in his letter of the 18th of May, and are given as reasons for his hoping for a successful campaign. I will confine myself simply to the information contained in the General’s letters, and will then leave it to the world to judge whether the Minister’s assertion is not justified in the most ample manner even upon this ground.

The noble Lord told the House, “ that he had reason to expect a successful campaign.” The General writes to the noble Lord, “ that by the latter end of the campaign he expects
 “ to be in possession of the provinces of New York, Jerseys, and Pennsylvania :” ’tis true he adds, “ that this in some
 “ measure must depend upon the successes of the northern
 “ army.”

Minister justified.

From G. Howe's
own letters.

"army." In his letter to Sir Guy Carleton, inclosed in the letter to the Minister of the 2d of April, Gen. Howe writes, "that the possession of Ticonderoga, would naturally be the first object of the northern army;" and recommended "the securing Albany and the adjacent country" as the second. "The further progress of this corps," says he, "depending so much upon the enemy's movements, cannot be foreseen at this distance of time, still I flatter myself, and have reason to expect the friends of government in that part of the country, will be found so numerous and so ready to give every aid and assistance in their power, that it will prove no difficult task to reduce the more rebellious parts of the province."

And Gen. Bur-
goyne's.

The 16th of July the Gen. writes, "the enemy's movements taking this turn," (viz. Washington marching to the defence of Pennsylvania) "I apprehend General Burgoyne will meet with little interruption, otherwise than the difficulties he must encounter in transporting stores and provisions for the supply of his army." But let us see how far the Minister's hopes were authorised by his intelligence from that quarter. General Burgoyne, in his letter dated Skeensborough, July 11, 1777, says, "your Lordship will pardon me, if I lament that my orders do not give me the latitude I ventured to propose in my original project for the campaign to make a real effort, instead of a feint upon New England. As things have turned out, were I at liberty to march in force immediately by my left, instead of my right, I should have little doubt of subduing before winter the provinces where the rebellion originated. If my late letters reach Mr. Howe, I still hope this plan may be adopted from Albany."

The deceivers
turn accusers.

Who would not have imagined from these accounts that the rebellion was at an end? Who would have hesitated at promising a successful campaign? It is true, our expectations were deceived, our hopes were most cruelly disappointed; but shall the authors of our misfortunes, those very men who flattered us with the hope of brilliant success from operations they themselves planned, and who afterwards by their delays and blunders wasted the campaign, and sacrificed our armies, be allowed to call those hopes delusive, and charge the Minister with deceiving Parliament, when they themselves have been the only deceivers.

Was the force sent out from this country equal to the objects of the American war?

The noble Lord at the head of the American department being asked in the House of Commons, soon after he came into office, what force he thought would be sufficient to reduce the revolted colonies? replied, "That the measures of the force should be the wishes of the General."

This truly is a generous method of estimating force for military

military operations. And we find that General Howe's wishes were not only gratified in this respect, but the force that was sent out in the spring of 1776, so far exceeded his most sanguine expectations, that he appears to have been surprized to a degree of Astonishment at the amazing efforts that had been made. What he thought of the preparations, and of the minister, under whose immediate direction they were made, will best appear, by his own letter, dated Halifax, 8th June 1776, where he says, "I cannot take leave of your Lordship without expressing my utter amazement at the decisive and masterly strokes for carrying such extensive plans into immediate execution, as have been effected since your Lordship has assumed the conduct of this war, which is already most happily experienced by those who have the honour of serving here under your auspices. That you may finally receive the acknowledgements of a grateful country, the lasting glory which such services merit; and that I may in some degree contribute to the completion of measures so vigorously concerted, is the fervent wish of your Lordship's, &c. W. HOWE." *Gen. Howe astonished at the force sent him. by L. Gumb.*

In his letter of the 2d of April 1777, the General acknowledges that the force of 1776 was adequate to its object. It would be therefore preposterous in me to adduce a single argument to prove it. I will however beg leave just to state the following facts, that General Howe's army, in 1776, exceeded 30,000 regular, effective troops, exclusive of those left at Halifax and of the northern army, and that Washington's army did not amount to more than 16,000 men. *In 1776 Gen. Howe 30,000 men, Washington 16,000.*

By what means such an army, so well appointed, served by so large a train of artillery, and attended by so numerous a fleet, could fail of success against a divided people, destitute of Officers, Soldiers, Magazines, fortified towns, ships of war, or any apparent resources, will be the subject of my inquiry.

I follow the General in not entering into the policy or justice of the war, nor shall I dwell upon the wanton and unparalleled sacrifice of the bravest of our troops on Bunker's Hill, but will take up his conduct where he thought proper to do it in his speech, viz. at the time of his receiving orders from the secretary of state for evacuating Boston, and before I follow him to the southward will shew—that by his not quitting Boston when he was ordered to do it, and it might have been effected without any disgrace, the army remained thro' the winter cooped up in a most ignominious situation, suffering for want of necessaries, exposed to insult, and were neither the objects of terror or cause of distress to the rebels;—that by abandoning that post when he had wrote to government that he should not, and by declaring that Boston was tenable and then suffering the rebels to drive him from it with marks of disgrace, he did his utmost to depress the spirit of the troops and to raise those of the rebels;—that tho' the *Train of Gen. Howe's conduct* invin-

invincible fortitude of British troops prevented the first, the latter had its full effect; the defection from Great Britain was greatly increased, and the rebels excited to exertions that otherwise they would never have attempted

That by not blockading the Harbour, as the General himself had recommended, in case Boston should be evacuated, and leaving that as well as the other sea ports on the coast in every respect open and accommodated to their naval efforts, the rebels not only supplied themselves with military stores from our own storeships, and captured great numbers of our own troops, but were enabled to collect such a marine as to make depredations on our trade in every part of the world, which for some time was the sole support of the rebellion: And that by going northward 600 miles further from the intended scene of action, instead of going southward as he had been directed, the spring and summer were wasted away, Washington had four or five months leisure to fortify New York and its dependencies, and to draw the whole force of the continent to the spot where he knew our main army was destined. So that finally, with an army so decidedly superior to the enemy, the General did little more in that campaign than provide winter quarters for the troops.

G. Howe's train of wretched manœuvres and wretched excuses.

But these wretched manœuvres, unequalled but by the wretched excuses made for them, shall now be the subject of consideration.

Having now fully obviated the charges which the General thought proper to institute against the minister, I will consider Sir William Howe's vindication of his own conduct.

"The order (says he) for evacuating Boston came too late for me to execute it when I received it. I did execute it on the 17th of March, and in a manner, I trust, that was free from disgrace."

It is only necessary to consider what those orders were, and the time and manner in which they were executed, to decide on this part of the General's conduct.

Orders for evacuating Boston early in winter.

In the beginning of November 1775, Gen. Howe received a letter from the Earl of Dartmouth, wherein, after referring to a former letter which had suggested the advantages of the army's being removed to New York, and the hazard of continuing at Boston through the winter, his Lordship writes, "The intelligence and information of every day since, have shewn more clearly both the one and the other, and the situation of the troops cooped up in a town, exposed to insult and annoyance, if not surprize, from more places than one, deprived of the comforts and necessaries of life, wasting away by disease and desertion faster than we can recruit, and no longer the objects of terror or cause of distress to the rebels, is truly alarming, and demands the most serious consideration; and I am

" I am commanded by the king to say, that if no alteration for
 " the better should have happened before this letter reaches
 " you, or any unexpected advantages of carrying on the war,
 " on the side of New-England, should have opened themselves,
 " it seems not only adviseable but necessary to abandon Boston
 " before the winter, &c.—and to remove with the troops either
 " to New York, or some other place to the Southward, where
 " a squadron of the king's ships may not only lie, but carry
 " on operations with security during the winter."

Here is an explicit, practicable order, framed on the real situation of affairs in America, by conforming to which, great evils were to be avoided, and advantages of equal magnitude to be obtained. Had the General, immediately on receiving it, gone to New York, he might have effected in 1775 nearly, if not quite as much, as he did in 1776 with 30,000 troops. There was nothing to oppose his army, which then consisted of 9000 effective men. Staten-Island and Long-Island would have received him with open arms, and New York, by his own confession, was then in his power. The army would not only have been relieved from the pressure of an ignominious and most distressing blockade, have abounded with fresh provisions, and been able to carry on operations during the winter, but what was of still greater moment, the early possession of New York would have left the immense armament that was sent to America in 1776, at liberty to act on the extensive scale for which it was calculated, and to which it was adequate, and a total suppression of the rebellion have been the necessary consequence. If done, the good effects

But whether it is to be imputed to incapacity, to an inability to combine circumstances, to balance probable events, and to improve situations and conjunctures, to the sordid views of those who principally composed his cabinet council; to his own love of ease, and the reluctance he felt at abandoning the Rotine of pleasure that had been established at Boston for the winter; or to his being wedded to a system of politics that favoured the rebellion. I do not pretend to say, but certain it is General Howe so conducted as to suffer all the evil pointed out in his Lordship's letter, which accumulated ignominy and disgrace, as well as to lose every advantage that had been suggested. Conjectures on Gen. Howe's conduct.

The general did not think proper to obey the secretary of state's order, and assigned for the reason of his disobedience, that he had not sufficient shipping to effect the removal at one embarkation, and going at two would be hazardous. True it is that the tonnage of the shipping then at Boston fell short of the quantity usually allowed for long voyages; there was, however, a sufficiency for a short one; for in the March following, when the evacuation took place, there was still less

R

shipping

shipping in the harbour, owing to more vessels having, within that period, been sent to Carolina, Georgia, Nova Scotia, the West Indies, and to Europe than had arrived; notwithstanding which, enough were found to transport the army which had been reinforced in the mean time, together with 1100 loyal inhabitants, at one embarkation, besides near 50 sail of vessels that were left at the wharfs, for the use of the rebels, many of which were soon converted into privateers, and decorated with the thirteen stripes.

100
Leaves fifty sail to the rebels.

His verbal excuse refuted. These are facts, and I adduce them as unequivocal proof of the insufficiency of the reasons, given by Sir William, for his continuing at Boston during the winter. And I allow him some credit for saying nothing, in the House of Commons, of a want of transports, and resting his defence for disobeying the order solely on its late arrival. But unfortunately for him this ground is equally untenable with that which he abandoned; for the northerly winds, which he tells us in the same letter prevail at that season, are extremely favourable for a movement southward.

If sea ports destroyed, our trade saved.

The crushing the privateering business in its bud was another object worthy the attention of a General. In November 1775, the assembly of Massachusetts passed an act for granting letters of marque and reprisal, and constituting a court of admiralty for the condemnation of British ships. The destruction of those nests of pirates, the sea ports, where the evil originated, might have been very easily effected, and would have rendered the most essential service to the British empire, as it would have prevented the depredations on our unsuspecting trade, and have cut off the only resources that for a long time enabled the rebels to carry on the war. But this was never once in contemplation. To judge from his letters, Sir William intended neither the one nor the other; but after solacing himself at Boston during the Winter, to have gone, at his own leisure, in a pleasant season of the year—to some other place.

On leaving Boston intends entrenching a battalion.

To quiet the minds of administration, the general wrote he was not under "the least apprehension of any attack from the rebels by surprize or otherwise; on the contrary, that it was to be wished that they would attempt to rash a step;" requested instructions respecting the effects at Boston; and proposed that whenever the troops should be withdrawn, a battalion should be entrenched at a place where ships could winter with safety, for blockading the harbour.

Our confidence in Howe disappointed.

Government acquiesced in the reasons he had given, and the assurances he had made, and not doubting but their General might be found at Boston in the spring, sent a large force to that place, and expected him to have put a very different face on the war there before he left it. But in this, as in every other

ther instance, in which any confidence had been placed in our hero, they were to be disappointed.

The rebels having cannonaded and bombarded the town from Roxburgh and Phipps Farm, three nights successively, in the beginning of March, with very little effect however, unless it was the amusing and diverting the attention of the garrison from the main object, took post on the commanding heights of Dorchester Neck. Here, as at Bunker's-Hill, the works were in great forwardness when discovered; with this difference however, that these were more extensive, had strong abatis round them, and were so situated as not to admit of the choice of ground for attacking them as the others did. The General tells us they must have employed 12,000 men in their construction; we may therefore reasonably conclude, that they would have been defended by an equal number. A detachment of 2400 only were ordered to dislodge the rebels, and were embarked in transports to fall down the harbour to Castle William, from whence the descent was to be made. The intervention of a violent storm of wind and rain prevented the attack, and providentially saved those devoted troops; and the very next day, without any material change of circumstances having taken place, (for the storm that had prevented the debarkation of the troops had stopt the progress of the works) the enterprizes was abandoned, and to the utter astonishment of all who were not in the General's councils, orders issued for evacuating Boston. Rebels occupy
Dorchester neck

Now, I beg leave to ask Sir William Howe whether Boston was tenable or not? he had indeed staked his reputation as a general on the affirmative. If it was not, how could he or his favourite engineer overlook this post? Could they suppose that the rebels, who before winter had made regular approaches to the foot of this hill, would fail as soon as the season opened to occupy the top of it? why were no precautions taken to prevent it? why was not a post established there as at Bunker's-Hill? or if Boston was tenable as the General had pledged himself, and I confess I have not the least doubt of, why in God's name was it so shamefully abandoned? why were the army and the loyalists obliged to combat war, pestilence, and famine through the winter at Boston, only to be hurried from it in the spring? or why was the town finally evacuated with circumstances so dispiriting to the troops, and so encouraging to the rebels? All the cannon at Charles Town, the greatest part of those at the lines on the Neck, two thirteen inch mortars, and other ordnance, amounting in the whole to (serviceable and unserviceable) 100 pieces, great quantities of military stores, and even provisions, fell into the hands of the rebels. And as though something was still wanting to swell their triumph and make it complete, a convention was entered into with the re-

The favourite
Engineer ne-
glects Dorchest.

100 cannon,
stores, and pro-
visions left to
the rebels.

ful Boston convention.

Reasons against evacuating it.

ch Leaving the harbour open lost us store ships and 1000 men.

Sails 600 miles out of his way.

bels with General Howe's knowledge and approbation, that the town should not be injured in case they would suffer the troops to embark without interruption. The agreement was religiously kept, as the last division of troops embarked at the long wharf, a flag was hoisted on the steeple of a church, and Washington entered the town with drums beating, music playing, colours flying, and in all the pride and exultation of victory.

However forcible the reasons for evacuating Boston before the winter had been, those for not doing it at this time were equally strong. The season had moderated, several victuallers had arrived, and the circumstances of the garrison were rendered happy to what they had been. The being compelled, or what was equally bad, the appearance of being compelled to surrender that long-contested town, indeed the only one in the thirteen confederated provinces, that the crown was in possession of, could not fail of producing the worst effects on the minds of the Colonists. Besides it must necessarily counteract the plans, and derange the measures of administration.

Had the General only entrenched a battalion on George's Island, as he had purposed, this with a man of war, who would have been mutual securities for each other, would have prevented our transports, victuallers, and storeships from running and even fighting their way directly into their enemies port. As this was neglected, a man of war that was left behind, was soon compelled to quit her station, and there was at least an equal chance of so great a part of our fleet being caught in the snare as even to have prevented a campaign.—Fortune was once more our friend, and warded off so great a calamity; so many ships however by this means fell into the hands of the rebels, as to supply them with ordnance, a complete assortment of military stores, and camp equipage, and several thousand suits of regimentals; articles which were absolutely necessary for them to take the field, and which at that time they could have had by no other means. Besides, near a thousand of our best troops were made prisoners.

Had the general gone southward, as he was directed, the consequences would not have been so bad; but in defiance of orders, advice, and even common-sense, he sailed the opposite point of the compass, and carried the army to the northern extremity of the continent, six hundred miles directly from the intended scene of action. Want of provision has been suggested as an excuse for this extraordinary step; but a moment's reflection will convince us of its insufficiency; for Nova Scotia, as the General tells us in his letter, had been stripped of its provisions the preceding winter; and the victuallers, on which his sole dependence was placed, were all destined for Boston: these could as well have followed him south as north; and besides Rhode Island, Staten Island and Long Island, abounded with provisions.

provisions. The only reason the General himself thought proper to give for this mysterious conduct was, that the transports were crowded, and the stores disordered. This might with propriety have been urged as an example for not going against a place, where an enemy was in force to oppose him; but surely it is not a sufficient reason for his not going to places where there was no enemy, nor possibly could be any before his arrival, viz. Staten Island, Long Island, or even Rhode Island. It could not be pretended that a reinforcement was necessary; for he finally left Halifax, and took possession of Staten Island with less force than that which he sailed with from Boston.

By this delay all the spring and summer were wasted on our part; the rebels were at liberty to fortify New York and its dependencies, and to collect all the force of the continent to that spot where they knew our army would be directed; the dislodgment of which force occupied our whole army the remainder of the campaign.

How this delay
hurtful.

Upon a review of General Howe's conduct at the northward, I don't know which part of his generalship to admire most; his unnecessary assault of the rebels works at Bunker's-Hill, whereby three quarters of the assailants were killed and wounded—or after this experience, his ordering two thousand four hundred troops to dislodge twelve thousand rebels still more strongly posted on the heights of Dorchester Neck; his neglecting to evacuate Boston in the fall, under pretence of his not having sufficient shipping, and yet doing it in the spring with more troops and fewer ships; his assuring the ministry that Boston was tenable, and inducing them to send a reinforcement there, and before its arrival suffering himself to be driven from it at the head of nine thousand British troops; his proposing, in case the troops should be withdrawn from Boston, to entrench a battalion at the entrance of the harbour to blockade it, and afterwards leaving it open to ensnare the unsuspecting ships that were bound there; his going to Halifax when he had been ordered to New York, or his saying in his speech, that going northward in the spring was executing the secretary of State's orders, which was to go southward before winter.

Review of Gen.
Howe's conduct

It has been the singular fortune of this General to efface former mistakes by subsequent blunders of greater magnitude: his northern misconduct was in this increasing Ratio; and the whole is forgot when Long Island, York, White Plains, Trenton, Quibbleton, Saratoga and Chesapeake are mentioned. Even resentment gives place to pity at his suffering himself to be burlesqued by the Mischianza, in honour of his leaving America unconquered, and the rebellion stronger than he found it.

Has left the re-
bellion stronger
than he found it.

Strictures

Strictures on Sir William Howe's Mischianza or Triumph, upon leaving America unconquered; with Extracts from the "American Crisis." In order to show how far the King's enemies think his General deserving of Public Honours. A flattering Account of this Mischianza was published in the Philadelphia Gazette, and copied into the Morning Post the 13th of July last; and a larger one by a still more flattering panegyrist, may be found in the Gentleman's Magazine for August last.

A triumph preposterous after personal defeat and disgrace.

If Sir William Howe had thought fit quietly to resign his command, and been content to enjoy in privacy the fortune he had acquired, till the nation had in some measure digested the disgraces and losses we had suffered under his command in America; or till the dangers and calamities, which, in consequence of them, threaten us here at home, were passed over;—he might not then perhaps have been disturbed in his retirement.

And on national ruin insulting.

But at a time when the British empire in America is sunk, and when thousands and thousands of good subjects in both countries are ruined by its fall; at a time, when, with the loss of our Colonies, the empire here in Britain itself is shaken and endangered; at such a time of public calamity, when every good Englishman was trembling for the commonwealth; at such a time of distress for a General to take to himself ovations and triumphs greater than the Duke of Marlborough, or any English commander ever thought of; to suffer himself to be crowned with laurels, and to have triumphal arches erected to his honour; is such an insult offered to our understandings, as cannot but raise in the mind of every man of sense, the highest degree of astonishment and indignation.

No sense of public calamity.

Could a Commander in Chief, in a war of so much importance; after the nation had been put to the expence of so many millions to no purpose; and when so many thousands of good subjects are ruined by the miscarriage of it—could he think, that we should lose all sense of the public calamities, because he expresses no feelings for them? Did he think we should imagine that America was still ours, because he shewed no shame, but had a triumph made for him upon the loss of it? Or that a three years series of perpetual disgraces would not be seen through all his ovations and triumphal arches?

Or personal shame.

A series of ill conduct and disgraces.

How much soever it may be in a General's power to represent his army as greater or less, to suit any *present occasion* yet one thing at least is certain, that Gen. Howe was furnished with a force abundantly sufficient to have quelled the rebellion. Both friends and foes agree in this, that from the year 1776 he never met Mr. Washington but with an army superior in number, as well as in goodness, to that of the enemy which was

was opposed to him: yet in the course of three campaigns, he never thought proper to fight Mr. Washington, but once; and then did not chuse to pursue the victory which his troops had gained for him. Either, therefore, the British troops must have been the greatest of all poltroons, who were unable to contend with an inferior number of new-raised, half-clothed, and half-armed American militia;—or else there must have been an extreme deficiency in our Generalship. Whichsoever of these may have been the case, what ground can either of them afford for a triumph? Or upon what foundation could a General, who had seen the British arms endure innumerable disgraces under his command; who had suffered himself to be ingloriously driven out of Boston; and who, after having been beaten at Trenton and Prince-Town, was still more ingloriously driven out of the Jerseys; whose troops, by bravely beating in the rebel out-posts, had often pointed out to him the way to victory while he never chose to follow it; but invariably allowed the Americans to march off unmolested, and unpursued; who had suffered himself to be surprized at German-town, and had seen his army thereby brought to the brink of destruction, from which it was rescued by the single bravery and good-conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Musgrave; who had been baffled and defeated in all his attempts, and out-generaled even by a man that was none; and who now, after three years command, found himself much less able to suppress the rebellion, than he was the day he landed on Staten-Island?—Upon what pretence, I say, could this gentleman suffer himself to be crowned with laurels never won. Or encourage the dedicating a triumphal arch with plumes and military trophies to his honour, without his having once had the honour of a conquest?

When so very extraordinary a method has been taken to persuade us of the high estimation in which he is held for his military abilities, it is a piece of justice due to the public, to produce the opinion which even the rebels entertain of him; so very different from that which is here given by his flatterers and dependants.

The words of a letter addressed to him in the American Crisis; a work which some have given to Dr. Franklin. It is known to be written under the patronage of the Congress, and under the instructions of their capital and best informed leaders.

The AMERICAN CRISIS, Number V. addressed to General Sir William Howe. By the Author of Common Sense.

“That a man, whose soul is absorbed in the low traffic of vulgar vice, is incapable of moving in any superior region, is clearly shown in you by the event of every campaign;—your
 Congress character of Sir W. Howe.
 “military

" military exploits have been without plan, object, or decision.
 " Can it be possible that you or your employers can suppose the
 " possession of Philadelphia to be any ways equal to the ex-
 " pence or expectations of the nation which supports you?
 " What advantages does England derive from any achieve-
 " ments of yours?

They wonder at
 their own pre-
 servation.

" If the principal events of the three campaigns be attended
 " to, the balance will appear strongly against you at the close
 " of each; but the last, in point of importance to us, hath ex-
 " ceeded the former two. At the close of the campaign in
 " seventy-five you were obliged to retreat from Boston. In
 " the summer, seventy-six, you appeared with a numerous fleet
 " and army in the harbour of New York. *By what miracle*
 " *the Continent was preserved in that season of danger is a*
 " *subject of admiration.* If, instead of wasting your time against
 " Long Island, you had run up the North River, and landed
 " any where above New York, the consequence must have been,
 " that either you would have compelled General Washington
 " to fight you with very unequal numbers, or he must have
 " suddenly evacuated the city, with the loss of nearly all the
 " stores of the army, or have surrendered for want of provi-
 " sions; the situation of the place naturally producing one or
 " the other of these events.

Advantages of
 Gen. Howe.

" You let slip the very opportunity which seemed to put
 " conquest in your power. Through the whole of that cam-
 " paign you had nearly double the forces which General Wash-
 " ington immediately commanded. The utmost hope of A-
 " merica, in the year seventy-six, reached no higher than that
 " she might not then be conquered. She had no expectation of
 " defeating you in the campaign. You had then greatly the
 " advantage of her; you were formidable; your military know-
 " ledge was *supposed to be complete*; your fleets and forces
 " arrived without any accident; you had nothing to do but to
 " begin, and your chance lay in the first vigorous onset.

America under
 many disadvan-
 tages.

" America was young and unskilled. She was obliged to
 " trust her defence to time and practice; and hath, by mere
 " dint of perseverance, maintained her cause and brought her
 " enemy to a condition in which she is now capable of meeting
 " him on any ground.

Sarcastic re-
 marks on Sir
 W's movements.

" Let me ask, Sir, what great exploits have you performed?
 " Through all the variety of changes and opportunities, which
 " this war hath produced, I know of no one action of yours
 " that can be filed masterly. You have moved in and out,
 " backward and forward, round and round, as if valour con-
 " sisted in a military jig. The history and figure of your move-
 " ments would be truly ridiculous, could they be justly deli-
 " neated. They resemble the labours of a puppy pursuing his
 " tail;

"tail; the end is still at the same distance, and all the turnings round must be done over again. ‡ Like the labours of a puppy

"Some weeks after this you likewise planned an attack on Gen. Washington, while at Whitemarsh; marched out with infinite parade; but on finding him preparing to attack you, the next morning you prudently cut about, and retreated to Philadelphia with all the precipitation of a man conquered in imagination. You was sure prized at Germantown. Retreats before Washington.

"Immediately after the battle of German-town, the probability of Burgoyne's defeat gave a new policy to affairs in Pennsylvania; and it was judged most consistent with the general safety of America to wait the issue of the northern campaign. Slow and sure is found work. The news of that victory arrived in our camp on the 18th of October, and no sooner did the shout of joy, and the report of the thirteen cannon reach your ears, than you resolved upon a retreat, and the next day, that is on the 19th, withdrew your drooping army into Philadelphia. This movement was evidently dictated by fear, and carried with it a positive confession, that you dreaded a second attack. It was hiding yourself among women* and children, and sleeping away the choicest part of a campaign in expensive inactivity. An army in a city can never be a conquering army. The situation admits only of defence. It is mere shelter; and every military power in Europe will conclude you to be eventually defeated. To hide among women.

"The time when you made this retreat, was the very time you ought to have fought a battle, in order to put yourself in a condition of recovering in Pennsylvania what you had lost at Saratoga; and the reason why you did not, must be
S "either

‡ I do not adopt this language of contempt; but if his panegyrist had not told us, could it have been thought possible, that this gentleman, a month after this publication, should have had a fame spangled with stars, stuck upon the top of his triumphal arch, blowing from her trumpet in letters of light: *Tes lauriers sont immortels.* And not content with this earth's being filled with the sound of his fame, she was even powdered with stars, to tell us that it reached up to the heavens."

* Should the reader ask, what it was that the General at last did among them? his panegyrist has here told us, "He bounces off with his bombs and burning hearts, set upon the pillars of his triumphal arch, which, at the proper time of the show, burst out in a shower of squibs and crackers, and other fire-works, to the delectable amazement of Miss Craig, Miss Chew, Miss Reiman, and all the other misses, dressed out as the fair damsels of the blended rose, and of the burning mountain, for this farce of knight-errantry."

“either prudence or c——e; the former supposes your inability, and the latter needs no explanation.”

Such are the sentiments which the Americans entertain of this gentleman, and so great the contempt they express of him.

Marlborough

What would have been said of the Duke of Marlborough's vanity, if, after forty thousand enemies killed and taken at the battle of Blenheim, he had encouraged his officers and dependents to dedicate to him a triumphal arch, and had employed even the enemies standards taken in battle, in forming an avenue for himself and fellow conquerors to have walked through?

A romantic triumph

What then are we to think of a beaten General's debasing the King's ensigns (for he had none of his enemies) by planting all the colours of the army in a grand avenue three hundred feet in length, lined with the King's troops, between two triumphal arches, for himself and his brother to march along in pompous procession, followed by a numerous train of attendants, with seven silken knights of the blended rose, and seven more of the burning mountain, and their fourteen Turkey dressed damsels, to an area of 150 yards square, lined also with the King's troops, for the exhibition of a tilt and tournament, or mock fight of old chivalry, in honour of this triumphant hero; and all this sea and land ovation made; not in consequence of an uninterrupted succession of victories, like those of

Not after victories

But after three years disgraces and defeats.

the Duke of Marlborough; not after the conquest of Canada by a Wolfe, a Townshend, and an Amherst; or after the much more valuable conquest of all the French provinces and possessions in India, under the *wise* and *active* General Coote; but after thirteen provinces wretchedly lost, and a three years series of ruinous disgraces and defeats.

ÆMILIUS SCAURUS on the Expedition from Canada.

High national expectation from Gen. Burgoyne.

When you received the Command of the Northern expedition, the public expectation was raised to the highest pitch, by your magnificent harangues in the senate, and your liberal promises of active and extensive operation in the field. The Ministry were as sanguine as the mob, and rejoiced beyond measure that they had, at last, found an Opportunity of employing a confidential General, not only unconnected with opposition, but zealous in the cause of the supremacy of the British Legislature.

Remarks on his proclamation

But it was not sufficient that our expectations should be raised; the fears of the enemy were to be increased in the same proportion. To produce this effect, a proclamation was published at Ticonderoga, which out-thundered all your great guns, numerous and noisy as they were. You there assumed the form of an offended Jupiter. Vengeance and death were in your right hand—Peace and forgiveness in your left. The time seemed

seemed to be come when rebellion was to be swept from the face of the earth, by the irresistible vigour of your out-stretched arm, attended as it was to be, in its awful progress, by the blessing of providence on the one side, and the savages of Canada on the other. This proclamation, though mighty sublime, was looked upon by the illiterate Americans as mighty obscure. You thought proper, therefore, a few months afterwards to elucidate it by a very clear commentary, written at Saratoga. The public admired the happy variety of style that distinguished those two performances. They concluded you to be a very good author, but recollected, with surprize, that they had once dreamed you were a great General. This illusion, though vanished from their minds, seems still to keep possession of yours : for though we are now groaning under the weight of those misfortunes which your defeat has brought upon us, you are not contented, Sir, with escaping the indignation of your country, you boldly step forward in the Senate, and insist upon your claim to its applause. I think in prudence you should have delayed this claim a little time longer. English ears are not yet sufficiently prepared for it. Allow a few more precedents to be established, and then you may make it with safety and success : for with an Administration of cowards, and an Opposition of bullies, disappointment and disgrace will soon become the best titles to approbation and reward.

You, Sir, took the earliest measures to obtain the patronage of the latter of those respectable bodies ; for the moment you surrendered your arms to the rebels, you resolved to sacrifice your principles to the opposition. The sacrifice met with the most propitious acceptance, for it came accompanied with the worst tidings this country ever heard. You had done a deed that secured even the forgiveness of Col. Barre for all your past offences. In reading the Convention at Saratoga, he forgot that you had once been a stickler for the honour of a British soldier.

This step being taken, the next consideration was to determine who should bear the blame of those misfortunes, which, you were resolved, should not be imputed to you. Sir William Howe, Sir Guy Carleton, and the American Secretary, presented themselves at first, as the parties among whom it would be proper to divide the whole. All your letters shew, that, for a time, you attributed your want of success entirely to the failure of that co-operation which you expected from Gen. Howe's army. This was the language you held to the Minister, to your army, and even to Sir William Howe himself. You spoke it in the most clear and unambiguous manner in your message to Sir Henry Clinton, by Capt. Campbell, when you declared that, " you would not have given up your communication with Ticonderoga, had you not expected a co-operation with the rebels." Who should bear the blame of his misfortunes.

First fixed on "rating army at Albany." Now, had you not given up your communication with Ticonderoga, it is clear you could never have been forced to surrender your army. The whole of your misfortune, then, if we may believe yourself, was entirely owing to Gen. Howe's failure in the expected co-operation.

Strong as this ground of defence might at first sight appear, you were obliged, for prudential reasons, totally to desert it, and abandon every advantage you could have derived from it. Sir William Howe had now left the King's standard to its own fortune in America, and had returned to look for laurels under the banners of opposition. He was of a weight and standing in the corps, which you, though a hopeful recruit, could not possibly pretend to rival: it was therefore necessary to give up every idea of criminating him before you could procure the concurrence of the whole party in defending you. With regard to Sir Guy Carleton, it had been given out by your friends that he had been greatly deficient in making the necessary preparations for the commencement of your campaign, and shamefully dilatory in forwarding to you the supplies and assistance that were afterwards to come from his province. Unfortunately he too was connected with a part of the opposition, in such a manner as made it necessary to suppress this charge, for the same reasons that induced you to keep back that against Sir William Howe. There now remained nothing to lay the blame upon, but your orders from the Secretary of State. Those hopeless orders therefore are now to be censured for every thing you did, and every thing that you omitted to do—for your marches and your halts—for lying by while you had a prospect of success, and advancing when you had none—and finally, for that strangest of all strange ideas, that when you could proceed no farther, it was better to surrender than to attempt to retreat.

The first charge against you in the conduct of your unfortunate expedition, is the carrying with you a quantity of artillery so totally incompatible with that celerity of movement, on which your success entirely depended. It was necessary indeed to carry a train to Ticonderoga, equal to the reduction of the very strong works that we expected to meet with there. So far you could have justified yourself even without the example of Sir Guy Carleton; but farther, you in vain endeavoured to procure his opinion in your favour.

You, and your learned friend Captain Money, have informed the committee, that artillery kills men at a distance, and that it makes a greater impression on the enemy's defences, than mere musquetry can effect. Indeed!—It did not require the testimony of Moses and the prophets, much less that of two men from Saratoga, to convince the most incredulous senator of the truth of this allegation. But you should have recollected, Sir, that the very carriage of this artillery created afterwards

wards the necessity of employing it. The army was pinned down to attend its motions, and the enormous delays occasioned, in a great degree, by the slowness of its progress, gave full time to the rebels to recover from their first panic, and to collect again that army which had been completely dispersed. Where-
as, had you advanced rapidly without incumbrance or delay, you would neither have found men to oppose, nor works to interrupt your progress through the country. In point of fact, what works did this artillery of yours ever get the better of? After passing Ticonderoga, you met with but one fortified camp of the enemy, and all your boasted artillery never enabled you to advance a single foot beyond it.

But it was not sufficient to embarrass yourself with every incumbrance that could retard the progress of an army; it was necessary, in order to complete your plan, to adopt such a route as would add to every difficulty, and augment every delay. Instead of the straight and common passage by the way of Lake George, which it never would have occurred to any other officer to have departed from, you thought proper, at the expence of much time and incredible labour, to cut a road through a piece of ground the most difficult and impracticable that perhaps all America afforded. You seem to be convinced, that to the generality of mankind this measure would appear altogether inexplicable, and were therefore pleased to communicate to us your motives for a movement so extremely eccentric. You were apprehensive, it seems, in the first place, that the retrograde motion of the army from Skenesborough to Ticonderoga, would abate the panic of the enemy, and at the same time have a bad effect on the spirits of your own troops. Your philosophy seems of a piece with your generalship. It must be in some new system that you have discovered, that a man is most terrified when it is least possible to overtake him, and that a soldier led out of his road in pursuit of an enemy, will feel himself dejected or depressed, if he returns into it after the pursuit is over. General Frazer's corps made this retrograde motion from Huberton, and yet I profess the grenadiers and light infantry never betrayed the smallest symptom of the truth of this strange theory of yours: but you are further pleased to express your opinion, that had you gone by the Lake the enemy would have delayed you greatly by making a stand at Fort George; and in this opinion all your witnesses are pleased to concur. Now let us state the premises from which this conclusion is drawn.

Delayed the army.

Difficulties and delays augmented by the choice of route.

Reason for that choice insufficient.

The rebels had fled from Ticonderoga, where they had collected all the force it was possible for them to assemble—where they had works of a most amazing strength, and had made every preparation for a long and vigorous defence.

You, therefore, suppose that those very rebels, panic-struck, beaten

His letters and evidences in opposition.

beaten and dispersed as they were, would make a stand at Fort George, where they had no strength, no defence, nor any preparation that indicated an intention of a moment's resistance. Besides the total absurdity of such a supposition, you know perfectly well that in point of fact there was not the smallest foundation for it; for on the 11th of July you write to Lord George Germain, in your private letter, that the enemy, so far from preparing to make a stand at Fort George, were even then labouring to remove their magazines both from thence and from Fort Edward. Yet, in direct contradiction to this, you and your friends now seriously assure the committee, that you expected to find the rebels in force at the first of those places, and that your march by Skenesborough was occasioned chiefly by that expectation.

Army halts a month.

At last, Sir, when the season was half spent you arrived at the banks of the Hudson's River, where you thought proper to make a dead halt of one entire month. If Mr. Gates himself had directed your operations he could not possibly have planned measures more favourable to his own views. The flight from Ticonderoga had made such an impression on the spirits of the rebels, that it was impossible immediately to collect an army, or to inspire them with that confidence which is necessary to insure success: but it was certain that in time that impression would wear off, unless it were continued or renewed by the rapid movements of the King's troops. When, instead of such movements, they saw those troops wasting days, weeks, and months without making the smallest progress, it is no wonder that they at last got an army to assemble—it is rather surprizing that they were without one so long.

Rebels weak in August and beginning of September.

I wish your friend, Colonel Kingston, in some of his confidential communications with Mr. Gates, had obtained a return of the rebel force not only on the 7th of October, but during the whole of the months of August and September. If it had answered your purpose, I make no doubt but it would have been procured and produced. But it would have appeared too clearly from thence that during the whole of the first month, and the greatest part of the second, they had no force that could enter into competition with yours, and that nothing but your monitrous delays, joined to the misfortune at Bennington, created that formidable army which appeared against you in the month of October.

On want of provisions.

But your excuse for those delays is the want of provisions; and to account for this want, the roads from Lake George are said to have been out of repair. This is one of the blessed consequences of the march by the way of Skenesborough. Had the army come by Lake George, they would of course have repaired the roads as they came along. But you contrived just to double both the fatigue and the delay; for they had first one road

road to make from Skenesborough, and then they had another to open and repair from Fort George. In the whole of the evidence you have produced, the method is, to state a necessity for every one of your measures, contriving to link this trifling circumstance, that *that necessity* invariably originated from some ^{Ingenious method of vindicating} previous blunder or omission of your own. The delay in this case, you prove to have been unavoidable, forgetting to inform us that it became so, only by the unaccountable whim of departing from the route which any other man would have taken.

I come now to the unhappy affair at Bennington, which being the commencement, and in a great measure, the cause of ^{Expedition to Bennington.} all your misfortunes, it will be necessary to state at some length. Your army, far from being too numerous, you say was not even adequate to the enterprize you were sent upon. It is therefore perfectly clear, that you could not afford to risk detachments from it, for the execution of any collateral purpose whatever. But supposing an object had presented itself, of sufficient magnitude, to justify a deviation from this rule, the detachment employed should either have been strong enough to maintain itself against any opposition that it could be expected to meet, or it should have had orders to retreat the moment that it was threatened with an attack. Instead of proceeding on this clear military principle, you sent out 600 of your worst troops, at a distance from your army, into the heart of an enemy's country, and ordered them to keep their ground at all events—even though the whole country should rise against them. A detachment thus circumstanced was not only hazarded; it was clearly and infallibly devoted; for the enemy must have wanted common sense, if they did not reduce its destruction to an absolute certainty.

When you communicated your intentions to Brigadier Fra-Gen. Fraser a ser, he expressed his most positive disapprobation, not only of ^{gainst it.} sending Germans, but of sending such a detachment of any troops, for any purpose whatever.

He thought the point of so great consequence, that he did not confine himself merely to a verbal disapprobation—he remonstrated against the measure in writing, and predicted the fatal consequences that it might be expected to produce. This you know to be true. It was the common report of the camp, that this freedom of his displeased you so much, that you declared with some warmth, that “you should learn for the future to be more peremptory and less communicative.” ^{G. Burgoyne's reply.}

Certain it is that you disregarded his remonstrances, and proceeded to execute this very strange plan in an equally strange manner. Had you sought through all the various descriptions of men who then received the King's pay, you could not possibly have found a corps so totally unfit for this kind of service as Reidesel's regiment of dragoons. Besides that heaviness and slowness

Improper troops
employed.

slowness which they possessed in common with other Brunswick regiments, they were loaded with accoutrements that rendered them additionally clumsy. Their very hats and swords weighed more than the whole equipment of one of our soldiers. Yet those poor devils did you pitch upon for a flying expedition through the woods, for the sagacious purpose of mounting them on horses, in a country where cavalry could not be used.

Col. Baum's
character.

The command of this expedition was given to Colonel Baum, a brave man and good officer in his way, but just as much qualified for this sort of service as an Indian Chief would be for the command of an army in Flanders. He neither had, nor could be expected to have, an idea of the nature of American warfare; he did not even understand a syllable of the language of the people whose affections you sent him to try. The event was just what might be expected from such a plan. The country people finding so small a detachment at so great a distance from the army, flocked in from all quarters to surround it, while poor Baum, totally ignorant of the country, the people, and the language, hardly knew whether they were assembling as friends or foes. He however dispatched intelligence of this rising to you, and you now perceived the consequences with which your deep-laid scheme was about to be attended. The only possible chance of retrieving the blunder, and preventing the detachment from being cut off, was to send forward the lightest and most expeditious troops in your army, who by mere dint of quick marching might perhaps arrive before the enemy should find it expedient to commence their attack.

A 2d mistake.

But you seem positively to have abjured the guidance of reason throughout the whole of this transaction. For you, a second time made choice of the Germans, who possessed no one qualification that such a duty required. Did you really believe, Sir, that they would march to Bennington in a shorter time than any equal number of British troops in your army? did you not know, on the contrary, that the worst British regiment in the service, would with ease march two miles for their one? was not the choice of them then a voluntary and a wanton sacrifice of the detachment which you pretended to send them to relieve? the Germans proceeded exactly as every man in the camp knew and expected that they would. They halted ten times an hour to dress their ranks, which were liable to be broken at every step in such a road as they had to march by. You knew this to be their constant practice, and therefore had no reason to be astonished at it on this occasion. The consequence was, that they arrived just time enough to be attacked by the victorious rebels, flushed with their conquest over the unfortunate Baum. Colonel Breyman made a gallant stand, notwithstanding the advantage the rebels had got by occupying the hills, at the foot of which he was obliged to march. At last

last both parties seemed tired of the conflict—for they both retreated at the same instant, the Germans leaving behind them their cannon, which the rebels did not take possession of till four days after the engagement.

Both parties run away. The German cannon not taken by the rebels for 4 days.

Thus ended this unfortunate affair, which almost instantaneously darkened the prospect of the whole campaign. We lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, little less than a thousand men. The Indians began immediately to desert. The loyalists were disheartened, while the rebels were elated beyond measure, and totally forgot the terror with which you had at first inspired them. They even conceived the most contemptible opinion of your talents as an officer, and filled their papers with the most satirical reflections on your orders to Colonel Baum, which they said betrayed a want of military skill that one of their militia colonels would have been ashamed to discover. To all this, what do you and your friends answer? why, that it was entirely the fault of the Germans, who did not march so fast as you expected they would have done. Good God! Sir, do you and your witnesses mean to trifle with the common sense of mankind? we all blame the Germans, but must we therefore acquit you, who, with an absurdity bordering on madness, pitched upon those very Germans in preference to all the other troops in your army? that would be to make your crime the instrument of your justification.

New mode of justification.

REVIEW of the WAR.

It is a singular and convincing proof of the weak and distracted state of our councils, and of the power of the reigning factions, when notorious public delinquents, who have entailed upon us an enormous additional debt, who have loaded us with national dishonour, who have plunged us into a French and Spanish war, not only escape with impunity, but are heard with patient submission in the senate, declaim on their own merits, and arraign that country for ill treatment, which they, by their base and miserable conduct have undone. Such tameness in us, is the last and most wretched stage of national humiliation: In them, to ruin a people, and call for their praise, is the highest pitch of daring insult and impudent malignity. But to leave the crowd of delinquents to the consolations and flatteries of opposition, Sir William Howe shall be my object.

Effrontery of pub. delinquents.

This man, who has brought a name formerly honoured into contempt, wantonly sacrificed a thousand of our bravest men at Bunker's Hill, by despising the situation of the enemy, and rejecting the simplest and easiest of all manœuvres, that of landing on their left from Mystic River, and taking post on the heights

Loss by despising situation.

T

above

above their rear, which would have given us their whole army to a man.

Secret history of
Boston evacuation.

By neglecting to occupy the heights of Dorchester, which he had constantly before his eyes for ten months, and which he knew from the first * the rebels intended to possess, he was forced to fly with ignominy from Boston; purchasing a quiet retreat by a secret capitulation, never having the candour to own his obligation to the negotiator of his safety, but all along disingenuously attempting to impose on the world, "that his fine military disposition had enchanted the rebels."

100 cannon, 100
ships, &c. abandon-
ed.

From this place he fled with all the precipitation of a man completely discomfited, abandoning an hundred pieces of cannon and mortars, great quantities of military stores, and even provisions, and such a vast assortment of linens and woollens as lasted the New England rebels, who were in great distress for them, no less than two years; together with 100 vessels of various denominations, which were all fitted out against us next summer, and scouring the Western Ocean, nearly ruined for that year our whole West India Trade.

He was repeatedly urged and intreated to issue orders for transporting the linens and woollens to Halifax, that they might be restored to the proper owners, but to no purpose; fullen, indolent and dissipated, he was incapable of doing any business, or of surmounting any difficulty.

1000 men lost.

The same motives or want of motives prevented his leaving a garrison on George's Island near Nantasket Road, though a proposal of his own to the Minister. A battalion on that Island, which is very defensible, would, with a ship of war, have completely secured Boston Harbour. But for want of the protection that such a garrison could have given to a man of war, and received from her, the rebels soon forced Capt. Banks to leave the Road, in consequence of which, most of our store ships from Europe and the West Indies with near a thousand men in transports, ran directly into Boston Harbour, and were taken.

Howe wishes to
be attacked.

Orders were sent in summer and fall 1775 to evacuate Boston, Ministry being ashamed of the inglorious situation of troops so cooped up, exposed to insult, want, and surprize; and no longer either objects of terror, or cause of distress to the rebels. These orders our commander rejected. The prospect of six months total idleness, was too great a happiness for a sluggish mind to relinquish. In reply, he sent home the following bravado: "that it were to be wished the rebels would hazard so rash an attempt as to attack him."

But they did make the attempt, and he sunk under it, without a single effort or struggle, on his part, to make head against them.

* General Gage had information of this in May 1775, at the same time with their intention of occupying at Bunker's Hill.

them. If his mind had not been of a most impenetrable or callous texture how dreadfully mortified must he have felt, when just as he had commenced his flight, and not yet out of sight of the spires of Boston, a ship of war from England hailed him, and gave him the minister's dispatches applauding his reasons for *not leaving* Boston, and justifying his resolution of remaining there, as an *Evacuation* would have been a very unadvisable measure. Thus he fled with those praises in his pocket, which had been lavished upon him, only on the supposition that he still kept firm in his post. There are few minds but would have felt this stroke for life.

Though he knew the necessity of remaining in Boston on account of his expected reinforcements, and to keep up an alarm to prevent the rebels from reinforcing their army before Quebec, yet he went to shut himself up on the inhospitable coast of Nova Scotia, eight days sail out of his road, instead of going to New-York, which at last he thought proper to do three months after. Immediately on our deserting Boston the rebels detached a large reinforcement to their army in Canada. As to Quebec, he had left it to its fate, or rather apparently consigned it to the rebels; on the 10th of October, while solacing himself at Boston, General Carleton's letters beseeching succours arrived, with intelligence he had not an hundred soldiers under his command. Our great man, so wise, so active, and zealous, in consultation with Admiral Graves determined a battalion of marines should be sent: in three days the transports were ready to take them on board: but at that instant Admiral Graves receiving a new light, thought fit to declare, that to send transports up the St. Lawrence was unadvisable and impracticable. People wondered from whence the Admiral had received this sudden illumination, as he had been quite of another opinion three days before. Then our General undertook the business; but he came to a quicker decision: doing in one day what Graves had taken three to do; that is, coming to a determination to send them, and a determination not to send them. Sending troops would have been doing something, therefore it went no further than an idea, as we were always better pleased when doing nothing. After all this preparation and exertion of wisdom, the vessel from Quebec was sent back expresses the 13th of October in the evening, to let Gen. Carleton know, that it was the decided opinion of General Howe and Admiral Graves, that it was impracticable for vessels with troops on board to get up the river St. Lawrence; but that vessels with *expresses* without any troops certainly might,

In his passage from Halifax to New York, he might have destroyed every thing that could float in all the rebels harbours, and yet have landed when he did, August 22d, on Long Island. By frequent landings on the coast, he would have weakened

T 2

Washington's

They do so; he flies, & receives mortifying dispatches.

Curious opinions for and against reinforcing Quebec.

Rebel shipping might have been destroyed.

Washington's army at New York, by the withdrawing of the New England men. Had this been done, the privateers that in the summer commanded the seas, would have been destroyed in embryo.

Original disposition of the Americans.

Commander's conduct.

Character of Lord and General Howe.

It is now necessary to bring forward Lord Howe, touching his negotiations. The body of the people of America, were loyal to the King, and affectionate to the mother country. These original and habitual dispositions prevailed over two thirds of the people, when Lord and General Howe met as commissioners at Staten Island. Men of genius and address, would soon have brought most of the provinces on our side. But the Howes for want of qualities to gain, or abilities to negotiate, confirmed all our enemies, and lost us most of our friends. At first, even Washington's army shewed a joy at the prospect of reuniting with Britain, and the people of the Provinces were praying for our appearance, and preparing to receive us with open arms; but before the campaign 1776 ended, our four manners, our want of capacity, and even of civility; an universal and indiscriminating scene of plunder, produced the most fatal effects, our enemies were rendered more inveterate, and our friends dreaded the approach of soldiers more than of rebels. This arose from the contrasted conduct of Generals Howe and Washington. Our army plundered. Washington retook twenty waggon loads at Trenton, and restored the whole to the proper owners without regard to their political creeds. It should be remarked, however, in justice to Sir William Howe, that he forbid plundering in orders, but he could not conceal his illiberal hatred to the American name; and officers and men continued a practice, which was thought no ways disagreeable to the commander in chief. But for this, plundering might have been prevented in the other parts of the army, as well as in the first brigade. Such conduct in our two brothers was rather the effect of weakness than of vice: they had in common the fullen family gloom: in one thing they differed: Sir William hated business, and never did any; my Lord loved business, dwelt upon it, and never could leave or end it. Their different passions and desires were equally destructive to us; all of which, joined to their injudicious, weak, and disgraceful operations, proved the ruin of the war. Their uniform character through life, has been, and is to this day, haughty, morose, hard hearted and inflexible; in general a composition of pride and personal courage, though this last phrase ought to be expunged for insensibility; on their first appointment, they were considered as the Horatii of the English state, but now a melancholy reverse of sentiment is felt; they are looked upon as our undoers, rather than our saviours.

The most sanguine wishers on the side of government, never even hoped for half the force to end the rebellion that the present

sent American minister employed. General Amherst's demand of twenty thousand men, had been considered as an extravagancy, and only made to answer the purpose of a refusal. General Howe had 40,870 effective men under his command. Let us see what use he made of them.

When he landed on Long Island, he neglected to seize the heights above Flat Bush; the rebels knew their importance, and took possession of them at three in the afternoon, which he might have done at ten in the morning. This neglect might have been fatal to him. He had nearly been induced to attack where he must have failed. But the enemy had their neglects too. Washington's order for securing the Jamaica road was not obeyed. General Howe, by a night march, occupied that pass; and unperceived by the enemy, got between their army on the heights and their lines. The rebels fled in the utmost disorder. Sullivan owned, that when he saw himself surrounded, he desired his men to shift for themselves. This they did with great expedition; and our troops were following the rebel fugitives into their lines, when they were with the utmost difficulty called back by the repeated orders of General Howe. Exclusive of the rebels who were routed, there were only 300 men with Putnam in their lines. There is not the least doubt but our soldiers would have carried them by storm; and in consequence, all the enemy's army on Long Island, consisting of 7000 men, must have been killed or taken.

General Robertson, in evidence, though he could not deny these facts, yet palliated the measure, by saying, he imagined General Howe could not know these circumstances, and that it was his opinion at the time, that General Howe did right in calling back the troops; but the matter is not what men of middling capacity might think or do. Would a great officer weighing what he might get and what he might lose, have recalled his troops from lines, which he himself was confident they would, had they been permitted, have stormed with success?

Without a single movement we lay three days in the face of these lines with 18,000 men eager for battle, and allowed the enemy to ferry themselves over to New York with all their baggage, though their place of embarkation was only a mile and a half from our camp. Lord Howe was equally supine; he lay almost within sight of the ferry, with the most numerous fleet ever seen in that part of the world, as if he had been sent to cover, rather than to cut off their retreat. Had the two brothers most earnestly desired that the rebel army should escape, it was impossible for them to have acted more properly for the effecting of such a purpose.

Though our commander was now in possession of the heights that commanded Governor's Island, he suffered 1500 rebels to go off without the least disturbance. They retired in such fright

Gen. Amherst's demand.

Interesting particulars of battle of Brooklyn.

Gen. Robertson palliates Gen. Howe's conduct

Conduct of Ld. & Gen. Howe.

Neglect Governor's Island.

Rebel retreat
might have
been cut off.

fright that they abandoned their cannon ; but two days after, finding we did not take possession, they returned and carried them off to New York. Our chief now composed himself for more than a fortnight, only amusing himself in erecting a battery against a gentleman's house on York Island, endeavouring to frighten the rebels with the noise of his cannon, but without doing them any harm. During this time he should have gone up the East River and cut off the rebel retreat by King's Bridge, while his Lordship with his parade fleet, should have occupied the North and East Rivers ; these plain and simple movements would *yet* have given us all Washington's army, and all the rebel ringleaders almost without firing a gun ; for they must have surrendered soon for want of provisions. In this case too we should have saved the 500 men lost before Fort Washington.

Odd situation on
Frog's neck.

But as we never were to be in the right, after giving the rebels 17 days to run away from New York, we crossed the ferry with the most pompous parade to take possession of it. Had we been *wise* and *active*, we might *yet* have cut off the retreat of the rebels, but four weeks were spent at Haerlem, and the opportunity lost, the rebels at last having discovered their dangerous situation. After so much delay, negligence, and blindness, we were now to do, when all opportunity was gone, what we ought to have done six weeks before. Our infallible Hero, above all good advice, and taking his own way, landed on Frog's Neck, October 12th, without ever thinking beforehand that it was necessary to reconnoitre the ground. The enemy having no intention to dispute this paltry slip of land with him, broke down the bridge that joined it to the main, and looked at him from their entrenchments on the opposite side with no little satisfaction : they had shut him out from the continent ; he was now fairly blocked up on the land side.

Ridiculous ob-
stinacy.

In this odd situation he had neither candor nor sense enough to confess his blunder, and then endeavour to remedy it. But spent another week cooped up on this pleasant spot, trying to convince the army that he was certainly in the right. With their situation before their eyes, and a full conviction of the folly that brought them there, all their respect for their commander could not make them swallow this absurdity. Heaven knows when he would have moved, had not the ridicule and murmurs of the army overcome for once his obstinacy, and sent him to sea again. Now indeed he landed near New Rochelle, the place he should originally have debarked at.

Slow march.

It has been justly observed, that in following our Hero's progress, our astonishment suffers no rest. Indolence and folly directed all our movements. In ten days we hardly march ten miles, though it was supposed the rebels were retreating. On the 28th, however, we find them waiting for us on the Bronx.

Two

Two regiments attack a detached corps of the enemy, and gain a material post. Another General would have pushed his good fortune, having an army superior in number, superior in discipline, in every point of equipment, and more than all these, victorious, against a beaten, disheartened, flying enemy. But we had done *active service* enough for one day. Next day, as at the heights of Dorchester last year, the enemy's lines *appeared* much strengthened, therefore the attack was deferred, till we were reinforced. Our reinforcement joined us the 30th. *Now* Enemy escapes. we were to attack the next day, but it happening to rain in the night and morning, this was sufficient excuse for putting it off a third time, though the day proved fair; and then the day after that, November 1st, to our *great surprise*, the enemy were run away. They left a rear guard within two miles of us to cover their retreat. This corps we did not think proper to attack. Such conduct will never put an end to any rebellion.

We now returned or retreated to York Island and stormed Fort Washington, in which the rebels had left upwards of 2000 men. It cost us 500. If our operations had been directed with any degree of judgment, we should have had this conquest with Washington and all his rebels at much less expence.

By our march back, or retreat, we abandoned all that part of the province of New York beyond King's Bridge. The rebels whom we had not thought worth pursuing, now pursued us, and ravaged the Chester counties, where we had been joy- Clergyman fully received, murdering the clergyman of Rye, for having murdered. been assiduous in strengthening the loyal principles of the inhabitants. In this respect our conduct has been constant and uniform, in urging our well wishers in America to public declarations of loyalty, and then abandoning them to persecution and death.

We should have intercepted the shattered remnant of the rebel army, by pushing a detachment over to Elizabeth Town or Amboy: our not doing it could only arise from ignorance, indolence, or a dread that the rebellion would be too short. And again Lord Cornwallis's halt at Brunswick, for want of orders, when in sight of these same wretched fugitives, little more than 2000 men, whilst he had with him the reserve of our army, the very flower of our troops, nearly double the rebel strength, is a strong instance of a deficiency somewhere, and another decisive opportunity rejected. Through indolence of manoeuvre Again the re- our Hero did not come up till six days after the enemies escape. bels escape. For some days he looked at them across the Delaware, and on December 14th put his troops into winter quarters in an extended line of cantonment of near a 100 miles, in open villages, without a single work to cover them. The pleasures of New-York now attracted us; and in 12 days we were defeated at Trenton. But the mind cannot dwell on this shameful transaction;

Trenton defeat; faction; Rhall has been blamed because he is dead; and per-
the dead blam'd. haps, the brave Donop has been cited as a proof of the charge,
because he too is dead.

The defeats at Trenton and Prince Town broke up our cantonments, and lost us the whole Jerseys except three villages. During the remainder of the winter our foraging parties were attacked and shot down wherever they presented themselves; and these petty, disgraceful conflicts, lost us more men than a general engagement. Our Commander paid us one visit and was in great danger of being killed or taken prisoner; he had a very hard ride for his escape.

Strong & pointed saying of Gen. Vaughan.

This winter Gen. Vaughan, a very gallant officer, and remarkable for his strong and pointed sayings, being asked his opinion on the ensuing campaign, replied with great promptitude and conciseness, "*I am for the most vigorous measures: I am not for nursing a rebellion.*" I believe his opinion was never again asked, and he has been left to amuse himself the best way he can at New York.

Despondence & execration on deserting Burgoyne.

In the spring and summer it is impossible for the mind of man to conceive the gloom and resentment of the army, on the retreat from the Jerseys, and the shipping them to the southward: nothing but being present and seeing the countenances of the soldiers, could give an impression adequate to the scene; or paint the astonishment and despair that reigned in New York, when it was found, that the North River was deserted, and Burgoyne's army abandoned to its fate. All the former opportunities lost through indolence or rejected through design, appeared innocent when compared with this fatal movement. The ruinous and dreadful consequences were instantly foreseen and foretold; and despondence or execration filled every mouth.

Had there been no Canada army to desert or to sacrifice, the voyage to the southward could only originate from the most profound ignorance or imbecility.

Army in fetters at Philadelphia.

To run away from, and consequently to ruin the people who had submitted in the Jerseys, as he had formerly served those of the Chester counties, could have no other effect than that of fixing on our standards the character of destructive idiotism, or knavery: to fly before Washington was depressing the spirit of our own troops, and giving a triumph to the enemy: to fly from the scene where he ought to have acted, and with a land army undertake a six weeks voyage in the very heart of the campaign, are certainly absurdities even too extravagant for a fairy tale: Above all, to go to Philadelphia, which every corporal could have told him would be putting his army in fetters.—His conduct has verified this opinion.—He never dared to move a days march from it: It was a cord about his neck.

As to the Brandywine manœuvres so much idolized by his partizans,

partizans, any boy at a military academy can repeat them out of Saxes Reveries; and from the same source can add to them, ^{manœuvres from} ^{Saxe's Reveries.} "That not to prosecute a victory and pursue your enemy to the utmost in your power is founded on a false principle: that 10,000 men in pursuit are sufficient to overthrow a 100,000 in retreat: that no manœuvres can fail but those that take up time and give respite to the enemy: that a regular retreat is impracticable, unless a conqueror is guilty of *remissness*; ^{Saxe's opinion of remiss Generals.} but that generals avoid these decisive opportunities, from an unwillingness to put an end to the war." It is a known truth, people present at the engagement rode to Philadelphia that very night; that the rebel congress were then assembled in that town; and that a spirited march of a detachment from the division of our army that passed Chad's Ford, and were not fatigued as that part which marched on our left, might have surprised the whole rebel conclave: at least would have gained possession of all the rebel magazines. Instead of a movement so very plain and rational, the whole army hardly moved at all, for even our most forward detachment was 15 days in reaching Philadelphia. Whereas had a detachment the night of the battle been pushed forward to Philadelphia; and ~~our~~ ^{any} army or another strong detachment moved briskly in pursuit of the fugitive rebels, their army for that year would have been undone. So far from that happening, we suffered another blockade in Philadelphia all winter, by a ragged contemptible enemy not half our force: Our Hero has a passion for being blockaded. In 1775 we were blockaded in Boston: in 1776 in New York and three Jersey villages: In 1777 in Philadelphia.

At German Town, Washington was forced to seek him in his own camp: we were completely surprised. He, it is said was not to be seen: he was deeply engaged somewhere, or with somebody: he was not to be disturbed: and if General Grant had not forced his way to him, he would have known nothing of the battle but by report: yet he could tell his bravest men, the British light infantry, who had been fought down by the whole rebel army, with that harsh insensibility so characteristic in him, "that they ought to have remained in their post, and been cut to pieces on the spot." In this affair we lost our baggage, and had not the gallant Musgrave thrown himself into a stone house, which was very strong, its likely our active Hero might have been surprised in bed. ^{Howe surprised.} ^{His harsh speech.}

Such dreadful conduct could operate in no other manner than it did: that is, in bringing destruction upon England, and a load of disgrace upon himself. On the 18th of October, the rebel cannon announced the ruin of Burgoyne: appalled, and ^{Hears of Burgoyne's ruin & retreats.} conscience-struck, and trembling for himself, instant orders were given to retreat, and he led us back to hide his head in Philadelphia. There, after three days tumult of mind, he wrote his letter

And resigns.

letter of resignation; finding THAT, the only resource left him to parry his sacrifice of Burgoyne; to extricate himself from the unmilitary position in which he had involved himself; and to ward off from himself, if possible, under a quarrel with the ministry, all blame of the ignominy and ruin he had brought upon his country.

Our immense losses.

The consequences of this man's unaccountably weak and wretched conduct are, thirty thousand brave men destroyed, thirty millions of money expended; thirteen provinces lost; and a war with the whole House of Bourbon.

If such misconduct is to pass without censure or punishment, there must be a radical weakness, either in the constitution of the state, or in the minds of the people, and the total dissolution of this empire must be fast approaching: for the people who sit in patient stupidity, and see themselves become the victims of ignorance or treachery, cannot, and do not deserve to exist as a nation.



